

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A

SKETCH OF THE WAR,

TIPPOO SULTAUN.

A

SKETCH OF THE WAR,

WITH

TIPPOO SULTAUN;

OR,

A DETAIL OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES AT THE LINES OF TRAVANCORE IN DECEMBER, 1789, UNTIL THE PEACE CONCLUDED BEFORE SERINGAPATAM, IN FEBRUARY, 1792.

IN TWO VOLUMES.




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BY

RODERICK MACKENZIE,

LIEUTENANT 52d. REG.

Sic vos ——— non vobis.



VOLUME SECOND.

CALCUTTA:
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1794.

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ERRATA

ERRATA.

Page 69, for "eight Bombay battalions," *read* eighth Bombay battalion.
— 89, for "northeaſt," *read* ſouthweſt.
— 157, for "Tookagee," *read* Ragogee.
— 159, for "fittn," *read* fitting.

GLOSSARY.

GLOSSARY.

AHMEDI, of, or belonging to Ahmed, or Mahomed.

Badjerah, a ſmall grain of Hindoſtan.

Badſhah, king.

Baugh, a garden.

Bazar, a market place.

Binjarah, people who live by tranſporting the produce of one country to another, over land.

Buckſhee, a pay-maſter.

Cawn, or *Khan*, when applied to man, is a title of rank:—vide Richardſon's Dictionary.

Choulum, a ſmall grain of Myſore.

Dawlet, riches.

Doll, or *Dall*, ſplit vetches.

Droog, a fortified hill.

Durbar, the hall of audience; a court; levee room.

Eadgah, the place ſet apart for ſolemniſing the feſtivals of Eaſter, the Paſſover, and of the ſacrifices at Mecca.

Gee, a ſort of butter made from the mik of buffaloes.

Gram, a kind of pea, or vetch.

Juary, a grain of Hindoſtan.

Laul, red.

Maund, a certain weight; it is of forty ſeers in Bengal, but of 12 at Madras, and varies at different places.

Moody,

Moody, ſhop-keeper; grain-merchant; grain-market

Nachine, a ſmall grain of Myſore.

Paddy, unhuſked rice.

Pagoda, Hindoo temple; place of worſhip; alſo a gold coin, in value about eight ſhillings ſterling.

Seer, uſually the 40th part of a maund.

Shebir, or properly, *Sheh'r*, a city.

Sirkar, government; principal manager; from *ſir*, head, and *kar*, buſineſs.

Sirraf, money-changer; banker.

Tattoos, an inferior ſpecies of horſes.

Tom Tom, an Indian drum.

Tope, a clump of wood; a grove.

A

SKETCH

OF THE WAR WITH

TIPPOO SULTAUN.

CHAPTER THE FIRST.

THE operations carried on againſt Tippoo Sultaun have been detailed in a former volume, until the arrival of the Britiſh forces in the neighbourhood of Vellout, a village at which the campaign under Major General Medows came to a cloſe(1), and diſtant from Fort St. George about eighteen miles. Here, after detaching the advance, with the exception of Stevenſon's regiment, to the Eaſtward of Poonamalee, in order to keep our communication with the Preſidency open, the troops reſted from the 27th January 1791, until the 5th of the enſuing month. During this ſhort interval, the ſeveral depart-

(1) This period is conſidered a concluſion to the firſt campaign; not that the army quitted the field, or entered into quarters, as in other countries; nor on account of any inclemency of weather or alteration in the ſeaſons; but becauſe the whole, after a total change in the plan of attack, took a new departure from the Carnatic, with freſh equipments and under a different commander.

ments were occupied in completing their equipments for a ſervice, which, from the evident diſinclination of the enemy to give battle, promiſed honour to the Britiſh troops more from perſeverance and a patient endurance of hardſhip, than from any advantages that could be obtained in the field.

THROUGHOUT the Carnatic military preparations forwarded by all deſcriptions of people might be ſeen in every direction. Fourteen hundred Bengal volunteer ſepoys, ſoon after their arrival on the coaſt, received inſtructions to proceed to camp, and to eſcort a reinforcement for the park, conſiſting of eleven eighteen pounders, ſix iron twelves, eight mortars, with an ample proportion of ammunition and a variety of other ſtores, all under the direction of Colonel Patrick Duff of the Bengal artillery; recruits and recovered men belonging to the army, were directed to join their reſpective corps from Madras, Poonamalee, and other adjacent ſtations without loſs of time; the ſick, all the braſs twelve pounders, with whatſoever was judged unneceſſary among the immenſe quantity of baggage and ſtores already collected, were ordered into Fort St. George; the ſervants of that government, as well as of its ſeveral dependencies, whether civil or military, vied with each other in forwarding the public ſervice; nor was the Nabob of the Carnatic altogether deficient in demonſtration of zeal, although circumſcribed by deranged finances. Upwards of three hundred troopers, tolerably accoutred, (of which number one hundred and twenty eight were mounted) detached from his own guards, diſcovered inclinations warm

in

in the Britiſh intereſt. Three elephants with twenty camels enhanced the value of this ſupply. The Nabob's troopers, however, backward in diſcipline, were ſtill leſs ſerviceable from the mean quality and wretched condition of their horſes.

AFTER being formed into battalions headed by Captains Hyndman and Welſh, the Bengal volunteers were ſupplied with two ſix pounders to each corps, and ordered to ſtrengthen the brigades which their countrymen already compoſed; ſome alterations that tended to the improvement of bazars for the native infantry, were recommended to the commandants of battalions on the coaſt eſtabliſhment (1); the twelve pounders ſent to Fort St. George were replaced by an equal number of ſix pounders from that garriſon; commanding officers of regiments were directed to complete their arms, accoutrements, ſtores and camp equipage, to the extent for which they had means of conveyance; pay and allowances for the troops were iſſued to the firſt of the enſuing month, at the exchange of three hundred and ſixty-five rupees for every hundred pagodas; and, the followers were repeatedly cautioned to furniſh themſelves with a ſupply of proviſions, ſufficient for a conſumption of at leaſt twenty days (2).

(1) *G. O. 31ſt Jan.* 1791. My Lord Cornwallis is deſirous that all the Native corps ſhall have Bazars attached to them upon the ſame principle as is regulated for the Bengal native corps, as ſoon as their commanding officers ſhall report themſelves prepared to carry the arrangement into execution. His Lordſhip is convinced that the conveniency to corps from a regulation of this kind, and the advantage that will be derived from it to the ſervice at large, will occaſion immediate exertion in the officers at the head of the coaſt native corps. They are directed to report to the adjutant general as ſoon as they have compleated their arrangements for regimental bazars. — Lieutenant Buſhby being the ſuperintendant with the Bengal bazars with the army, will be ready to give them every information they may require on this ſubject.

(2) *G. O.* 1ſt February, 1791. Parole, The Prince of Wales.—For the day tomorrow Lieutenant Colonel Dupont—next for duty Major Skelly.—Followers are cautioned to provide themſelves with twenty days rice from the 3d of this month. Field officers of engineers and artillery being ſufficiently employed in their own branch of the ſervice, are not to take the daily duty of the line. Lieutenant Colonel Giels will ſuperintend and direct the artillery and ordnance of the right wing, Major Moorehouſe of the left, Major Woodburn of the heavy park, and Major Montague of the advance. Lieutenant F. Caper is permitted to ſerve as volunteer with the Cavalry. Empty money tumbrils to be ſent to Madras. Piquets and guards not to change their front to pay military honours. All piquets and guards are to be informed that Lord Cornwallis diſpenſes with their turning out when he paſſes, and that centries are not to reſt to his Lordſhip.

WHILST

WHILST the army was thus ſtrengthened by men, money, bullocks, and ſtores from different directions, but principally from Bengal, Major General Medows continued at Madras, diſcharging duties of a judicial nature, annexed to his appointment as Governor, that could not be carried on by any delegation of power; reinforced from the ſtations to the northward, Fort St. George, with all the troops remaining in the Carnatic, were given in charge to Major General Muſgrave, during the abſence of Earl Cornwallis and General Medows; and, as the Sultaun ſtill continued his ravages on the Southern diſtricts of the Carnatic, he certainly aimed at enticing his opponents into their former ſyſtem of purſuit (1). Conſcious, from the preparations going forward, that he could not at this period procure an advantageous peace, he wiſhed to divert Earl Cornwallis from his deſigns on Myſore; and as delay muſt have been fatal to the cauſe of Britain, nearly in the ſame proportion with failure or defeat, he wiſhed to protract the war, well knowing, that in this event, his purpoſes would be anſwered, not leſs from the difficulty of ſubſiſting the multitude againſt whom he had to contend, than from the eaſe with which the experience of former times taught him to imagine he could looſen the bands that united the native branches of the confederacy. Diſappointment, however, appears to have attended all his expectations from the inſtant that the Governor General perſonally undertook the charge of the war.

AT whatever period Earl Cornwallis determined to abandon the invaſion of Myſore from the Coimbatore diſtrict, for a length of time

(1) A ſummons from the Sultaun, accompanied by the appearance of the whole Myſorean force, about this period, threw the inhabitants of Cuddalore into the utmoſt conſternation; ſome eſcaped along bye paths to the ſouthward, ſome concealed themſelves in their godowns, whilſt the greater part, quitting their habitations, made the beſt of their way in boats to Madras. However on the very firſt intelligence of Earl Cornwallis's movement towards Myſore, the Sultaun decamped without waiting an anſwer to this ſummons.

after

after his arrival at Madras, an idea of his joining the army at Trichinopoly, and of entering the enemy's country by the Guzzlehatty paſs, was deſignedly circulated. His Lordſhip, however little he fluctuated in reality, ſtrengthened this idea both by converſation and arrangements. Although occaſional circumſtances of neceſſity diſcovered the real deſign in ſome degree, ſtill, the intention of moving the troops from Trichinopoly to the vicinity of Fort St. George, was not known by any part of the army, until the orders for marching were about to be iſſued. It is now evident that the Britiſh General at an early period "determined, inſtead of proſecuting the plan of a "ſouthern invaſion, to penetrate by the paſſes that lead from the "centre of the Carnatic, and to commence operations with the ſieges "of Ouſſore, and Bangalore, unleſs Tippoo ſhould reſolve to hazard "an action, and its event ſhould render it expedient to take other "meaſures" (2). But on this alternative, which riſked abſolute ruin, whilſt it promiſed little hopes of ſucceſs, the Sultaun did not think proper to venture.

The advance having joined the army by break of day on the 5th February, the whole was immediately put in motion (3) in a weſterly direction, and proceeding by eaſy marches, paſſed Parumbaucum and Pollilore, ſituations rendered famous in hiſtory by misfortunes, and marked as claſſical ground from the defeat of Colonel Baillie, and the deſtruction of his army; and for an action between Hyder and Sir

(2) Earl Cornwallis to the right honorable W. W. Grenville, 28th December, 1790.

(3) General Medows will act as general at the head of the line, and he will aſſiſt Lord Cornwallis in forming plans of operations, in arranging the marches, and in conducting the general detail of the army.—*G. O.* 5th February, 1791.

Eyre

Eyre Coote, in which if the latter was not put to the route, he certainly could boaſt of no material advantage. Shulangur, the ſcene of another action between theſe warriors, being alſo left to the right, the whole arrived at Vellore (1) after a march of ſix days, impeded but little either by the train or ſtores, and not at all by the enemy. A ſmall party of horſe, however, that watched the motions of the army, contrived to carry off ſeveral bullocks, a few bandies, and ſome ſepoys that ſtraggled from the line.

ORDERS of march, however minutely deſcribed, ſeldom convey much ſerviceable information, or afford ſatisfaction to the generality of readers. Varying daily with the nature of the country, and adapting poſitions to the probable ſituation of the enemy, and other caſual circumſtances, when the vaſt multitude of followers and immenſe quantity of baggage is taken into conſideration, there was leſs confuſion and loſs than could reaſonably have been expected (2). But as outlines ſeldom tire, it may be obſerved, that the rules practiſed by the army during the former part of the war were put in force on this occaſion. The cavalry, with the exception of one regiment ordered for the rear guard, ſtrengthened by a regiment of the Company's Europeans, and two battalions of ſepoys, with their proportion of guns, moved in advance; flanked on the left by the relieving piquets

									Miles	*Fur.*
(1) 1791. Feb.	5th.	Caukilore,	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	—
	6th.	Parambaucum,	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	—
	7th.	Pollilore, —	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	4
	9th.	Alumpauk,	—	—	—	—	—	—	13	—
	10th.	Lallpett,	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	—
	11th.	Near Vellore,	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	—

(2) Beſides elephants, camels, buffaloes, and other beaſts of burden employed by individuals, the contractors for the public departments alone ſtarted from Vellout, with at leaſt a ſupply of forty thouſand bullocks; cattle for ſlaughter, with large ſpeculations by individuals of various complexions, contributed alſo to render this an unwieldy maſs, incapable of order.

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the park followed (3); the infantry marching in general by columns of half companies, with their ſeveral quarter guards, and inlying piquets on the ſame flank, next ſucceeded; the baggage, covered by the Pullicat hills from the north, moved on the right of the whole in perfect ſecurity, the enemy being to the ſouthward; and two battalions of ſepoys, that compoſed the piquets of both wings, ſupported by the regiment of cavalry already mentioned, brought up the rear.

No occurrence that will be deemed of an extraordinary nature by ſuch as are accuſtomed to the wiles of dubaſhes, and Eaſtern hirelings, took place during the march; but, thoſe who never had intercourſe with this race of men, and whoſe ears have been dinned with the ſympathetic epithets of "innocent natives", "injured people", will be aſtoniſhed to hear that many hundreds of the camp followers accumulated fortunes within twenty miles of Fort St. George, by the moſt ſhameful and barefaced plunder that ever took place in any civilized country, to the diſgrace of the Madras police, which wanted energy to ſtop this flagrant, licentious, and dangerous abuſe (4). To ſuch a height did theſe dextrous thieves carry their ravages, that many officers who had pro-

(3) The advance piquets coming on duty will march in future on the flank of the heavy park, inſtead of drawing a battalion from the line for that duty. They are to be formed in front of wings at aſſembly beating, and to move up as ſoon as formed to the flank of the park, where the field officer of the day will receive them, and give the further neceſſary orders. The captains will march with their piquets, but the field officer of the day is to move with the advance, as ſoon as the line is marked out; the piquets will form in the front of wings reſpectively, and there wait the orders of the field officer of the day. — Lieutenant Colonel Moorhouſe is poſted to the heavy park, and Major Woodburn to the left wing. *G O*, 6th Feb. 1791.

(4) I underſtand, that the want of a police at Madras has been an object of preſentment at every ſeſſion, for upwards of twenty years, and that a plan ſuggeſted by Mr. Popham, the Company's ſollicitor, had been brought forward during Sir Archibald Campbell's adminiſtration, but, unfortunately for the projector, and the community, General Campbell reſigned the government before this plan was thoroughly eſtabliſhed. The conſequence is, that impoſition ſtill prevails, much to the inconvenience of all perſons in moderate ſituations of life, and to the ſerious prejudice of Mr. Popham, whoſe extenſive bazars are ſtill unoccupied, though built in a neat ſubſtantial manner, and centrally ſituated. I cannot do juſtice to this gentleman's exertions in a ſhort note, and therefore refer my readers to an addreſs he has lately publiſhed, to the proprietors of India ſtock, detailing his ſervices, and abounding with ſo much local information as muſt eſſentially aſſiſt thoſe who may have the arrangement of any future ſyſtem of reform in the Madras police.

vided

vided themſelves with ſupplies for a campaign of ſix months, were to be ſeen without a ſingle article of comfort or nouriſhment, on their arrival at Caukilore, the firſt ground of encampment. On this occaſion no rank, no ſtation, not even the commander-in-chief, was permitted to proceed without loſs.

During a ſhort halt in the Vellore diſtrict, the ſick of the army were ordered into the fort, and ſeveral other arrangements took place. A reinforcement of two twenty-four with one eighteen pounder, as alſo a quantity of grain, was drawn out of that garriſon; to the carriage of five days proviſion for the Europeans, and of ten for the native troops, both conſented without a murmur (1). The 21ſt Coaſt battalion, left by General Medows in Arnee, joined the army here; and a battalion of Coaſt ſeapoys, the 23d, ordered towards Amboor, with which much baggage ſtrayed, confirmed the Sultaun in an opinion which he for ſome time cheriſhed, that it was the intention of our General to aſcend the ghauts, either by the Padnagdirgum paſs, or through the Barahmahl valley. It was in this perſuaſion that he haſtened through the entrance at Changama, to oppoſe our aſcent; but the diſtance between that and Muglee rendered all attempts at oppoſition abortive.

From Vellore, the army, turning of a ſudden to the right, ſtruck immediately into the Pollums, and for ſeveral days continued marching amongſt rocks, jungles, and eminences which were formerly reckoned impenetrable for cannon, and where horſe can never act. After

(1) *G. O. 12th Feb. 1791.*— Lord Cornwallis is highly pleaſed with the willingneſs which the troops ſhewed to carry an extra quantity of proviſions, to promote the grand object of the war. His Lordſhip's approbation of this additional proof of their zeal is to be communicated to the troops in the ſtrongeſt terms.

forming

forming into two diſtinct diviſions (2), one under the immediate command of Earl Cornwallis, lightly equipped, advanced at break of day on the 14th, leaving the other to follow at leiſure, with the train, under the guidance of Major General Medows. During the whole of this day's march there was no diverſity of ſcene; one rugged jungle terminated the view whereſoever the eye was directed; no veſtige of cultivation could be traced; ſtill nothing that bore reſemblance to thoſe tremendous ghauts deſcribed in ſuch lively colours by Major Rennel, Doctor Thomſon, and others, was to be ſeen.

On the 15th the whole again proceeded, moving with wonderful expedition, conſidering the weight of the train, and vaſt quantity of ſtores that was conducted through thick jungles, interſected by many deep ravines and ſloughs. The appearance of the country varied but little from that on the day before; but ſo confined were the roads, that the firſt diviſion, after ſending the reſerve ſome diſtance in front, was neceſſitated to encamp on two pieces of ground ſeparate from each other; the ſecond remained ſome miles in the rear.

On the following day both diviſions paſſed Chittore, a fort alternately in poſſeſſion of the contending powers during the former war. In ſhape this fort is nearly ſquare, and conſtructed with ſo little judgment as to be commanded by many of the adjacent heights. It was at this period in a ſtate perfectly ruinous, and although moſt of the inha-

(2) *G. O. 13th Feb.* 1791.— The army marches in two diviſions tomorrow: Lord Cornwallis will take the immediate command of the firſt, which is to be compoſed of the advance, the firſt regiment of native cavalry excepted, and the firſt and third brigades. The ſecond diviſion will be commanded by Major General Medows, and is to conſiſt of the left wing, the 4th brigade, and the regiment of cavalry, with the heavy park, and all the ſtores and proviſions of the army, except ſuch proportion as will be directed to move with the firſt diviſion. — Information has been ſignified twice this day, by beat of tom tom, that the followers are to provide themſelves with grain, ſo as to march from the preſent ground ſupplied for twenty days, and as much more as they can carry: this order is to be ſtrictly attended to.

bitants had abandoned their homes, ſuch was the plentiful ſtate of the country, and the confidence of thoſe who continued their occupations, that grain, poultry, and gram were to be purchaſed at a cheaper rate than offered afterwards throughout the war. Gram ſold at forty ſeer for a rupee during our march through the Pollums; rice at from twenty five to thirty.

STILL continuing to advance, on the 17th the firſt diviſion obtained ſight of the paſs, which preſented nothing to be dreaded in aſcent. Although the face of the ghauts is wholly covered by jungles, the perpendicular height in this quarter does not exceed nine hundred feet, and that neither ſteep nor ſtony. The nature of the ground, too, was ſo well humoured in conſtructing the road, that with the aſſiſtance of an elephant and a few men to each gun and carriage, the whole was got up in a very inconſiderable ſpace of time. Indeed in ruggedneſs, in ſteepneſs, or in height, the Mugley paſs bears no compariſon at all to that of Tapoor. Major Gowdie, with the infantry of the reſerve, being the firſt diviſion that aſcended, took poſt on the 17th at the top of the hills, whilſt the army encamped in a well cultivated valley at bottom (1). On the 19th the Commander in Chief, with his diviſion aſcended alſo, and by the 21ſt the whole army was encamped in Myſore (2), without firing one ſhot ſince their departure from Vellout.

(1) *G. O. 17th Feb.* 1791.—Parole, Liverpool.—For the day tomorrow Major Skelly; next for duty Lieutenant Colonel Cockerell. The army halts tomorrow. Major Montague, with the guns of the 9th brigade, and with the 27th battalion of native infantry, to join this brigade at the head of the paſs tomorrow morning: they will ſtrike tents at revalie beating, and march off as ſoon as poſſible.

(2) March of the army in two Diviſions, as already noticed:

Route of the firſt diviſion:

			Miles.	Furlongs.
February	14	Chittapelly,	12	4
	15	S. E. Chittore,	8	4
	16	Maſſamoodrum,	7	—
	17	Muglee,	14	4
	19	Paſſmanair,	8	—

FROM

FROM the village of Palmanair, the firſt ground occupied by our army after their aſcent, the hills to the Northward and Weſtward form a grand and pictureſque view. This place with other villages for ſeveral miles further in advance, is under the ſupremacy of the Nabob of Arcot, the land being rated in the collectorſhip of Vellore. Although the diſtricts at the top of the ghauts are rocky and mountainous, they have in many inſtances very liberal gifts from nature. The whole face of the country, except where it is overgrown with thickets and jungles, is interſected with natural or artificial ſtreams, and conſequently is friendly to the growth of corn. Great quantities of water, too, are conſtantly collected in tanks around the bottoms of the hills, ſo that large tracts of land in high cultivation, are eaſily inundated at every ſeaſon of the year. Theſe diſtricts are peopled by Poligars of various deſcriptions, who, notwithſtanding their fealty to the Sovereign of the Carnatic, range in tribes under ſeparate leaders. Their manners are truly feudal. Rejecting ſoft and effeminate amuſements, their warlike diſpoſitions are legible in their countenances. They pay obedience to no law but the will of their immediate ruler. Their diſtance from the ſuperior Lord, prevents attendance at his durbar, and conſequently transfers their allegiance to the Poligar Chief, who, living in the midſt of them, is ever ready to adjuſt internal animoſities, or, to avenge foreign inſults. At the diſplay of his banner danger has taught them the neceſſity of pre-

Route of the Second diviſion.

14	Marapetty,	8 - 4
15	Tadapadoo,	5 - 4
16	Chittore,	11 - 4
18	Inkatagheria,	10 —
19	Muglee,	7 —
20	Pallmanair,	8 —

paration

paration for defence; the ſound of the conque proclaims the approach of that danger throughout the diſtrict; and a circular citadel of conſiderable height that riſes in the centre of each village, and to which they invariably flock, is ſtrongly characteriſtick of their habits and fears. Here they hoard up grain to provide againſt famine and ſcarcity; here they depoſit their valuable effects when they proceed againſt a diſtant foe; here they aſſemble for mutual defence when attacked by ſuperior force; and, as their country is naturally fertile and ſtrong, theſe rude fortifications would never have been built but for the apprehenſion of danger and the frequency of commotion.

It would appear, that the terrace of Myſore declines towards the extremity of the peninſula, as well as towards the eaſtern boundary. The rivers in general, riſing near the ſummits of the Malabar ghauts, or on the tops of the loftieſt mountains, in their courſe wind to the ſouthward: and as they all empty themſelves into the ſea on the Coromandel Coaſt, it is evident that the weſtern range is conſiderably higher than the other. The plains, too, on the Carnatic ſide, decline as you approach to the ſouthward in a proportion ſtill greater than the table land; conſequently, the more ſouthern the paſſes, the more the perpendicular height from the bottom to the terrace. It is on this principle, alſo, that the extraordinary fertility of the diſtricts to the ſouthward of the Coleroon, and the great capability of improvement, can be accounted for with moſt probability of correctneſs.

The ſecrecy that covered the deſigns of Earl Cornwallis contributed in a high degree to the brilliancy of the ſucceſs that attended his arms. So ſudden the movement from Vellout, and ſo unexpected the route from Vellore, that when the diſtance between

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the entrance by Changama and the Mugley paſs is taken into conſideration, all poſſibility of the Sultaun's collecting a force ſufficient to oppoſe our aſcent was done away. Indeed, ſuch was the ardour throughout every department, that no difficulty could obſtruct our progreſs, eſpecially with ſo decided a ſuperiority of diſcipline. Such exertions muſt ever ſurmount all diſadvantages, and reap the fruit of patient perſeverance in the end.

WHILST at Palmanair, proviſions for the troops and followers were to be purchaſed in the utmoſt abundance, and at a rate nearly as reaſonable as in the Pollums. Here ſeveral hundred brinjaries, driving bullocks, aſſes, and buffaloes, laden with rice and other grain, that joined our army, could find no purchaſer; they were, however, induced to follow the camp, by aſſurance of protection, and a ready ſale whenever the followers expended their ſtores, and before any conſumption from the public ſtock ſhould be admitted. Their confidence met the merited attention. It was here alſo, that the elephants from Bengal made their appearance, eſcorted by Lieutenant Macdonald and a ſmall party of troops from that eſtabliſhment. Sixty four of thoſe noble animals, all, excepting five, in high order, facilitated the enſuing marches. Beyond all deſcriptions of cattle, the elephants are uſeful in the movements of Indian armies. Sagacious, powerful, and hardy, they travel for a greater length of time, and carry a greater weight than any other animal; beſides that they feed on grain of any kind, or on whatſoever nouriſhes horſes or bullocks; branches and leaves of trees ſerve them for provender: in ſhort, whilſt their ſervices are more beneficial, their wants are more eaſily ſatisfied than thoſe of any other beaſts of burthen. Thus ſupplied, independent

dent of what was carried by the brinjarries, the whole army was ready to ſtart, with proviſions ſufficient for a conſumption of at leaſt forty-five days.

AMONGST the Polygar chiefs that paid their reſpects and offered ſervices to Earl Cornwallis whilſt in this neighbourhood, Chiel Naig and the chief of Punganore were the moſt conſpicuous. Mounted, and armed with pikes and ſpears, each leader was attended by a groteſque group of adherents firmly attached to his intereſt, but without order or dicipline. The want of union amongſt theſe tribes, ſubjects each individual branch to every adventurous warrior that chuſes to viſit their diſtrict with artillery. Their villages, although abundantly protected by hedges and mud walls againſt the depredations of horſe, are utterly unprovided againſt cannon; conſequently, they ſeldom remain in a ſtate of vaſſalage to one prince for any length of time; indeed they frequently acknowledge no ſuperior at all. The particulars of one amongſt them, will, with ſome allowance for occaſional variations, lead towards forming a ſufficient acquaintance with the whole.

ABOUT forty years ago the chief of Punganore paid fealty to the rajah of Cuddapah. Some time afterwards this rajah yielding to Nizam Ally Khan, transferred to his Highneſs the homage he had juſt acquired. The ſubadar of Decan in his turn had to ſurrender the ſuperiority of Punganore, and many other valuable diſtricts, to the Maratta ſtates; and it is not above ſix years ſince that turbulent people were compelled to abandon the whole of their uſurpations near the ghauts, before the all-graſping power of Tippoo Sultaun. The activity and valour of Chiel Naig, the other Polygar chief, notwith-

withſtanding a far greater viciſſitude of fortune, renders him even at this period rather an ally than a vaſſal to the Eaſt India Company.

AT the top of the ghauts ſome alterations were directed, both in the arrangement of the march, and encampment. The cavalry, after ſending a regiment to cover the baggage, proceeded to the flank on which the army was prepared to form, and preſerving a diſtance of about two thouſand feet, advanced parallel to the head of the column. In the event of an attack, this corps formed the reſerve, and on all occaſions, from the preſent period, encamped in the rear of the centre (1). All the iron twelve-pounders were at the ſame time ordered from the park, and attached to European regiments.

AFTER muſtering the bullocks, and diſtributing the elephants, except a few that were allotted for the park and head quarters, amongſt the ſeveral European corps (2), the army marched towards Bangalore on the twenty fourth, at day-break, in three columns. The infantry moved in the centre, with the artillery on their right, and cavalry on their left, flank. The villages, which were numerous, and defended as already repeatedly deſcribed, were totally abandoned by their inhabitants; great quantities of grain and forage, collected in granaries, or heaped up in ſtacks, ſtrongly indicated high

(1) *G. O. February* 22, 1791.—The army will continue to encamp in the order that is cuſtomary, with the exception of the cavalry and brigade of infantry which is placed under Lieutenant Colonel Floyd. This corps is to encamp in the rear of the centre of the line, and will in future be called the reſerve. The order of march will be only materially altered in reſpect of the corps commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Floyd, who after ſending regiments to flank the baggage & form the rear guard, as uſual, and two troops as an advanced guard at the head of the column, will march with the two three pounders from a quarter to half a mile's diſtance from, and keeping his front nearly oppoſite to the head of the line, on the flank on which the army is prepared to form. Patroles and flanking parties will be detached, according to the nature of the country.

(2) *G. O. February* 22, 1791.— The elephants and their keepers, being placed under the general controul and ſuperintendance of Lieutenant Sandys, the commanding officers of corps are directed to make their repreſentations to him, when any occur, reſpecting the ſtate of the elephants

culti-

cultivation, mild management, and conſequent happineſs; and extenſive tanks in every direction afforded an abundant ſupply of water.

CONTINUING our march next day, the licentious behaviour of our followers was the cauſe of more vexation to Earl Cornwallis, and of concern to every lover of diſcipline, than any occurrence of a ſimilar nature that offered throughout the war. Many of the principal inhabitants in this diſtrict approached the Commander in Chief to take coule at the very inſtant their villages blazed to aſhes. Parties of horſe were diſpatched in every direction, to ſeize the perpretrators of ſuch wanton miſchief; but the abuſe, once begun, raged without the poſſibility of a check, even for the day. The vaſt tract over which the followers extended, rendered it impoſſible for them to know the motives that actuated the firſt culprits; nor were the horſe able to communicate the deteſtation which theſe ravages occaſioned, to a proportion of one in the hundred; ſo that many conſidered the deſtruction meritorious. Thus, a ſtrict General, at the head of an army diſciplined equal to any on earth, was neceſſitated to witneſs an evil, which, although it galled him to the ſoul (1), he could not for a time correct. Of all curſes impoſed by a wiſe Providence on the human race, this certainly is amongſt the worſt.

PUNISHMENT, the only magiſtrate that can awe an Hindoo, prevented a repetition of this diſgrace; for, nine of the principal leaders, being clearly convicted, they were executed on the following day, in the moſt conſpicuous ſituation of as many bazars. After a tedious

(1) *G. O. 26th February*, 1791.—Lord Cornwallis has too high an opinion of the zeal, honour, and public ſpirit of the officers of the army, to doubt for a moment that every individual amongſt them felt the ſame concern and indignation that he did himſelf at the ſhocking and diſgraceful outrages that were committed on the laſt march. His Lordſhip now calls, in the moſt ſerious manner, for the active aſſiſtance of every officer in the army, and particularly thoſe commanding flanking parties, advance and rear guards, to put a ſtop to this ſcene of horror; which, if it ſhould be ſuffered to continue, muſt defeat all our hopes of ſucceſs and blaſt the Britiſh name with infamy.

march through a country, rugged and difficult to paſs, from ſloughs and other impediments, the whole encamped on the 25th, within a ſhort diſtance of Molwoggle. This hill is from three to four hundred feet in height, ſteep in aſcent, difficult of acceſs, and ſtrengthened with a ſtone wall towards the ſummit, but without baſtions or guns. It was at the foot of Molwoggle, that Captain Brooke, of St. Helena, practiſed a ſtratagem in a former war, which would do credit to the firſt military genius of any age.

About twenty-five years ago, Colonel Wood, then detached with a diviſion of General Smith's army, had nearly fallen a ſacrifice to the abilities and ſuperior force of Hyder Ally Cawn, when the Captain was attracted by the fire to the ſcene of action, but with a very inconſiderable force. Situated as Colonel Wood then was, any aſſiſtance which this weak party could afford, would evidently prove of no material advantage. Conſcious of this, Captain Brooke rightly judged, that the only chance of rendering effectual ſervice was by impreſſing the enemy with an idea of General Smith's near approach. He therefore beat the grenadier's march in a ſituation where the ſmallneſs of his force was not liable to be diſcovered; and, the ſtratagem ſucceeding, Hyder drew off his troops, in the apprehenſion that the main force of his enemy was at hand.

The march of the 27th was along a road perfectly good, through a country in a high ſtate of cultivation, and abounding with inhabitants. It had alſo plenty of forage and water, with ſome hills, which although of no conſiderable height, afforded a number of entertaining proſpects. During this day's march, the inhabitants contiguous to the road, in general, had the reſolution to continue in their villages;

nor did they ſuffer the ſmalleſt degree of moleſtation. Here the enemy's horſe made their firſt appearance ſince the departure of our army from Vellore, in number probably about one hundred, but they kept at a very reſpectful diſtance.

It was now evident that the Sultaun had relied on the reſult of his threats to deſtroy the Carnatic for the ſecurity of his Myſorean poſſeſſions, and that he waited the effect of his plans for a length of time too conſiderable to admit of any ſerious oppoſition to the invaſion, even at this period. However, all that was in his power, although it might not eſſentially avail him, he attempted. To harraſs the Britiſh army as they advanced, to deſtroy as much as poſſible their baggage, to lay waſte the whole face of the country, and to burn and carry off all grain and forage, was his firſt object. To deprive his antagoniſt of any communication with the Pollums and Polygars of every deſcription was naturally his next endeavour. Nor was it poſſible entirely to prevent the execution of theſe intentions. The vaſt diſparity in numbers obliged the cavalry of our army to move in compact bodies, although under the neceſſity of keeping a conſtant eye on the baggage and ſtores, whilſt thoſe of the enemy, from the weight of their columns, were enabled to detach parties that ſcampered in every direction, and conſequently, in a conſiderable degree effected their deſigns.

Still proceeding on a good road, over a well cultivated country, the next ground of encampment was cloſe to an opening through the Colar Hills(1). This lofty range, together with an extenſive

(1) Feb. 24 Goondagal, Miles 14 Fur. —
25 Molwoggle, 14 4
27 Neſampelly, 10 4
28 Colar, 10 —

diſtrict, takes its name from a town which is fortified after the ancient manner of the Eaſt. Colar, ſtanding at the bottom of the hills, towards their centre, on the ſouth-eaſt face, is of conſiderable extent, and encloſed by a high mud wall with ſeveral baſtions. The main ſtreet is wide and regular, the houſes in general have flat roofs, with pipes to throw off water; and chimnies, however rare in Aſia, decorate the principal dwellings of this town. From the number of walls, windings, and other obſtacles that ſtand in the way, the citadel, although not tenable againſt cannon, would not be eaſily forced by other means. Here, a few Polygars who awaited our arrival, ſurrendered to the third battalion of Bengal ſepoys: but the killedar, with the garriſon, fled previouſly towards Bangalore. About two hundred blankets, manufactured in the neighbourhood, together with a quantity of gram and ſome proviſions, were captured in this citadel.

At a ſhort diſtance to the weſtward of Colar a ſmall but neat mauſoleum covers the remains of Nadim Sahib, the father of Hyder, as alſo thoſe of his mother. Here likewiſe lies interred his elder brother Iſmael Sahib. Superſtition had decorated the ſeveral tombs with baſkets of flowers, with feathers, and with trinkets of various kinds. It is known too, that the Myſorean hero, having finiſhed his earthly career in the neighbourhood of Vellore, about the middle of December 1782, his corpſe was embalmed and conveyed into Myſore nearly by the route on which Earl Cornwallis had now advanced, and that it remained in this building for ſeveral months, in order, moſt probably, to allow time for finiſhing an elegant mauſoleum then preparing for its reception on the iſland of Seringapatam.

Close

CLOSE to this tomb, a garden, ſurrounded by a high ſtone wall, planted with vines of different deſcriptions, with rows of cypreſs, with clumps of orange, lime, guava, and other trees, and abounding with roſes and ſhrubberries of various kinds, marked the religious veneration in which the ſhrine of Tippoo Sultaun's anceſtors had been held. Nor did this repoſitory, or its ornaments, ſuſtain the leaſt injury on the preſent occaſion, as centries poſted by direction of the Commander in chief, guarded whatſoever appeared ſacred to thoſe relicks. Tanks too, dug at a conſiderable expence, together with a large jeel, or natural ſheet of water, contributed to render this ſituation at once convenient, romantick and agreeable.

THE mild and lenient treatment of the natives, who, continuing their reſpective occupations, remained at their homes, together with the ſevere puniſhments already inflicted on ſuch of the followers as diſcovered an inclination to pillage, appeared to have taken the beſt effect on the inhabitants of the diſtricts between Colar and Ooſcotta. On this march villages were to be ſeen crowded with people ready to ſupply every want of the troops, but with gates doubly barred againſt all that were not in arms. Narſipore, an inſignificant fortification near to the firſt ground of encampment, alone offered inſult. A patrole of horſe under Major Young could not prevail on theſe refractory villagers to open their gates; but on the appearance of two ſepoy companies with a gun, the whole of the inhabitants fled with precipitation. From thence to Ooſcotta the road was equally good as for ſeveral preceding days. It had been cut by the inhabitants

with

with much labour through an uneven bruſh-wood and thick jungle. Taking advantage of the confined ſituation, which prevented our cavalry from covering our flanks on this march, the looties contrived to carry off two elephants, ſome camels, and a number of bullocks.

JUST as the army encamped in the neighbourhood of Ooſcotta, the 13th Bengal battalion, with its guns, were ordered to take poſſeſſion of the fort and pettah. On approaching the gate, the garriſon refuſed admittance. A gun, loaded with blank cartridge, and uſed as a petard, had no effect: but the firſt diſcharge of ſhot ſhattered the bars, ſprung the bolts, and wounding ſome people within, the reſt ſurrendered at diſcretion. This fort is in figure nearly ſquare: its walls are chiefly of mud, with a berme and deep dry ditch. To the north and from the weſt it is protected by an extenſive jeel; and, in front of the gate, a work of excellent maſonry, built in the European manner, is of conſiderable ſtrength. The ſouth face however, is completely commanded from a riſing ground, even to the very bottom of the rampart. Ooſcotta, in circumference, meaſures about twelve hundred yards. A quantity of forage, ſome grain and cattle being ſecured, this fort, like Colar, was put in poſſeſſion of ſome friendly Polygars.

ABANDONED by its inhabitants, the pettah was given over to be plundered by our followers during a halt on the enſuing day. They were however prohibited from injuring a plantation of coffee trees, apple trees and vines, that was evidently in its infancy: indeed, the high ſtate of cultivation of the country around promiſed and afforded a conſiderable ſupply of grain. The culture of ſilk, too, appears to have been an article of much attention in this vicinity, as ſeveral worms

worms, in their various forms, from the egg to the inſect enveloped in thread, were found in different factories; and, as the Sultaun had begun to face the wall of the fort with ſtone at a great expence, he certainly intended it for a place of ſome importance.

FROM this period the nearneſs of the contending powers to each other enabled the Myſoreans to rocket the Britiſh camp at night; and to appear in force through the day. A thick fog that cleared away as the ſun ſtrengthened early on the 4th, diſcovered a body of horſe, in front, ſo near as to induce Earl Cornwallis to order a brigade of infantry to ſupport our cavalry, who were then a ſhort diſtance in advance, and to cover the train as it paſſed a deep ſlough. This enemy, however, did not think proper to riſk an engagement. Content with watching an opportunity to attack the baggage, they ſeparated into ſeveral diviſions, and failed in almoſt every attempt. A troop of Young's regiment, detached againſt one of theſe parties, returned with ſix horſes, having cut down their riders. Another body mounted, and ſtill more conſiderable, appearing in the afternoon, the left wing was ordered under arms, whilſt the Commander in Chief, eſcorted by ſeveral ſquadrons, advanced to reconnoitre. His Lordſhip ſoon diſcovering that this enemy, although in force, had no inclination to fight, returned to camp.

AMONGST the many maſterly ſtrokes in the military career of Earl Cornwallis, his manœuvres on the 5th of March will ever hold a conſpicuous place. The whole force of the enemy, now but a few miles diſtant on the left flank, was ready to ſeize on any advantage

tage that offered, either from overſight, or from the natural obſtacles and impediments of the country. Aware of theſe circumſtances, at break of day the left wing, which then led, ſtrengthened by the fourth brigade from the right, was ordered to form on an advantageous ground fronting the direction in which the enemy had been ſeen the day before. The firſt and third brigades, proceeding on their march in columns of half companies, for a ſhort diſtance, were ready to ſupport this line if neceſſary; whilſt the piquets, the ninth brigade, and he cavalry, awaited orders to advance with the baggage. By this piece of generalſhip, the train and ſtores continued in perfect ſecurity for the day; every diviſion of the army underwent the uſual fatigues of an ordinary march, and a front was oppoſed to the enemy which he durſt not venture to attack, but with a diſtant cannonade. After halting in this poſition for upwards of one hour, it was evident that the Sultaun had no inclination to give battle.

THICK fogs concealed the Myſoreans for ſome time after gun fire; but clearing up as the day advanced, their whole force was diſcovered in motion towards Bangalore. Orders for marching were immediately iſſued in the Britiſh camp, and the two powers moved for ſome time parallel to each other, ſeparated by a piece of low ſwampy ground. The line already deſcribed, after fronting the enemy for ſome time, under the immediate direction of the Commander in Chief, followed ſlowly in the rear, and to the left of the baggage. Perceiving our diſpoſition, the Sultaun inclined to his right, as near as the nature of the

the ground would admit, and puſhing forward his cavalry, in order to ſtrike at our baggage in front, he opened a heavy cannonade about ten o'clock, acroſs the ſwamp. The diſtance, however, was ſo conſiderable, that not one ſhot was fired in return. Our loſs throughout the day amounted only to one man killed and four wounded.

THE firſt and third brigades proceeded with the baggage, and unlimbering the twelve-pounders whenever the horſe made their apearance, they held them in compleat check, and defeated all their deſigns. Here a moſt daring attempt on the life of Earl Cornwallis was fruſtrated by the vigilance of his guards. Three deſperadoes, riding at full gallop, mixed with a body of our troops on a riſing ground, from whence his Lordſhip, with General Medows, and ſeveral ſtaff officers, viewed the movements of the enemy. Two of them forfeited their lives to their temerity; the third was ſpared through the mercy of the General. Ferocious and unenlightened as the Sultaun has been repreſented throughout this work, to charge him with a deſign ſo diabolical as the deliberate intention of murdering his antagoniſt, would be dangerous to the cauſe of truth. The moſt reaſonable concluſion is, that he was totally ignorant of that dark, ſavage, and truly villainous attempt, and, that it aroſe, either from an ill judged intention to eſtabliſh ſuperiority in courage amongſt the individuals; or, from an inſtantaneous effect of ſtupefaction occaſioned by the free uſe of bang. Towards ſun-ſet the troops encamped within random ſhot of Bangalore (1) after witneſſing villages blazing to aſhes in every direction, by order of the Myſorean ruler.

			Miles	Far.
(1) March 1	Beyloor,		8	4
2	Ooſcotta,		15	4
4	Kiſtnaporam,		8	6
5	Bangalore,		8	4

ON

On the morning of the 6th the army changed ground, and embracing the pettah, occupied a poſition on its north-weſt face, in which it continued with but little variation during the ſiege. Towards three o'clock in the afternoon all the cavalry, ſupported by Gowdie's brigade, were ordered out under Colonel Floyd, in order to cover the chief engineer, and other ſtaff officers, whilſt they reconnoitred Bangalore from an eminence on its north-eaſt face (2); about mid-way between this eminence and camp, there was a broad and deep ſwamp, which the artillery and infantry had inſtructions from our leader not to croſs. As the cavalry advanced, the enemy's horſe diſplaying two ſtandards, aſſembled on the reconnoitering ground, ſeemingly with an intention to diſpute the right of poſſeſſion. Colonel Floyd approached it alſo with his ſix regiments, in ſeparate columns, preſerving intervals to form in line; yet the Myſoreans, although far inferior in numbers, did not give way until their opponents approached them to within fifty yards.

Just as this height was gained, another body of horſe, about ſeven hundred in number, appeared on a riſing ground in front, diſplaying ſeveral ſtandards. Swarms of bullocks, with bandies and ſome guns, were alſo ſeen in that direction. Preſerving the ſame order, the cavalry advanced as before, and the enemy again gave way. At this period the baggage of the Sultaun's army, protected

(2) I arrived before Bangalore in the afternoon, on the 5th of March, and on the 6th the engineers were employed in reconnoitering the place, both in the morning and evening; on the latter excurſion Lieutenant Col. Floyd, who eſcorted them, with the whole cavalry, diſcovered the rear of Tippoo's line of march, apparently in great confuſion, and unfortunately ſuffered himſelf to be tempted by the flattering proſpect of ſtriking an important blow, to deviate from the orders he had received from me to attack the enemy. His ſucceſs at firſt was great, but the length and ardour of the purſuit threw his ſquadron into great confuſion. In this ſtate they were charged by Tippoo's cavalry; and being out of the reach of all ſupport, they were obliged to retire with great precipitation, and the loſs of above two hundred men and near three hundred horſes. Lieutenant Colonel Floyd received a very ſevere wound in the face, from which, however, I have the pleaſure to add, that he is now perfectly recovered.— *Earl Cornwallis to the Court of Directors, 21ſt April*, 1791.

only by an inconſiderable rear guard, aſſiſted by ſmall parties of irregular horſe, on the flanks, was in ſight. The temptation to action was ſcarcely to be reſiſted. Stevenſon's regiment was directed to puſh forward on the right, whilſt the other corps proceeded as before. All theſe movements were at two thirds ſpeed; ſo that the principal part of the enemy's baggage, with a number of guns, were paſſed immediately, without much oppoſition. Panick-ſtruck at an enterprize ſo hardy, daring, and unexpected, the Myſoreans fled in every direction. Horſe and foot relinquiſhed their charge for a time. The nature of the ground, however, now impeding the purſuers, afforded the runaways time for reflection. Volleys of ſhot from a pagoda crowded with people ſtopped Stevenſon in the middle of his victorious career, notwithſtanding his endeavours to poſſeſs it ſword in hand. Rocky heights and deep ravines that ſtretched along and interſected the country in every direction, impeded the other corps; and although the enemy were at firſt unprepared to oppoſe ſo deſperate an attempt, yet perceiving that the aſſailants were totally unſupported by infantry, they faced about, and bethought them of reſiſtance. Collecting their forces, therefore, on the ſeveral heights, they commenced ſuch a diſcharge of muſquetry and rockets as rendered it apparently judicious in our cavalry to put about. In an inſtant the retreat was general. Colonel Floyd, by this time ſhot in the head, had fallen from his horſe as ſuddenly as if ſtruck with a twenty-four pound ball. He was conſequently left on the field for a while. Corporal Murray, with Buchan, a dragoon, obſerved the ſituation of their colonel, and in defiance of danger diſmounted, examined the wound,

wound, and finding it was not mortal, the former haſtened to report, whilſt the latter remained to protect his leader on the ſpot.

As the retreat was at full ſpeed, although but a ſhort time had elapſed, the cavalry had galloped not leſs than a mile when Murray overtook his regiment. Captain Child, then in command of the Dragoons, inſtantly directed that a troop under the writer of this narrative, ſhould return to bring off the Colonel. This ſervice was effected. The enemy preſſed hard in purſuit. Their fire was heavy and deſtructive; but the nature of the country, divided every where by deep ruts and interſections of water courſes, heightened our embarraſſment more than the ſhot and ſwords of our opponents. Jaded and worn down with exceſſive fatigue, the horſes were incapable of clearing ditches which but an hour before they paſſed with ſpirit; and as the Myſoreans mixed with our rear, the ſeaſonable aſſiſtance derived from a determined countenance in the infantry, together with a well-directed fire from our cannon, could alone ſecure the retreat. In ſhort, had not Majors Gowdie and Montagu advanced, although in diſobedience of orders, the greateſt part of the cavalry would moſt aſſuredly have been diſabled from further ſervice for what remained of the campaign.

In whatever light this hazardous enterprize may be viewed by the generality of readers, if a narrator of facts has any right to advance opinions founded on probable contingencies, it is affirmed, that in the event of having been contented with moderate acquiſition, appearances promiſed abundance of ſucceſs. Not only the principal

part

part of the Sultaun's baggage, but many of his guns, carts, elephants, and camels, were completely in our poſſeſſion, without a poſſibility of eſcape, had the capture of theſe been our ſole object. It is affirmed alſo, that had not Colonel Floyd been wounded, the cavalry would in all human probability have gone round the fort with a loſs not more conſiderable than they ſuffered through the confuſion of a retreat. However dangerous in a ſoldier to act contrary to orders, if allowable in any inſtance, the temptation on this occaſion will ever be deemed the moſt difficult of reſiſtance; nor was the din of ſtaff officers not only recommending but ſpurring to action, the leaſt preſſing of theſe temptations, eſpecially as their opinions were known to have conſiderable influence amongſt the officers of the army. But few indeed are the inſtances in which blame has not been attached to misfortune. Where things turn out unhappily, mankind in general pretend to diſcover errors, although the ſelf-ſame meaſures, under oppoſite circumſtances, would be ſtamped with the higheſt applauſe; without pauſing to enquire into the ſprings of action, they ever aſcribe misfortunes to want of foreſight and arrangement, which moſt probably, had their riſe in accident, the neglect of others, or ſome improbable contingency. Induced by the preſent failure to ſurvey with a retroſpective and more minute eye the conduct of this leader at Sattimungulum, on which occaſion credit had been given him for an union of judgement with intrepidity; reaſoners affirmed, that the reſult warranted that concluſion in neither inſtance (3).

(3) For a return of the killed and wounded, on this occaſion, and on every day throughout the ſiege of Bangalore, ſee the firſt volume, Appendix, No 21.

An

An intention of ſtorming the pettah on the night of the 5th, with the piquets, had been abandoned, under the idea of its being reinforced during the day, a circumſtance in which various intelligences concurred; however, to do away any impreſſion occaſioned by the late diſaſtrous rencontre, and to ſecure a large ſupply of forage and materials for the ſiege, the intention was again renewed, but with another body of troops. His Majeſty's 36th regiment, and the 26th Bengal battalion of ſepoys, with their field pieces, ſupported by two eighteen and two twelve pounders, were ordered for this ſervice, early in the morning of the 7th, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Cockerell. Lieutenant Colonel Moorhouſe took charge of the heavy guns. The point of attack was a gateway of conſiderable ſtrength on the north face, to which a winding paſſage led, that was ſmooth and even, but narrowed ſo much by a thick jungle on either hand, that the troops, unable to extend their front, had ſcarcely room to advance by columns of half companies. The firſt barrier was ſoon carried. After a few diſcharges of an eighteen pounder the troops ruſhed to the bayonet. They ſecured this poſt, and puſhed forward; but whilſt the field pieces played on the inner gate, without effect, as it was barricaded with ſtones, a briſk fire from a mud baſtion, from turrets, and from roofs of houſes, made conſiderable ſlaughter amongſt the Europeans. It was here that the gallant Moorhouſe fell (4), juſt as the heavy guns made their appearance. His manly exertions,

(4) *Earl Cornwallis to the Court of Directors, 21ſt April,* 1791.— I cannot, however, help expreſſing on this occaſion, my ſincere regret for the death of that brave and valuable officer, Lieutenant Colonel Moorhouſe, who was killed at the aſſault of the Pettah, on the 7th of March.

Preſident and Council of Fort St. George to the Court of Directors, 14th April; 1791.— We ſincerely lament the loſs ſuſtained on that occaſion, by the death of Lieutenant Colonel Moorhouſe, whoſe military character was ſo much diſtinguiſhed, and whoſe long, active, and zealous ſervices to the Company deſerved the higheſt applauſe. In order to teſtify our ſenſe of ſuch conſpicuous merits, we came to the following reſolution;

exertions, conſpicuous from the beginning, were now followed up without intermiſſion, by the intrepid Medows. Enlivened by ſuch examples, the ſoldiery ſtrained every nerve. A delay in bringing up the heavy cannon, together with ſome other untoward circumſtances, inſtead of tending to abandon the enterprize, increaſed their eagerneſs to proceed; and their officers, alike inured to danger and accuſtomed to victory, were foremoſt whether to ſcale the ramparts or to paſs through openings or apertures. Slender in frame, but raiſed up by ſome ſturdy grenadiers, a hole made by ſome eighteen pound ſhot admitted Lieutenant Ayre through the gate, under the immediate eye of his General, who with the ſtrongeſt marks of approbation encouraged the troops to "ſupport the little gentleman" (1). Ladders were now applied, and the ramparts were covered with aſſailants in an inſtant. All obſtacles ſurmounted, the enemy gave way; but the nearneſs of the pettah to the garriſon afforded them ſhelter in the quarter under its immediate protection. During this attack the fort kept up an inceſſant fire of cannon; and ſeveral of their ſhot reached our encampment, although at a diſtance of nearly two miles.

SUCH was the obſtinacy of this defence, that Earl Cornwallis directed the 76th regiment, with the third Bengal battalion, and the firſt battalion of volunteers, to join in the aſſault; but the confined nature of the paſſage would not admit of their aſſiſtance. However,

lution; viz. "Government having received advice of the death of Lieutenant Colonel Moorhouſe, who was killed in ſtorming the pettah of Bangalore, on the 7th inſtant, reſolve, as a teſtimony of reſpect to the memory of an officer who ſerved the Company many years with diſtinguiſhed zeal, ſpirit, and ability, that his remains be, with the permiſſion of the miniſters and church wardens, publickly interred in the church at Fort St. George, at the Company's expence, and a marble table fixed over his grave, with a ſuitable inſcription, in commemoration of his merits; Reſolved likewiſe, that a letter be written to Earl Cornwallis, to inform him of this intention, and to requeſt his Lordſhip will be pleaſed to direct, that the body of the late Lieutenant Colonel Moorhouſe be removed to the Preſidency ſo ſoon as the ſituation of affairs will permit."— We are aſſured that your honourable Court will be pleaſed to find, that proper reſpect has been paid to the memory of one of the beſt officers that ever ſerved the Company; and we are confident this preſent teſtimony will be gratefully received by the whole army.

(1) Theſe were his own words.

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in the ſpace of two hours they enabled Colonel Cockerell to eſtabliſh poſts over two thirds of the pettah, and to capture a vaſt quantity of forage, which contributed ſo much to our ultimate ſucceſs, that the Commandant is ſaid to have forfeited his life for diſobedience of the Sultaun's orders, poſitively commmanding, that the whole ſhould be burnt. Confidence in the ſtrength of the place, and not a treacherous diſpoſition, led to this cataſtrophe.

THE pettah of Bangalore is of a circular form, and meaſures full three miles in circumference. All around, except where it is defended by the fort, it has a deep dry ditch, the inner ſide of which is in general faced with ſtone. Beſides an open communication towards the garriſon, there are four entrances to this place, all defended by ſtrong gates and baſtions with embraſures for guns. Of theſe one is on the eaſt face; two are to the northward, and one at the north-weſt quarter. A thick and almoſt impenetrable jungle of trees, bamboos, thorny buſhes, and prickly ſhrubs, extends along the ditch, within which a lofty mud wall, with ſeveral turrets, ranges. To ſtrengthen the inner works, this jungle, which is upwards of one hundred yards in depth, is ſecured by redoubts or fletches at each of the outer entrances. Many years ago theſe defences, on repeated occaſions, baffled the whole Maratta force; nor does it appear hazardous to affirm, that they are ſtill abundantly ſtrong againſt any native power in the eaſt. An idea of their ſufficiency, even againſt our army, prevented the deſtruction of all grain and forage, which, without doubt, conſiderably facilitated the fall of Bangalore.

HERE there are many ſtreets laid out with much regularity, and of great width; few towns in Hindoſtan can boaſt of better houſes, or of richer inhabitants, if credit can be given to appearances; and although

though the people had removed the principal part of their wealth on the advance of the Britiſh army, ſtill, bales of cloth, with immenſe quantities of cotton and grain, were ſtrewed in every direction; indeed the booty dug up by individuals, out of concealments and deſerted houſes, ſtrongly indicated eaſe, comfort, and happineſs in former times.

GRIEVED at his misfortunes, the Sultaun inſtantly meditated a plan for retaking the pettah. Early in the afternoon, he, as a feint, drew out his army to the north-eaſt of the fort, and advanced towards the Britiſh camp with all the appearance of an intention to give battle, whilſt his real deſign was to ſtrengthen his troops, not yet diſlodged by Colonel Cockerell, with ſix thouſand choſen men. Earl Cornwallis, ſuſpecting the true motives from appearances, immediately directed the 76th regiment, which had been recalled to camp in courſe of the day, to return to Colonel Cockerell. His Lordſhip ſtruck his encampment, and wheeling to the right, he formed his line with its front to the enemy, and watched their approach. A low marſhy ground now ſeparated the two armies, acroſs which the Sultaun contented himſelf in this quarter for the day, with a diſtant cannonade. Widely different was the ſtruggle to deprive us of our late acquiſitions.

As if confident of ſucceſs, the Myſorean reinforcement advanced on the 36th and 76th regiments, but they were received at the point of the bayonet. With the ſepoys alſo, they came to a cloſe engagement. The ſtruggle was obſtinate and bloody. As if fired at being driven from their homes by ſtrangers, they yielded to ſuperior diſcipline with much unwillingneſs. Mortified that their foes ſhould triumph around their altars and zenanas, they fought with uncommon

mon reſolution; and at length, although defeated and purſued with conſiderable ſlaughter, they retreated reluctantly, and diſputed every wall, range of houſes, or other building, that afforded the leaſt proſpect of ſhelter. The loſs fell heavy on the 76th regiment. But although this was their firſt trial in arms, they behaved with a firmneſs that would ſtamp credit on the moſt veteran troops (1). The Myſoreans, after loſing from three to four hundred men, no longer able to contend with ſuch ſucceſsful opponents, abandoned their intentions, and returned to their encampment.

FROM this period to the 12th, nothing of importance occurred. Working parties were employed in cutting down bamboos, in collecting materials for batteries, and in erecting redoubts and fletches in front of the encampment, on a conſtruction more to prevent alarms, than for the ſecurity of the troops (2). A ten gun battery, intended to take off the defences, but not to breach, now opened, but without any material advantage for ſome days. A two gun-

(1) *G. O. March* 26, 1790.— Lord Cornwallis having this morning received from the 36th regiment, the colours that were ſo gallantly taken by that corps, at the time that it contributed to render abortive an attempt which was made by a large body of the enemy, to retake the pettah on the 7th inſtant, he gladly embraces this opportunity of declaring, that the behaviour of the officers and ſoldiers of that regiment, during the whole of that day, muſt ever reflect great honour upon their courage and diſcipline, and juſtly entitles them to his higheſt approbation. He likewiſe deſires, that his beſt thanks may be preſented to the 26th Bengal battalion, for the zeal and ſpirit which was manifeſted by that corps in the aſſault of the pettah; and to the 76th regiment, the 3d Bengal battalion, and the 1ſt battalion of Bengal volunteers, for the firmneſs and gallantry which they diſplayed in repulſing the attack which the enemy afterwards made upon it; and His Lordſhip requeſts that Lieutenant Colonel Cockerell will accept of his warmeſt acknowledgments for the vigour and judgment with which he ſo ſucceſsfully conducted the aſſault of the pettah, and for the military ability with which he occupied the different poſts, and maintained poſſeſſion of them during the day, againſt the very extraordinary powerful efforts of the enemy to diſlodge them.— Enſign Manoury, of the 52d regiment, is to do duty as an aſſiſtant engineer in Bangalore until further orders. Lord Cornwallis orders the following ſums to be paid to the ſerjeant and twelve of the advanced party, on the aſſault of the 21ſt inſtant; the ſerjeant, twenty pagodas; corporals five pagodas; and privates, three pagodas each; if any of the men who were killed in the aſſault have left families, they are to receive double.

(2) *G. O. March* 8, 1791 — Lord Cornwallis is ſo ſenſible of the zeal and ſpirit of the officers and ſoldiers of the army, that he is convinced they will bear with chearfulneſs, the fatigues which the preſent important criſis renders indiſpenſibly neceſſary. He muſt, however, recommend it to them to keep it conſtantly in their minds, that the utmoſt exertion upon all working parties is not leſs requiſite for enſuring ſucceſs, than gallantry under arms; and he with great truth declares, that he ſhall feel the moſt ſincere gratification when he finds it in his power to give them every relaxation that good ſoldiers can deſire, after the ſervice of hardſhip and labour that they have undergone with a degree of animation and ſteadineſs which reflects ſo much honour upon them.

battery for enfilading, with another for firing en ricochet, were in readineſs about the ſame time. A conſiderable diſtance in front, but ſomewhat to the weſtward of theſe, another battery for nine guns, conſtructed by Captain Kyd of the Bengal engineers, was begun; and ſoon afterwards a mortar battery was laid out in that part of the pettah ditch which was neareſt to the fort. This opened on the 15th with excellent effect, and an inceſſant fire from the other on the following day promiſed a practicable breach, at an early period, in the firſt curtain to the eaſtward of the Delhi gate. From the opening of the batteries until now the contingencies were neither important nor numerous.

A ſally attempted on an advanced poſt, in which was ſtationed a company of the 76th regiment, with two of the 28th battalion of Bengal ſepoys, was repulſed with loſs. The enemy's horſe occaſionally made their appearance in parties through the day, and rockets were thrown into our camp at night; forage, notwithſtanding the ſupply found in the pettah, could not be procured at any price; the bullocks of the public departments died daily in hundreds, whilſt the cattle for ſlaughter were reduced to mere carrion; our gallant handful of cavalry, unequal to oppoſe the myriads by which they were ſurrounded, were neceſſitated to forage within piſtol ſhot of their pickets; and beſides other neceſſities at this period of the ſiege, two of our guns, a twenty-four and an eighteen pounder, were completely diſabled.

EITHER the movements of the enemy, or ſecret intelligence, or perhaps both, induced Earl Cornwallis, on the 16th, to direct ſome alterations in the order of encampment. The cavalry changed ground with the ſecond brigade, and the fifth and ſixth brigades with part of the fourth, occupying a new poſition, fronted outwards in the direction formerly obſerved by the reſerve. By this alteration the horſe were thrown into a hollow that covered them from the enemy's view. A ſudden and briſk cannonade on the morning of the 17th diſcovered the propriety of the late arrangements. This fire was principally directed towards the ground lately occupied by the cavalry; conſequently, the loſs fell principally on the corps encamped in that poſition.

As large bodies of horſe, encircling our encampment like a rainbow, hovered on the eminences all around, it is reaſonable to conjecture, that the Sultaun intended to ſtrike at the baggage and ſtores, in the event of any confuſion; but on the return of Earl Cornwallis from the pettah, where his Lordſhip had been to examine the effect of his batteries, Colonel Stuart, with the principal part of the firſt and third brigades, was ordered to advance againſt the right flank of the enemy. On this movement the Sultaun judged it prudent to retire; and the fort, at the ſame inſtant, ceaſed a diſcharge of cannon, which, as if by concert, it opened with the fire in the field. The only return to the cannonade from the northward was from one eighteen and one twelve pounder, ſerved with excellent aim by Captain Carliſle of

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the Madras eſtabliſhment. A four-gun battery, intended to deſtroy the defences at the gateway, was conſtructed on this night.

So juſt was the aim of our artillery, that on the 18th, notwithſtanding the ſtrength of the wall, the breach was conſidered practicable by ſeveral qualified to judge from the experience of many years ſervice. However, during the night, another parallel, upon which the enemy opened an inceſſant and heavy fire of muſquetry, was laid out and compleated within two hundred yards of the fort, and its proportion of guns were placed in the battery lately erected. A diſcharge of rockets was kept up on our encampment without intermiſſion.

EARLY on the 19th the four-gun battery opened; this, together with thoſe already mentioned, kept up a conſtant cannonade on the breach and neighbouring towers, that of the enemy being much ſlackened; they, however, fired ſharply with muſquets from the covert way and outworks. Againſt theſe a battery for two ſix-pounders was conſtructed, that compleated for four, was enlarged ſo as to admit ſix guns; and on the left of the advanced parallel a mortar battery was finiſhed before day-light. From camp the 36th regiment, and a battalion of ſepoys, were ſent out under Major Skelly, to ſurprize a body of the enemy reported at a ſhort diſtance. Twelve only were found from the intelligence, all of whom were put to death, with the exception of one man, who eſcaped by flight.

THE fire of the 20th widened the breach, and rendered it much more eaſy of acceſs, by the deſtruction of its defences, which notwithſtanding the cannonade, were ſtill numerous and reſpectable. At

duſk

duſk a ſtrong working party of the 72d regiment was ordered to open a ſap from the advanced ſix-gun battery to the creſt of the glacis. This work, ſo very cloſe to the enemy, could not be carried on unperceived, even from the ramparts; but as large bodies of the beſieged were out ſtockading the breach, a galling fire was received juſt as the party began to work, and as it did not ceaſe until under complete cover, the caſualties of this night were very numerous.

EARLY on the 21ſt, the Sultaun, with his whole force, was in motion; part of his troops advanced, with an intention of opening a battery in order to enfilade the pettah, from high grounds on the eaſt ſide of the fort, cloſe to the cypreſs garden; others dragged ſeveral heavy guns to the bank of a tank in which a number of well maſked embraſures had been cut, whilſt his main force was drawn up on the neighbouring heights, to protect theſe operations. A thick fog concealed the Myſoreans from the Britiſh general till towards eight in the morning; but as ſoon as it cleared away, the drums beat to arms, the encampment was inſtantly ſtruck, and the right wing moving towards the enemy by columns, intimidated them for the preſent from their deſigns.

As a ſtorm was now reckoned practicable by all, the fire of this day was levelled chiefly againſt the defences about the point of attack, and the guns and towers which looked in that direction. A ſmall baſtion, cloſe to the Delhi gate, together with one of a much larger ſize, which bore on the breach, and flanked the ſhattered curtain to the eaſtward, were battered to pieces. Anxious under theſe circum-

cumſtances, the Sultaun in the evening again drew out his troops, and as in the morning conducted ſeveral heavy guns to the bank already deſcribed, evidently with intention to cannonade the pettah. The critical ſtage at which affairs had now arrived, required that bold and energetic determination which totally abſtracted from ſcale and compaſs reaſoning, is only to be found with great minds.

As night approached, preparations were made for the ſtorm, with the direction of which Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell was entruſted. A ſerjeant and twelve, ſupported by Lieutenants Duncan and Evans, with thirty choſen men, compoſed the forlorn hope. The grenadiers of the 36th, 52d, 71ſt, 72d, 74th, 76th, and fourth Madras regiment, with the light infantry of the corps juſt mentioned, in all fourteen companies, followed as in this detail. Cloſe to theſe the 36th, 72nd, and 76th advanced according to ſeniority of regiments, and in the rear of the Europeans two Bengal battalions, the 7th and 26th, were poſted in the laſt parallel, with inſtructions to ſcour to the right and left ſo ſoon as the ſtorm ſhould commence. Pioneers carrying ſcaling ladders were judiciouſly interſperſed with the troops; the appearance of General Medows amidſt the ranks, added vigour to diſcipline and valour; and, although Colonel Maxwell iſſued his inſtructions to the whole, the flankers were conſidered under the immediate direction of Major Skelly.

WHILST the troops deſtined for the aſſault, advanced to their ſeveral ſtations, with awful ſtillneſs, the garriſon both in the fort and outworks, as if wearied with inceſſant exertion, were equally lull; a bright moon, at times obſcured by a paſſing cloud, ſhone againſt

againſt the battered precipices over which the aſſailants had to paſs; from the heavens there came not a breath of wind; nothing diſturbed thought; and, this gallant corps, after beſtowing in reflection a ſoldierly and affectionate tribute on their fair friends, bade adieu to all wordly concerns, and rivetted their minds to death or victory.

At the hour of eleven a ſignal for advancing paſſed along the ranks in perfect ſilence. A cauſeway upwards of one hundred yards in length which would not admit of eight men abreaſt, was the only road that led from the trenches to the point of attack. To render the breach inacceſſible, the beſieged had cut a wide and deep trench acroſs this cauſeway, leaving a wall about two feet thick entire on the right hand. As there was no draw-bridge it was by this wall that the garriſon communicated with the covert way, and were enabled to ſally; but, although ſo narrow as to be paſſed by Indian files only, it ſerved alſo to convey our troops over the ditch, which was nowhere fordable in this quarter. To the left the fauſſebray, about twenty feet in height, and but little damaged, as it was covered by the glacis, was eſcaladed in an inſtant; but the principal part of the troops, in defiance of all obſtructions, advanced ſtraight forward, and ſurmounted every obſtacle. At ſome places they clambered over mounds, walls, bulwarks, and hindrances of various kinds, that had been ſhattered by the cannonade. At others, where the fortifications were more entire, they aſcended or deſcended by the help of ladders. As the aſſailants approached the baſtion and curtain that had been breached, the reſiſtance, which till then had fallen far ſhort of expectation, began to increaſe. Awakened from a fatal ſecurity into which the garriſon had been lulled, by the multiplicity of dif-

difficulties that the beſiegers had to encounter, as well as by the ſtrength of the place and the number of its defenders, they now bethought of precautions, which, if ſeaſonably applied, would in all probability, have rendered ſucceſs doubtful. The alarm once given circulated like wild-fire. Multitudes crowded tumultuouſly to the point of attack. In an inſtant, blue lights and fire balls thrown in every direction rendered all objects around the fort clear as at noon day; a blaze of muſquetry, which added ſtrength to this magnificent illumination, furniſhed it alſo with abundance of victims; a general diſcharge of rockets contributed to the aweful grandeur of an exhibition in itſelf truly tremendous; and one univerſal roar of cannon all over the fort and pettah at once ſtruck the ſpectator with conſternation and horror.

WHILST the forlorn hope mounted the breach, the leading companies kept a conſtant fire on the parapet; as theſe aſcended, other diviſions ſcoured the ramparts to the right and left. The aſſailants, although broken in advance, puſhed on with irreſiſtible preſſure. Inſtances of individuals at ſingle combat were to be ſeen in different directions; courage was equal on both ſides, but ſuperiority in diſcipline and bodily ſtrength ſecured to the Britiſh troops a firm footing on the ramparts. In ſhort, before one hour had elapſed, the grenadiers march, beating all over the works announced to their friends without, complete poſſeſſion of the place. Of the garriſon, however, there were many who fought with a degree of valour that bordered on deſperation; but the want of timely concert amongſt them rendered all attempts at oppoſition abortive.

ALTHOUGH

ALTHOUGH the ſtruggle was of ſhort duration at the breach, it was repeatedly renewed as the columns proceeded to take poſſeſſion of the works. At ſeveral of the baſtions, the defenders, encouraged by ſupplies of freſh troops, in vain endeavoured to retrieve their loſs; and the aſſailants, having previouſly divided their force, ruſhed forward to the right and left, until they met at the oppoſite entrance, which is called the Myſore gate.

WHILST the grenadiers advanced along the ramparts on the right, the light infantry preſſed forwards to the left; the 36th regiment deſcended into the body of the fort; the 72d and 76th regiments, ſupporting the ſeveral diviſions, ſecured all above the breach; and the two ſepoy battalions, ſcouring the glacis and covert way, bayoneted whomſoever offered oppoſition in the outworks. Taking advantage of the circulation of terror by contagion, Lieutenant John Plumer, of the 13th battalion of Bengal ſepoys, ſallied with two companies of that corps from the pettah; and, driving off their guards, he took poſſeſſion of ſome guns which the enemy intended to open on our batteries, from the bank of a tank already deſcribed. In this ſtorm, General Medows, obſerving a number of ſepoys, chiefly of the 7th battalion, amongſt the Europeans at the top of the breach, he immediately directed that they ſhould return to their ſtations in the outworks.

As women and children crowded along with the affrighted garriſon through the gate the carnage there was truly ſhocking. The height of the ſurrounding walls, the length of the arches, and the noiſe of the muſquetry, which had not as yet ſubſided, notwith-

ſtanding the humanity of Britiſh troops, for a time prevented all diſtinction of age or ſex. About two thouſand choſen troops that haſtened to ſtrengthen the garriſon, preſſed to get in at the Myſore gate; but, from the rapidity of the aſſailants, this reinforcement, which was too late in arrival, contributed only to increaſe the confuſion and ſlaughter. On the whole, upwards of fourteen hundred lives were loſt in this momentous event; an event, which firmly fixed the war in the heart of the enemy's dominions, as it put Britain in poſſeſſion of probably the ſtrongeſt and moſt important fortreſs in Myſore.

ALTHOUGH to particularize any individual in military operations, where the merits of all are moſt willingly acknowledged, muſt ever prove a taſk highly invidious, yet the conduct of Colonel Giels during this ſiege, but more eſpecially on the 21ſt of March, 1791, cannot be paſſed over in ſilence. A heavy fire kept up throughout the day was by his direction increaſed and wholly pointed at the breach for a full hour previous to the attack; and as the aſſailants advanced, the cannonade which intimidated the enemy from remaining in that quarter, was continued with blank cartridges, thus furniſhing the forlorn hope an opportunity of approaching the walls unobſerved. The expectation of a ſtorm on the preceding night contributed alſo to the lethargick ſtate of the garriſon. A reinforcement of ſeven hundred choſen horſe-men, diſmounted, gave additional ſtrength to Bangalore late in the evening of the 20th. Theſe, with the reſt of the defendants, continued a conſtant diſcharge of muſquetry until daylight, but the fatigue which they had undergone rendered them unable to watch on the enſuing night, and accounts in ſome meaſure

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for their being ſo little prepared when the attack actually took place (1).

BANGALORE, the capital of a province bearing that name, in ſhape approaches an egg, although by the model it appears to have been originally deſigned for an exact oval. It is ſomewhat more than a mile in circumference. The rampart, which is lofty, ſtrong, and of good maſonry, has a parapet five feet in height, and of the ſame thickneſs. Beſides twenty-ſix circular baſtions, mounting three guns apiece, and at the diſtance of ſixty-ſeven yards from one another, it has five cavaliers, which whilſt they overlook the whole work, are calculated for that number of guns each. Excluſive of theſe, there are other baſtions of a ſmaller ſize over either gateway. All round the bottom of the rampart a regular and ſubſtantial fauſſe-bray is erected. The ditch is wide and deep, but at the ſeaſon of the year in which the ſiege was undertaken, it contained but very

(1) *G. O. March* 22, 1791. Lord Cornwallis feels the moſt ſenſible gratification in congratulating the officers and ſoldiers of the army on the honourable iſſue of the fatigues and dangers which they underwent during the late arduous ſiege.— Their alacrity and firmneſs in the execution of their various duties has perhaps never been exceeded, and he ſhall not only think it incumbent upon him to repreſent their meritorious conduct in the ſtrongeſt colours, but he ſhall ever remember it with the ſincereſt ſentiments of eſteem and admiration. The judicious arrangements which were made by Colonel Duff in the artillery department, his exertions, and thoſe of the other officers and ſoldiers of that corps in general in the ſervice of the batteries, are entitled to his Lordſhip's perfect approbation, to which he deſires to add, that he thinks himſelf much obliged to Lieutenant Colonel Giels for the able manner in which he directed the fire during the day of the 21ſt.—Lord Cornwallis is ſo well acquainted with the ardour that pervades the whole army, that he would have been happy if it had been practicable to have allowed every corps to have participated in the glory of the enterprize laſt night. but it muſt be obvious to all, that in forming a diſpoſition for the aſſault, a certain portion of the troops could only be employed. The conduct of all the regiments which happened in their tour to be on duty that evening, did credit in every reſpect to their ſpirit and diſcipline, but His Lordſhip deſires to offer the tribute of his particular and warmeſt praiſes to the European grenadiers and light infantry of the army, and to the 36th regiment, who led the attack, and on that occaſion furniſhed a conſpicuous proof that diſciplined valour in ſoldiers, when directed by a zeal and capacity in officers, is irreſiſtible. The activity and good conduct of Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, in the command of the pettah, for ſeveral days previous to the aſſault of the fort, was in every reſpect highly commendable, but His Lordſhip deſires that he will accept his particular thanks for the judicious arrangements which he made for the aſſault, which was committed to his diſpoſal, and for the gallantry which he diſplayed in the execution of them.—He likewiſe returns his warmeſt acknowledgements to Major Skelly, who undertook the command of the corps who commenced the attack of the breach, and who by animating them by his own example, contributed eſſentially to our important ſucceſs.— Lieutenant Colonel Stuart may be aſſured that Lord Cornwallis will ever retain a grateful remembrance of the valuable and ſteady ſupport which that officer affords him, by his military experience and conſtant exertion to promote the public ſervice; and although his Lordſhip is unwilling to offend General Medows's delicacy by attempting to expreſs his full ſenſe of the able and friendly aſſiſtance which he uniformly experiences from him, he cannot avoid declaring, that it has made an impreſſion upon his mind that can never be effaced.

little

little water. On the ſouth-weſt face there were rocks in it, which muſt have conſiderably facilitated an attack, had a breach been made in the oppoſite curtain; but this appears not to have eſcaped obſervation, as the glacis in that quarter covers the works much better than in any other. Here there is alſo a ravelin, which is without any fault; but the oppoſite berme extends ſo far beyond the work as to admit of a lodgment ſhould an enemy get over the ditch; another ravelin ſtrengthens the eaſt face. There are alſo lunets at proper diſtances from each other all around the creſt of the glacis. In front of the Myſore gate there is a work of conſiderable ſtrength, with a large tank on its ſouth face. The Delhi gate, with ſome little diſtance on each ſide, embraced in a kind of creſcent by the pettah, is defended by ſeven ſtrong walls; and cauſeways, which as there are no drawbridges to the fort, terminate the ditch at either entrance, are the only paſſages that lead into the body of the work. Beſides all theſe obſtacles, the glacis, except that part directly oppoſite the pettah, was bounded by a cloſe and thick prickly hedge. The impoſſibility of procuring forage to maintain even the cattle for ſlaughter, heightened the diſtreſs of the beſiegers (1). But above all other diſadvantages, that of a powerful army ſtill in readineſs for motion, keeping our infantry buckled up in their accoutrements, and the cavalry at the heads of their horſes, was the cauſe of much inconvenience to the troops, as it gave riſe to frequent alarms, con-

(1) *G. O. March* 6, 1791. As it is well known, that the cattle in this country are at particular ſeaſons ſubſiſted principally by tufts of graſs, the Commander in Chief recommends it to all individuals to make the utmoſt exertion to feed their cattle in that manner. He likewiſe expects that the agents of the bullock contractor will take ſimilar meaſures for ſupplying the public cattle; and as the Commander in Chief is ſenſible, that in the preſent ſituation of the army, it may not be practicable to make that proviſion without ſome additional expence, he directs that an account of whatever may be incurred in this manner, ſhall be kept with the utmoſt preciſion, and certified upon honour; upon which the Commander in Chief will be ready to allow a reaſonable proportion of it to be defrayed by the public.

ſtantly

ſtantly deſtroying their reſt, and conſequently occaſioning diſeaſe, and heightening the bad effect of every ſickneſs and diſorder (2).

WHEREVER gallantry is recorded, Bahauder Khan, Killedar of Bangalore, will ho'd a conſpicuous place amongſt the heroes of our times. True to his truſt, he reſigned it with life, after receiving almoſt as many wounds as were inflicted on Cæſar in the capitol. In death his manly countenance wore a mild yet commanding aſpect. His appearance, reſpectable from an old age of temperate living, was rendered venerable by a beard of conſiderable length, every hair of which vied with ſilver in whiteneſs; and his corpſe, fair as any European, covered with wounds, all received from before, and cloſe to the point of attack, clearly declared that this reſolute Mogul, beſides a firm attachment to his Prince, poſſeſſed the genuine ſpirit of a ſoldier. His remains were offered to the Sultaun for interment, but refuſed with many acknowledgments of the attention: they were therefore decently interred according to the Mahommedan rites. It is ſaid that the Sultaun, in anſwer to Lord Cornwallis's ſoldier-like offer, replied, that the Khan could be buried nowhere with greater propriety than in the neighbourhood of the place at the defence of which he had fallen. Muſſelmans of the firſt rank in our army attended his funeral with every mark of reſpect and attention. At the loſs of this faithful ſervant, and the ſeverity of the blow he had recieved, the Sultaun wept; but his reaſonable grief was ſucceeded by unreaſonable and unmanly vengeance, which he wreaked on his unfortunate priſoners.

(2) *G. O. March* 12, 1791. Lord Cornwallis knows that the troops are deſirous on the preſent occaſion to be vigilant and alert. His Lordſhip obſerves, with the utmoſt ſatisfaction, that they are chearfully ready for the execution of any duty, and directs that corps ſhall be accoutred, and the cavalry ſaddled, from eight every night until ſunriſe, as the ſureſt means of defeating every purpoſe of the enemy, to relieve the place.

OUT

OUT of about one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon captured at Bangalore, eighty-five of which were fit for immediate uſe, ſeveral were caſt under the auſpices of Hyder; ſome were Spaniſh, ſome French, and a few bore the Engliſh ſtamp. For this train there was ammunition ſufficient for at leaſt a twelve month's ſiege found in four magazines; of theſe, two which are under ground, are ſubſtantially built with the beſt materials, and may be conſidered bomb proof. In the pettah there was an extenſive gunpowder manufactory. Storehouſes, founderies, with public buildings of various deſcriptions, appeared in conſiderable forwardneſs at Bangalore, and a machine copied from a French Encyclopædia, produced different ſamples of carabines, but very unequal in the bore.

HERE, a palace begun by Hyder, and at this time completely finiſhed, is, if we except ſome public buildings at Agra and Delhi, the moſt airy and elegant of any in the Eaſt. In form it is an oblong ſquare, with a terrace of eighty-four paces by thirty-two to the principal face. About the centre of the palace, this terrace for a ſpace of eight paces projects beyond the building on either ſide. Here the artiſt has exerted his utmoſt ſkill with ſucceſs. The roof, ſupported by two rows of wooden pillars, that communicate with each other by a ſcolloped arch, is painted with exquiſite taſte; the pillars, which have eight equal ſides, are about twenty feet in height; the field throughout is nearly of a purple colour; and the whole is decorated with a variety of flowers neatly executed in gold leaf. Beſides theſe ornaments, ſeveral galleries and projections magnificent in themſelves, but too difficult of deſcription, give an air of grandeur

to

to this palace that is ſeldom to be met with in any country. In one of theſe, to which four flights of ſtairs lead, there is a place with a canopy over it, for the Sultaun to ſit on when giving audience. This rich throne is lacquered within all around; it is ornamented with gildings of various colours; and the magnificence of its appearance is heightened by a beautiful fountain in front. The ſides of the palace that run eaſt and weſt are half the depth of thoſe in the oppoſite directions; the workmanſhip is nearly the ſame throughout the whole, but the painting occaſionally varies. Rich carpets covered the floors, ſuperb hangings decorated the walls, and ivory inlaid in figures of various ſhapes might be ſeen in every quarter. On the frame of a door, in a wretched hovel adjoining this palace, the names of Gowdie and many other Britiſh officers were carved. Here theſe gentlemen had been cloſely confined in maſſy irons, cruelly inſulted, and otherwiſe illtreated during the former war.

The only entrance into this palace is on the eaſt face; neat and commodious zenanas run all around the other ſides; but if we except what has been already deſcribed, the buildings within this fort are deſpicable in the extreme. One univerſal confuſion throughout the ſtore, ammunition, and proviſion departments, clearly diſcovered that the eſtabliſhment for Bangalore, however well ſupplied, was, from a deficiency of arrangement, ſtill in an infant ſtate. In front of the palace, a large ſpace, encloſed with a high wall, ſerved for a grand parade. In this wall there are four gates; one leads to the palace, another to the arſenal and foundery, and another towards each of the entrances to the fort.

To determine the preciſe period at which Bangalore became a military

litary ſtation, would be greatly hazardous; but to affirm that it was a reſpectable fortreſs upwards of forty years ago, and that it has been ſtrengthened piecemeal ſince, is ſafe from various concurrent circumſtances. In the year 1655 it was reduced by Adil Shaw King of Beejapoor; but before the cloſe of that century, it was ſurrendered to the arms of Aurungzebe. From that conqueror it was obtained in purchaſe by the then Rajah of Myſore. In 1730 it was beſieged by a large body of Marattas, without ſucceſs; but from another attack which was made about fifteen years afterwards, under Gopaul Row, its ſafety was purchaſed with a large bribe (1). Towards the Myſore gate part of the original works has undergone no alteration; all around, however, except in that quarter, it has been improved by ſeveral additions, which has ſo thickened the wall, that a breach through it can never be effected with artillery. The eaſt face is the moſt regular, as to the width of the berme, or the height and breadth of the parapet; but, although of conſiderable ſtrength, neither is ſo complete on the oppoſite ſide.

To the principal actors in this aſſault fell the lead in the province of humanity. Attention to the wounded captives ſucceeded the fury of the ſtorm. Both the fort and pettah, with a garriſon conſiſting of one European regiment, four native corps, a ſmall party of artillery, and a conſiderable number of laſcars and pioneers, were given in charge to Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell; but when it became neceſſary

(1) For ſuch of theſe remarks as are not conſiſtent with my own knowledge I am indebted to the reſearches of the ingenious Mr. Colebrook; and as I know that his information is drawn from a ſource highly reſpectable, I entertain no doubt of its correctneſs. On this ſubject the reader is further referred to the explanation of that Gentleman's View, *in* Myſore.

to

to examine the heavy guns, to repair the damaged carriages, to provide platforms, and to make every preparation for the ſiege of Seringapatam, this charge was transfered to Colonel Patrick Duff.

On the fall of Bangalore the enemy decamped, and proceeded to the weſtward with the utmoſt precipitation. Struck with extreme panick at ſo ſudden a reverſe of fortune, had circumſtances admitted of purſuit, the principal part of the Sultaun's guns and ſtores muſt, in all probability, have been taken; but, when it is conſidered, that the Britiſh forces had nearly exhauſted their ſtock of grain; that their ammunition for the heavy guns had been almoſt expended; that cattle of every deſcription, from a want of forage, died in hundreds at their pickets; and that all communication with ſupplies was cut off, unleſs forced by a movement of the whole army, the ſucceſs of our atchievements, which could not have taken place at a more favourable period, exceeded the moſt ſanguine hopes, and pointed to the propriety of not endangering the loſs of what we had already in poſſeſſion.

The climate of Bangalore is extremely temperate and ſalubrious. Situated, nearly, in the center of the peninſula, and abounding with reſervoirs of water, the lands benefit by the monſoons of either coaſt, without being deluged by the weight of their fall; the ſoil is fruitful, and produces the neceſſaries of life in great plenty; cabbages, lettuce, and other European culinary wares, planted by Britiſh officers, throve in the gardens all around without any extraordinary attention; and cypreſs, plantain, guava, with trees and ſhrubberies of various deſcriptions, riſing in clumps in all directions, afforded abundance of ſhade.

A

SKETCH

OF THE WAR WITH

TIPPOO SULTAUN.

CHAPTER THE SECOND.

THE reduction of Bangalore, whilſt it afforded the Britiſh force a firm eſtabliſhment, and fixed the war on a ſolid foundation, in the heart of Tippoo Sultaun's dominions, was at the ſame time attended with the very beſt conſequences to the ſeveral operations of our allies. The capture of ſo important a fortreſs, diſheartening the Myſoreans whereſoever beſieged, operated to the advantage of the confederates in all directions. Darwar, Capool, with ſeveral inferior forts that had till now perſiſted in a reſolute defence, as if ſtruck with the ſuperior proweſs and tactical ſkill of their antagoniſts, for the firſt time bethought of ſurrender (1); Polligars of all deſcrip-

(1) The ſtrong fortreſſes of Darwar and Capool, had long been inveſted by the Marattas and the Nizam, and with ſo little proſpect of ſucceſs, that it had been more than once under the conſideration of the Courts of Poonah and Hydrabad, whether they ſhould not convert thoſe ſieges into blockades, to ſet their armies at liberty for more active operations; but the news of the fall of Bangalore, which ſeemed to have been unexpected by the garriſons of thoſe places, ſo effectually intimidated them, that although in no ſhape reduced to extremity, or even diſtreſs, they agreed to ſurrender.—Earl Cornwallis to the Court of Directors, 7th September, 1792.

tions transferring their allegiance to the ſuperior power, in order to teſtify attachment at an early period, flocked with proviſions to the Britiſh camp; and the enemy, conſcious of inferiority from the beginning, ſtill continued to evince a determined reſolution not to try his fortune in battle, unleſs accident furniſhed him with ſome unforeſeen advantage. Yet, notwithſtanding theſe and many other favorable circumſtances, grounds that rendered the adjuſtment of diſputes highly adviſeable were not wanting.

Amongst theſe, the ſtate of politics in Europe, ſtrongly preſſed to bring the war with Tippoo Sultaun to a ſpeedy concluſion. Every information, about this period, confirmed an opinion, that a rupture with Spain, in which France muſt have neceſſarily been included, could not be avoided without much loſs of national reputation. In this event, ſituated as the Britiſh forces then were, our ſettlements in the eaſt would be expoſed, not only to the chance of invaſion from the French iſlands in the Indian ſeas, but, Pondicherry, a ſtrong fortreſs, garriſoned with a conſiderable body of regular troops, muſt, from its ſituation, have threatened the worſt of conſequences. To accommodate differences with the Myſorean Prince without loſs of time, was therefore an object of the utmoſt importance; but as none of his overtures had been addreſſed to the confederates jointly, although told all along that ſuch only would gain attention, whether to bring about an advantageous peace, or to effect a total ſubverſion of empire, a movement towards his capital became abſolutely neceſſary.

Whilst

WHILST the loſs of Bangalore was freſh in his memory, the deteſtation which his haughty and imperious demeanour had occaſioned amongſt the neighbouring powers, muſt have preſſed hard upon the Sultaun's mind. He could not be ignorant, that a combination in which all ranks and claſſes united, muſt have ariſen from a conviction that his conduct had been conſidered in a light ſingularly enormous. He clearly perceived, that the Native Princes, the Britiſh Governor General, the managers for other European powers, their adherents, dependants and ſubjects of every deſcription, were under the influence of one impreſſion; that, in order to humble his pride, ties of intereſt, connection, and religion, gave away amongſt individuals in various inſtances; nay, that all for a time fled comfort. He ſaw the examples of the ſeveral chiefs, ſpread like wildfire to the extremities of their dominions; in ſhort, he had the moſt ample proof of the hatred towards him being univerſal amongſt the neighbouring nations, and, ſo firmly rooted, that the ſeveral leaders however guided by prudence, found it difficult to reſtrain their ſubjects.

UNDER theſe embarraſſments it was natural to ſuppoſe, that a movement towards his capital would induce the Sultaun, to avert the threatening ſtorm by proportionate conceſſions, eſpecially, as he muſt have known, that this capital was unequal to a defence againſt a force which had already captured a fortreſs of much greater ſtrength, and, after being rendered ſtill more formidable by the co-operation of powerful armies and reinforcements, now in readineſs to join. But, the haughty Myſorean, bearing up againſt all theſe diſadvantages,

was

was not as yet ſufficiently humbled to become a ſupplicant or ſuitor.

AFTER burying the dead and providing hoſpitals for the ſick and wounded, Bangalore, with a garriſon conſiſting of his Majeſty's 76th regiment, the 14th Bengal battalion, the 2d battalion of Volunteers, the 21ſt Coaſt battalion, with the exception of one Company, then under command of Lieutenant Munro, and two Companies of Bengal artillery, was, as already mentioned, given in charge to Colonel Patrick Duff, whilſt the principal force continued its operations in the field. Amongſt other advantages, the operations at Bangalore had encouraged a conſiderable body of horſe detached from the army of his Highneſs Nizam Ally Cawn, to advance towards the Britiſh troops. At once to favor a junction with this reinforcement, and to benefit by a conſiderable ſupply of men, money, and proviſions then in readineſs at Amboor, the army ſet out in a direction firſt to the northward, but ſoon afterwards changing towards the eaſt.

THE very firſt movement on this ſervice, afforded a freſh proof of the Sultaun's inferiority in the field. As our army proceeded towards the intended ground of encampment, on the 28th March, a battalion of ſepoys ſent in advance, in order to ſecure forage, diſcovered the enemy at a very ſhort diſtance. Conceiving this to be our advance-guard he immediately took the alarm, and, as uſual on our approach, his nagger beat the ſignal for departure. In an inſtant his whole force was in motion. His rear was purſued and cannonaded by our troops in front; but, the reduced ſtate of our cattle, the celerity

lerity with which he moved, and his dexterity in covering a retreat with large bodies of horſe, which our cavalry were not adequate to oppoſe, protected his infantry and ſecured his guns, excepting one braſs nine pounder, of which the carriage had given way. Here a quantity of ammunition, with a ſmall but valuable ſupply of bullocks for ſlaughter, was alſo captured. That neither Commander had been acquainted with the movement of his antagoniſt on this occaſion, until nearly in ſight of each other, was evident throughout the march, which, from the very great fatigue, was the cauſe of a halt on the enſuing day. At this period, it was moſt probably the intention of Tippoo Sultaun, to throw his army in a ſituation, which by intimidating the detachment of Nizam Ally, would induce its leader to fall back.

CONTINUING our route to the northward, Deonelly, famous from having given birth to Hyder Ally Cawn in the year 1728, was our next ground of encampment. On the ſtrength and decoration of this ſmall fort, the Sultaun appeared to ſpare neither pains nor expence; European workmen thickened the walls all around with hewn ſtone, and materials of the very beſt kind; baſtions and cavaliers defended each angle; a magazine conſtructed with judgement was finiſhed in a ſuperior ſtile; and a gateway, of which the foundation only had been laid, promiſed to render the place reſpectable. As a very large Pettah, ſurrounded by a mud wall, had been built at a ſhort diſtance, it is probable, that in order to procure an eſplanade, the deſtruction of the old one was intended. Still, as

Deonelly is commanded by ſeveral adjacent grounds, it will never be able to hold out againſt a regular force. Here a ſeaſonable ſupply of forage induced the general to halt for a day.

CHINABALABORAM was on the 1ſt of April (1) found in a ſtate of repair, nearly ſimilar to Deonelly; but being nowhere commanded, the ſituation is preferable in a military point of view. It is ſurrounded with a good fauſſebraye, a deep ditch, a covertway, and a glacis; which as it is raiſed much higher than thoſe hitherto ſeen in Myſore, the wall is under better cover from breaching. Four angular baſtions and cavaliers were entirely finiſhed, but the reſt of the works were very incomplete. This fort was put in poſſeſſion of ſome friendly Polligars; the enemy, however, having ſuddenly turned about, retook it by eſcalade, and put the whole of the party to the ſword.

PROCEEDING from thence to the eaſtward by eaſy marches, after repeated contradictory accounts of their movements, a junction with the Nizam's detachment was effected on the 13th at Cottapilly (2). This reinforcement, which conſiſted of about fifteen thouſand fighting men, all on horſeback, ſet order and diſcipline at defiance. It was commanded by Tedgewunt Sing, a Hindoo, nowiſe dignified in appearance; without reſpectability amongſt his countrymen; without experience in warfare; and, of principles at the beſt doubtful.

			Miles.	Furlongs.
(1) 1791, March	28th,	Teronchy,	15	0
	30th,	Deonelly,	10	0
April	1ſt,	Chinabalaboram,	14	0
(2) April	5th,	Sillgottah,	9	4
	6th,	Chintomeny,	14	0
	11th,	Trambipetty,	10	2
	12th,	Cottapilly,	11	4

Armed

Armed with ſwords, ſpears, pikes, matchloks, bows and arrows, with implements of deſtruction from every nation, their very appearance forbade the expectation of benefit or regularity. Each was prepared to fight, according as his fancy or judgement dictated. One clad the right arm up to the elbow in ſteel; another with both expoſed had for defence a maſſy breaſt-plate; ſome truſted their ſafety to ſhields and bucklers; others were covered over with complete coats of mail; ſome wore regular helmets of ſolid metal; many had caſques with trappings, to ſecure the neck and ſhoulders: beſides theſe, there were ſeveral who without aught for defence, were armed with loaded rockets. Each moved as if himſelf had been ſole commander. In ſhort, ſcampering in every direction, they appeared like mountebanks tilting their weapons in the air, as at a juſt or tournament, and not like a regular force, ſeeking redreſs of wrongs. From a people of this deſcription, and under ſuch a leader, but little could in reaſon, be expected. Yet, there were a few, who, on the principle which ſometimes gives the day to an unſkilful gladiator, forbode advantage even from their irregularities. But, as in every inſtance they proved inferior to the enemy, their aſſiſtance fell miſerably ſhort of the moſt moderate hopes. Of this motley groupe, about two thouſand were attached to the reſerve, and put under the immediate direction of Brigade Major Dallas, to whom, without any advantage whatſoever, they proved the ſource of much trouble and vexation. Lieutenant Stewart, of the Bengal eſtabliſhment, aſſiſtant to Sir John Kennaway, accompanied this detachment of Nizam Ally.

AFTER a ſalute of ſeventeen guns, and a compliment from the line under arms to the Nizam's general, the whole proceeded to Venkitaghery, and were there (1) joined by Lieutenant Colonel Oldham, having under his command about four hundred and fifty Bengal cavalry, ſeven hundred European infantry, and nearly four thouſand ſepoys. With this reinforcement there was a large ſupply of proviſions, which had been principally collected by Capt in Alexander Read; an officer, whoſe indefatigable exertions have been pointedly acknowledged by his ſuperiors on repeated occaſions. But from the villainy of the native drivers, or ſome other cauſe, to aſcertain which, a court of enquiry aſſembled, upwards of thirteen hundred bullocks, laden with grain, were captured by looties whilſt on their way to join. Colonel Martin, of Bengal, a gentleman advanced in years, high in reſpectability and fortune, ſerved as volunteer with Earl Cornwallis from this period; Lieutenant Colonel Roſs, of the Madras engineers, Meſſrs. Hoare and Kingſcot, with ſome others of leſs note, here alſo joined the army.

STRENGTHENED with men, money and proviſions, the Britiſh force directed its route towards Bangalore, on the 22d of the month. This movement was productive of little worthy to be recorded. Small detachments from the enemy's horſe, hovered on our ſkirts, whether encamped or in motion; but they did no miſchief beſides cutting down a few native camp-colourmen. On all occaſions they

			Miles.	Furlongs.
(1) April 14th,	Hoodally,	—	11	4
15th,	Moodianoor,	—	11	4
17th,	Agani,	—	14	0
18th,	Venkitaghery,	—	8	0

ſtudiouſly

ſtudiouſly diſplayed their contempt of our Hyderabad allies. Throughout this country, villages depopulated, gardens unprotected by fences, houſes burnt down to the ground, whole fields of unripe corn torn away by the roots, trees not only robbed of their fruit, but ſtripped of their very branches, nay, the whole creation piteouſly bemoaning the deſolations of war, engraved the ruinous ſcene on the contemplative mind, and ſtamped the remembrance of its horrid effects in the moſt laſting characters. But not to dwell on this dreary proſpect, after a march of ſeven days from Venkitaghery, and an abſence of juſt one month from our late valuable acquiſitions, the whole arrived on the 28th, in the neighbourhood of Bangalore (2).

At this ſtage of the war, however, in order to give a juſt idea of the calamitous ſtate to which the affairs of Tippoo Sultaun had been reduced, and of the ſhocks that threatened to burſt his empire aſunder, it will be neceſſary to caſt a retroſpective eye towards the operations carried on by the other branches of the confederacy, before the deſcription of any movement againſt Seringapatam is attempted. In the proſecution of this deſign, the arrangement which appears beſt adapted for elucidation, is, to trace the military operations, juſt as they were carried on by the ſeveral powers in alliance, according

(2)

		Miles.	Furlongs.
April 22d,	Mindapilly,	10	6
23d,	Aytenpilly,	12	4
24th,	Vakulairoo,	12	6
26th,	Maloor,	12	0
27th,	Dorootooroo,	10	4
28th,	Agaram,	10	4

to the natural poſition of their reſpective dominions. Quitting therefore the exertions of Earl Cornwallis, agreeably to the plan propoſed, the part which His Highneſs Nizam Ally Cawn took in the war, comes next under conſideration.

FAR from a certainty of exactitude, with reſpect to the number of fighting men, that aſſembled on the plains of Hyderabad, towards the latter end of May 1790, even conjecture muſt be deemed dangerous. The deſire of revenging the many inſults offered to their Prince, and of recovering their ancient poſſeſſions, was ſo ſtrong amongſt the ſubjects of Nizam Ally, as that the whole face of the country was covered with men in arms, with elephants, camels, horſes and military equipments of every deſcription. This unwieldy maſs, moving in a ſoutherly direction, after croſſing the Kiſtna, reached Rachore, and pitched their encampment in that neighbourhood, for a term of at leaſt ſix weeks. From thence proceeding ſtill towards the ſouth, poſſeſſion was taken of Vanoo, with various other barrier ſtations, which offered little or no reſiſtance.

AFTER laying waſte the whole country, and being ſtrengthened according to agreement (1), by two battalions of Madras ſepoys, under Major Montgomery of that eſtabliſhment, with about ſixty

(1) Eſtabliſhment of a battalion of native infantry, according to the ſtipulation between the Right Honorable the Governor General, and His Highneſs the Nizam:

1 Captain,
4 Lieutenants,
4 Enſigns,
1 Adjutant,
1 Aſſiſtant Surgeon,
8 Serjeants,
8 Subadars,
8 Jemmadars,
32 Havildars,
32 Naigues,
8 Drummers,
2 Fifers,
1 Black Doctor,
8 Puckallies,
800 Sepoys,
40 Recruits,
1 Head Concoply,
1 Aſſiſtant ditto.

European

European artillery-men, under Captain Tutt, the grand army of Nizam Ally ſat down before Capool, on the 28th of October, 1790. This high rock, although ſcarcely acceſſible from nature, is ſurrounded at the ſummit with a ſtrong wall, within which, ſeveral barracks and magazines are conſtructed. A lofty cavalier, which ſtands in the centre of this encloſure, overlooks the other works, and commands all around; in every other part where the ſteepneſs will admit of it, batteries and other defences are erected; and the lower walls, which are built with hard blue ſtone and chunam, have baſtions and out works, with a deep ditch. The Pettah was ſoon taken poſſeſſion of, and in leſs than ſix days, the ſiege was turned into a blockade. One battery of ſix twenty-four-pounders, opened on the north face of the fort, and immediately after, another which had four guns of the ſame calibre, played on the oppoſite ſide. Several ſkirmiſhing parties, and ſallies, too tedious to detail, were conſtantly oppoſed with ſucceſs by Monſieur Remon, an enterprizing Frenchman, in the employ of the Subah; the cannonade although it had not effected a complete breach, appeared to have made conſiderable impreſſion upon the wall; but ſuch had been the unſerviceable ſtate of the guns, that in one week, all were completely diſabled, by their own fire alone. The probability of this dangerous event, although pointed out at an early period (2), had not been attended

(2) As the inſtructions given to the officer at the head of the detachment ſent to Nizam Ally, would occupy more room than the nature of this volume could conveniently ſpare, it is conceived the following extract may prove ſatisfactory to the reader:—"Major General Medows, is highly pleaſed with the readineſs expreſſed on "your part, at the meeting with Meer Abdul Coſſim, to comply in every reſpect, to the utmoſt of your power, "with the wiſhes of His Highneſs the Nizam; and recommends ſtrongly your continuing this line of conduct.

"He

tended to by Mahomed Jung, an unexperienced Muſſelman, who then held the ſupreme command. From various concurrent teſtimonies, this man's obſtinacy, which could only be equalled by his ignorance, prevented all poſſibility of convincing him that his opinions were erroneous. Under theſe circumſtances, it became neceſſary to draw a ſupply of cannon from Rachore and Pangul, at the latter of which ſtations, His Highneſs had determined to await the return of his army.

From the difficulties attendant on a freſh equipment, it was the middle of January before the new guns were ready to open; but as the battery on which they were chiefly planted, was erected within three hundred yards of the fort on the weſtern face, a breach of twenty-ſeven feet in width, was effected; ſtill a ſteep rock of conſiderable height rendered all acceſs to the wall in this quarter extremely difficult. The cannonade was inceſſant, until a flag hung out in the beginning of April, diſcovered a diſpoſition to ſurrender (1). On the 18th, the place was given up by treaty, and about a week afterwards, the example was followed by Bahauder Bunder, a ſtrong rock, at the diſtance of about three miles. In theſe forts near

" He is highly ſenſible that many difficulties may occur, in the courſe of the ſervice in which you are employed, " in co-operating with the general, appointed by the Nizam, to conduct the expedition. On this ſubject, the " Commander in Chief truſts much to your judgement and diſcretion; and that as the command of the expedi- " tions, will unavoidably be placed in the Nizam's officer, you will pay the neceſſary attention to the execution of " every plan of operation he may finally determine upon. Captain Kennaway intimates, that the Nizam's officer " will be directed to conſult you, on whatever is propoſed to be undertaken; and the General directs me to expreſs " his earneſt hope, that you will in every reſpect, as far as poſſible, conduct the public ſervice, in the beſt, and " moſt conciliating manner; ſo as not only to prevent complaint, but to enſure ſucceſs." Adjutant General, to Major Montgomerie, the 2d of July, 1790.

(1) The fall of Capool was as already noticed, one of the ſalutary conſequences which reſulted from the capture of Bangalore, and not from the operations of the troops, by whom it was inveſted. The diſcretional powers given to Lieutenant Colonel Cockerel, whilſt the Bengal detachment was on its way to the ſouthward, muſt lead the reader to believe, that conſiderable expectations had been founded on the exertions of our Hyderabad allies at the beginning; however, as no requiſition for troops, beyond the two battalions already mentioned, appears

near three thouſand fighting men ſurrendered to the army of His Highneſs, and upwards of fifty pieces of cannon, with a conſiderable quantity of proviſions fell to the captors.

LEAVING Rachore to the left, this force moved on the 1ſt of May, 1791, towards Cuddapah. When they had advanced as far as Canool, after a halt of one week in that neighbourhood, news which confirmed the ſurrender of Gunjecotta to Haffez Jee, an officer of merit and enterprize, was brought in from different directions. The main force now proceeded towards their late acquiſitions, and forming a junction with the ſucceſsful diviſion at Gunjecotta towards the end of June, the whole halted for the ſpace of one month. Proceeding again to the ſouthward, and leaving Cuddapah, which had now been given up, on the left, after a march of ſix weeks, Gurrumconda was beſieged on the 15th of September.

HERE, as on a former occaſion at Capool, the guns ſoon became unſerviceable. However, this deficiency was remedied by a ſupply of two eighteen-pounders, under Lieutenant Ruſſel, of the Madras

appears to have been made from that court, it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that Nizam Ally had determined at an early period not to attempt any hazardous enterprize, but contenting himſelf with retaking thoſe diſtricts which had been lately wreſted out of his poſſeſſion by Tippoo Sultaun and his father, to await the reſult of our operations, as obſerved at the cloſe of the firſt volume. A letter from the Adjutant General to Colonel Cockerel, runs thus: "In anſwer to the part of your letter, that ſtates the diſcretional power granted by Earl Cornwallis to join the forces "of his Highneſs the Nizam, in caſe they had croſſed the Kiſtna into the northern countries of the Myſore "chief, under the poſſibility that his Highneſs had placed a reliance on being ſupported with a part or the whole of "the detachment under your command, I am directed to ſignify as follows from the Commander in Chief: That "as Earl Cornwallis authorized you to halt the detachment eventually, and communicate with Colonel Kelly, com-"manding the troops in the centre diviſion, and with Captain Kennaway, the public Miniſter at the Nizam's "court, and to act conformable to the orders and communications you might receive in conſequence, that there-"fore your conduct ought to be guided by ſuch communications and orders, to the extent preſcribed by his Lord-"ſhip. But I am directed to ſignify at the ſame time, that Major General Medows is of opinion, it will meet "with the approbation of Earl Cornwallis, conſidering the advanced ſituation to the ſouthward of your detach-"ment, before this letter can reach you, if you do not join the Nizam without poſitive orders from his Lordſhip, "from the Commander in Chief on the Coaſt, or from the Council of Fort St. George. I am alſo directed to ſig-"nify from Major General Medows, his decided opinion, that your detachment ought not to be divided in the "event of your receiving orders to join the Nizam."

eſtabliſhment, which had been employed in the reduction of Nundydroog; theſe, together with two twenty-ſix pounders, and large quantities of ammunition ſent by order of Earl Cornwallis from Bangalore, arriving in charge of Lieutenant Macgregor of Bengal, with a detachment of ſepoys, gave additional vigor to the operations againſt Gurrumconda.

TOWARDS the beginning of November, the batteries opened afreſh; and on the 6th of that month, a practicable breach was effected. About nine o'clock at night, the beſiegers advanced to the ſtorm; twelve Europeans under Mr. Nixon, a conductor of ſtores, compoſed the forlorn hope; theſe, ſupported by all the artillery, grenadiers, and ſix companies of ſepoys under the direction of Captain Andrew Read, got poſſeſſion of the lower fort, but not without much reſiſtance and loſs of blood. Two Killedars, with about three hundred of the defendants are ſaid to have fallen in the breach. Of the Madras troops upwards of thirty were killed and wounded; amongſt the latter, Lieutenant Hall of that eſtabliſhment was numbered. At this place a number of ſepoys of the Company's ſervice, together with ſeveral hircarras in the employ of Earl Cornwallis, and Sir John Kennaway, were releaſed; all of them had been detained in heavy irons.

ALTHOUGH the beſiegers had thus become maſters of the works around the bottom of the hill, the upper fort ſtill continued in poſſeſſion of the enemy. Strong by nature, this fort was now ſtrengthened

ſtrengthened by all who ſaved their lives in the ſtorm of the lower wall; it was acceſſible only by one confined paſſage, which had been defended by nine gates of the beſt conſtruction; and was not, therefore, to be taken without much loſs of time. The proſecution of the ſiege was conſequently given in charge to Haffez Jee, with about five thouſand fighting men, of which number nine hundred were mounted; but the principal force, which had now been joined by about twenty-five thouſand fighting men, under the Prince Secunder Jaw, attended by Meer Allum, and Sir John Kennaway, moved towards the Padnagdirgum paſs, in order to ſtrengthen a convoy then on its way to the grand army, with Lieutenant Colonel Floyd.

As this force proceeded, information received on the 22d left no room to doubt, that Gurrumconda had been retaken about the 20th of the month. Led by Hyder Sahib, one of the Sultaun's illegitimate ſons, about ten thouſand fighting men, chiefly on horſeback, advanced to attack Haffez Jee. In order to ſave ſome Vakeels that imprudently reſided without the works, and to do away the diſadvantage of fighting between two fires, this reſolute warrior determined to advance on the enemy, at the head of his horſe. Of his firſt onſet nothing could withſtand the ſhock; but overcome by ſuperiority of numbers, he fell under a multitude of blows, and with him the greateſt part of his detachment were cut to pieces. Under the young Prince of Canool, ſupported by Rajah Joute Sing, the combat, however unequal, was for a time fiercely maintained; but,

overpowered

overpowered by a multitude, after the Rajah had been ſeverely wounded, the Prince yielded to his untoward fate and reluctantly gave way. He, however, managed his retreat with ſuch dexterity, that he protected his wounded friend, and got poſſeſſion of Muddawier, a ſmall fort which he maintained until he found an opportunity of joining Secunder Jaw, on the 24th of the month. Such as preferred a chance of protection from within to the fortunes of the field, communicated a fatal panick to the whole of the defendants. The enemy preſſing in cloſe purſuit, entered the works along with the fugitives; the garriſon of the upper fort ſallied at the ſame inſtant; and, as the attack thickened from all ſides, the route was general and compleat. At the head of the infantry, whilſt attempting to encourage them, the Rajah Paparow, and his brother were amongſt the firſt that fell; in ſhort, but few eſcaped this bloody maſſacre, and theſe owe their exiſtence to dexterity in feigning the appearance of death. Here a conſiderable quantity of treaſure, with a large ſupply of proviſion and ſtores fell to the captors.

CONTENTED for the preſent with this inſtance of fortune's favour, Hyder Sahib returned towards his father, and having taken the family of Cummer ul Deen out of the upper fort, he left a reinforcement of men and proviſions in Gurrumconda. But this ſtrong hold was doomed to be the ſcite of further contention. On Chriſtmas day, about the hour of ten, the Madras detachment ſtill under Captain Read, ſupported by Secunder Jaw, again attacked the Myſorean garriſon and ſoon became maſters of the lower fort, without the loſs

of

of one man; indeed, it is ſaid, there were none wounded. The enemy, however, ſuffered a little, although their retreat into the upper fort was very precipitate: they were purſued with much intrepidity to the very gates. During the attack, and for ſeveral days after, there was a conſtant diſcharge of cannon from the top of the hill; and ſeveral of thoſe that fought under the unfortunate Haffez Jee, quitting their lurking places amidſt the jungles, preſented ſpectacles miſerable to behold, all of them being deprived of ſome limb or other.

THE army of Nizam Ally Cawn advancing to the ſouthward, left the lower fort of Gurrumconda, with a force much ſuperior to that which had been lately cut off, in charge of Aſſed Ally, and took a final departure about the middle of January 1792. As the Britiſh forces were at that time employed in the reduction of ſeveral Droogs that riſe amongſt the jungles, between Bangalore and Seringapatam, it was recommended to the Prince by Earl Cornwallis, to advance but ſlowly with his army, as it would be impoſſible for ſo large a force to approach within ſeveral miles of the ground upon which the Britiſh troops were obliged to encamp; therefore, after halting for ſome days in the neighbourhood of Bangalore, the Hyderabad forces proceeded by eaſy marches, and formed a junction with the grand army towards the latter end of the month.

A DEGREE of caution that may be ſaid to have bordered on fear, marked all efforts made by a conſiderable force from the Marratta ſtates, which was employed in the diſtricts between the Kiſtna and

Tumbudra rivers, throughout the firſt ſtage of the *Myſorean* war. The leader of this armament, conſcious of inferiority, and conceiving that the Britiſh nation might, from want of ſucceſs or ſome other cauſe, be forced into a ſeparate accommodation, dreaded offending the Sultaun beyond the probability of reconciliation. However numerous, the eaſtern Marratta diviſion, truſting for protection more to the powers in alliance than to their own ſtrength, they contented themſelves with taking poſſeſſion of Gudgenagur, and ſome other barrier ſtations, at the time their Hyderabad allies laid ſiege to Capool, Gunjecotta, Cuddapa and Gurrumconda; but they reſolved not to attempt any hazardous enterprize, unleſs ſupported by another branch of the confederacy; indeed it is well known that by themſelves they effected nothing worthy of notice. The operations of the Marrattas who aſſembled under Purſeram Bhow, were widely different; but as the inſults to which this Prince had been ſubjected, rouſed him to powerful exertions, not leſs than the perſonal injuries he had ſuſtained, it will be neceſſary to detail his exploits at greater length.

EARLY in the month of September 1790, after being joined by two battalions of Bombay ſepoys, under Captain Little, agreeable to ſtipulation, about twenty thouſand fighting men, headed by the Bhow in perſon, proceeded to beſiege Darwar. As this force advanced, ſeveral inferior ſtations ſurrendered, without oppoſition; but a ſtrong party that was poſted in advance, in order to cover the fort, was not diſlodged without conſiderable loſs. In this action, which took place on the 21ſt October, four ſepoy grenadier companies, and

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the eight Bombay battalions, under Captain Macdonald, commenced the attack with great ſteadineſs; and being well ſupported by the Marrattas, continued to advance on the enemy until they gave way. The fugitives quitted the field with much precipitation, and leaving their guns to the conquerors, they fled to Darwar for ſhelter. In this action the loſs, which amounted in all to about one hundred and twenty killed and wounded, fell nearly equal on the Bombay and Marratta troops. Of the enemy upwards of two hundred were ſlain. Lieutenants Maxwell and Wynne, of Captain Little's detachment, were amongſt the wounded.

Darwar, garriſoned by ſeven thouſand fighting men, was now cloſely inveſted, but without ſuffering any material injury for a conſiderable length of time. Againſt this ſtrong hold, it was on the 13th of December that the firſt project of importance was attempted. Under Appa Sahib, ſon to Purſeram Bhow, the Bombay battalions, aſſiſted by a numerous Marratta force, aſſaulted the Pettah. They carried the lower works by eſcalade, and drove the enemy into the upper ones; but the diviſion under Captain Little excepted, the whole, unable to depart from their wonted habits, betook to plunder.

The garriſon of the upper fort, taking advantage of this circumſtance, ſallied from different directions and drove the Marrattas in all quarters. The diſcipline of a few ſaved the whole from deſtruction. Emboldened by ſucceſs, the Myſoreans dealt ſlaughter on every hand, and the utmoſt efforts of the Bombay troops was required to cover the

the retreat. This ſmall body, however, contrived to carry off three of the Sultaun's guns. Captain Little was himſelf wounded; Lieutenant Forſter, with about thirty ſepoys, ſhared a ſimilar fate. Amongſt our ſlain, which amounted to about half that number, there was no man of rank; but the confuſion in which the Mairattas attempted to eſcape, ſubjected them to a loſs far more conſiderable, although it could never be exactly aſcertained.

AFTER the beſieging army had been ſtrengthened by one regiment of Europeans, a battalion of ſepoys, and a detachment of artillery and laſcars from Bombay, under Lieutenant Colonel Frederick, Darwar was ſurrendered by capitulation, on the 4th April, 1791 (1). Reports generally believed ſay, that the articles of this capitulation were ſhamefully violated by the Bhow's troops. The terms of ſurrender were highly honourable to the Killedar, Budder ul Zemeen Cawn. With ſecurity for private property, he had the promiſe of a paſſport for his garriſon, their fire arms, and public treaſure to Simoga, a fort which the Sultaun held on the northern bank of the Tumbudra; but before they had advanced any diſtance, beſides being forcibly ſtripped of their whole property, ſeveral lives are ſaid to have been taken; and the venerable Killedar, although he eſcaped with life, ſuffered a number of ſevere wounds.

(1) "Laſt night official accounts arrived of the ſurrender of Darwar to Purſeram Bhow, on the 4th inſtant. "From what is reported of the capitulation, the conditions on the part of the Marattas are ſhameful. The enemy's "garriſon were allowed to paſs out with all their fire-arms, ammunition, and ſeveral field pieces. All the public "treaſure, as well as private property, were to remain in the enemy's hands; and the whole to be conducted ſafe "to Simoga, one of Tippoo's forts at ſome diſtance to the ſouthward of the Tumbudra." Extract of a letter from an officer of Major Montgomery's detachment to a friend in Bengal, dated 7th April, 1791.

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THE ſhort period which elapſed between the fall of Darwar, and the junction of Purſeram Bhow with Earl Cornwallis, was employed by the former in providing magazines, and ſecuring a ſafe communication with his own country, by occupying a chain of poſts that ſtretched in a direct line from the vicinity of Seringapatam to Darwar. But the failure of an expedition which ſoon afterwards took place againſt the enemy's capital, rendered it neceſſary to abandon this chain, as it led ſo far to the weſtward, for another, which ſtretching by Sera and Roydroog, could be maintained with much leſs chance of danger. However, as theſe circumſtances will be more fully detailed in due time, the reader is conducted to an attempt at the fulfillment of a promiſe that was made in the firſt volume.

THE confidence which the appearance of Lieutenant Colonel Hartley's detachment in Travancore, ſo early as April 1790, afforded to the Ram Rajah and his ſubjects, was cloſely followed up by the moſt vigorous exertions of the Britiſh forces on both ſides of the peninſula. The unbridled ambition of the Sultaun, by a premature attempt to commit an act of injuſtice in flagrant breach of the treaty of Mangalore, having given juſt cauſe for war during the period of a vigorous government, called forth the only power whoſe influence in India could forge ſhackles anywiſe capable of reſtraining that ambition.

HIS reſtleſs temper had no ſooner conſented to the treaty juſt mentioned, than he meditated an extenſion of conqueſt from his northern neighbours, which he ſoon carried into execution; conſequently ſquabbles

and bickerings, in which he was generally ſucceſsful, enſued between him and theſe powers for a period of nearly two years. The time that intervened between theſe troubles and the late war, he employed in preparation for the accompliſhment of thoſe latent ſchemes of conqueſt which have ſince been attempted againſt the King of Travancore, and which he well knew muſt ultimately have embroiled him with the allies of that prince. Whilſt the Sultaun by the erection of fortreſſes out of number, daily acquired internal ſtrength, he invigorated his whole ſyſtem by principles of ſound government, and by an œconomical management of reſources to which thoſe of any neighbouring power, if ſtate exigencies are conſidered, bore no compariſon. However bigotted to the tenets of the Koran, the vaſt number of Hindoo temples recently decorated throughout his dominions authorizes an aſſertion, that his enthuſiaſm gave way to his ambition, and that his zeal to propagate the Muſſulman faith, did not occaſion ſo many inſtances of barbarity, as his rage for conqueſt, and an innate cruel and revengeful diſpoſition. Although parſimonious in a high degree, numbers of his confidential Hindoo ſervants, who during the war fell into our hands, acknowledged him a lenient and indulgent maſter; nor have we to boaſt of many inſtances where his people were induced by our flattering proſpects of ſucceſs, to throw off his yoke and ſhelter themſelves under the benign influence of Chriſtian rulers. On the contrary, with the exception of a very few diſtricts, the inhabitants of Myſore have invariably laid waſte their country. They deſtroyed their habitations, and flying in

every

every direction, they drove their cattle into the moſt hidden receſſes, burning their grain, although famine muſt have been the inevitable conſequence.

CHECKING the frauds of intermediate agents by ſevere and exemplary puniſhments, the Sultaun protected his ryuts, who were chiefly of the Hindoo religion, from the enormities of black collectors; and wherever it became neceſſary to hold out an oſtenſible reaſon for the inhuman cruelties which he frequently committed, the cloak of religion was always ſpread to ſanctify the tranſaction. Although ſo parſimonious, that it was attended with the utmoſt difficulty to prevail upon him to diſcharge, with any degree of punctuality, the arrears due to his troops, yet their attachment to his cauſe, was ſuch all along that they paid the moſt implicit obedience to his mandates in the worſt of times.

IN all favorable ſituations, particularly contiguous to Bangalore, he was employed in erecting new forts with broad and deep ditches, with excellent covert ways and glacis, and flanked with ſtrong baſtions. As theſe were built of the beſt materials, under the direction of European workmen, they muſt have been intended as places of ſafety for the ſurrounding inhabitants, whilſt the ſtanding army ſhould be occupied in the conqueſt of diſtant countries. Fortunately, however, he commenced his career at a period in itſelf too early, and rendered ſtill more diſadvantageous to his purſuits from the internal diſtractions that agitated the Houſe of Bourbon. Beſides, he could not poſſibly have expected, that any negociation of our Governor General, could have united

united powers ſo diſcordant, as the ſeveral chiefs of the peninſula, for the overthrow of his Houſe.

SENSIBLE of the part which Great Britain would take in the cauſe of her ally, and fearful of the conſequences, it is ſaid that in the laſt council of war which the Sultaun called before his attack of the Travancore lines, more than the majority of his confidential ſervants oppoſed the meaſure; but none ſo pointedly as his favorite Buckſhee, a Hindoo, to whom he facetiouſly obſerved, that his was not the profeſſion of arms; that although he ſought his opinion, he was not obliged to abide by it; and, cautioning him to provide ample reſources, he declared his intention to march with the light of the enſuing day. His progreſs in the proſecution of that deſign has been already detailed, and the recovering of about forty guns out of the Paniani river, by Lieutenant Colonel Hartley, clearly diſcovers the precipitate manner in which he for a time abandoned his trophies and proſpects of conqueſt.

THE advance of Major General Medows into the Coimbatore diſtrict in April 1790, rendering it neceſſary for the Sultaun to withdraw from his intended invaſion to the protection of his own dominions, the Bombay detachment remained in Travancore without being ſent on any material exploit, until ordered in the enſuing September to relieve the Madras battalions which had been left in charge of Palligautcherry. Soon after this ſervice was effected, truſting the ſecurity of our ſouthern acquiſitions to Major Cuppage, with two ſepoy battalions, and a conſiderable body of troops from the Rajah of Travancore,

core, Colonel Hartley returned to the Malabar Coaſt. As he approached Callicut on the 10th December, information was brought into camp, that about fourteen thouſand of the enemy were ſtrongly poſted in a jungle at the diſtance of about ten miles, and that they were under the command of Mohub Cawn with Hooſſen Ally Cawn, then phuſdar of thoſe diſtricts. At the head of His Majeſty's 75th regiment, the 7th Bombay battalion, and one of native grenadiers, Colonel Hartley ſet out in queſt of this enemy, who truſting to ſuperiority of numbers, and the natural ſtrength of their poſition, did not decline the engagement. However, after a warm conflict they were driven to a village, where they made a moſt obſtinate defence; but compelled at length to give up this new poſt, they fled with precipitation to Trincalore fort.

HERE the grenadier ſepoys entering with the fugitives, Hooſſen Ally Cawn was taken priſoner, but Mohub Cawn having put himſelf at the head of ſome horſe, eſcaped by flight. A victory ſo complete, could not be in reaſon expected over ſuch ſuperiority of numbers, without loſs of blood; yet our ſufferings bore no proportion to the advantages gained, or to the length of the action. In Colonel Hartley's detachment, there was no man of rank ſlain; Captains Lawman and Blachford, with Lieutenants Powel and Stewart, were amongſt the wounded. This brilliant victory, was followed by the immediate evacuation of Furrucabad, a new fort in the vicinity of Callicut.

About the time that Lieutenant Colonel Frederick advanced to the aſſiſtance of Purſeram Bhow, Major General Abercromby, with His Majeſty's 77th regiment, the 12th battalion of ſepoys, and ſome artillery and laſcars, proceeded to the Malabar Coaſt; on the arrival of this force at Tellicherry, early in December 1790, one and all of the native princes who had paid implicit obedience to the will of Tippoo Sultaun, ever ſince his acceſſion to the Myſorean throne, made a ready and ſincere declaration of allegiance to the Britiſh government. The reduction of Cannanore by that General, on the 16th of the month, which was ſoon ſucceeded by the ſurrender of Biliapatam, without loſs of blood, left no part of the rich and fertile diſtricts that ſtretch from the Decla to Travancore, under the ſovereignty of the uſurper's ſon. The approach of Colonel Hartley's detachment on the laſt day of the year, enabled the Governor of Bombay to proſecute the plan of operations, which he had at an early period concerted with Earl Cornwallis; and in order to forward a junction of our force at the enemy's capital, by the neareſt route, nothing which induſtry, judgement, and zeal could effect, had been neglected throughout the ſeveral departments of our weſtern army.

The difficulties of equipment for weighty military operations from the Malabar Coaſt, are widely different from thoſe that offer in Bengal and the Carnatic. The Nairs who in general ſpread along the weſtern ſhores, do not ſubmit to labour like the inhabitants of other countries, far leſs is that degree of condeſcenſion to be expected from

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the rich and uſurious Moplahs. The confined nature of Bombay forbids the expectation of an adequate proportion of camp-followers from that quarter, conſequently our principal dependence reſted on what ſupplies could be procured from the Maratta ſtates; but as that people have an unconquerable averſion to expeditions by ſea, however well inclined to the public cauſe, the inſular ſituation of our weſtern preſidency, offered a formidable barrier to their exertions.

NOTWITHSTANDING theſe diſadvantages, an army which conſiſted of His Majeſty's 73d, 75th and 77th regiments, one Bombay regiment of Europeans, the 2d, 7th, 10th and 12th battalions of Bombay ſepoys, the 14th battalion of Coaſt ſepoys, and two flank battalions, with a proportion of artillery laſcars and pioneers, proceeded to the eaſtward on the 22d February, 1791. From the moment that Earl Cornwallis aſſumed the ſupreme command of the troops in the field, one uniform plan of approaching the enemy's capital by the neareſt convenient route was laid down, and invariably adhered to by both armies. Whatever advantages might have been derived from diverſions or attempts to cut off the enemy's ſupplies, fatal experience had taught us the danger of dividing troops, and of throwing them at a diſtance from the main ſcene of action. The Sultaun had now become too formidable to be fought in detail, and any good which could poſſibly have ariſen from traverſing diſtant countries, in order to cripple his reſources, could in no ſort balance the chance of injury to which detachments muſt have been expoſed, from the rapidity

dity of his evolutions, in conſequence of ſo decided a ſuperiority in cattle.

THE beſt and ſhorteſt road from the Malabar Coaſt to Seringapatam, is that which leads through the Coorga country. There is a ſafe conveyance by water from our ſeveral ſea-ports, by the Keeway river as far as Iliacore. From thence to the top of the principal Ghaut, including the riſe, is twenty-one miles, but from the ruggedneſs of the country, and cloſeneſs of the jungles, it is a journey which cannot well be performed with artillery in leſs than three days. To Periapatam from this ſummit, the diſtance is not ſhort of thirty-ſix miles, the country is difficult to penetrate, and conſequently cannot be paſſed over in a ſhorter period of time, than the other diviſion of the paſs. From Periapatam to Seringapatam, the diſtance is nearly the ſame as to the Ghaut, but the road is better beyond all compariſon.

AFTER their communication with the Coaſt had been ſecured, with infinite labour the battering guns, field pieces and ſtores, were got up an immenſe range of mountains, which riſing almoſt perpendicular, ſeparates the ancient dominions of Myſore from the poſſeſſions of the Rajahs, who time immemorial have inhabited the Malabar Coaſt. By fixing tackles to large trees, that grow all over the face of this range, a ſervice which otherwiſe appeared impracticable was conſiderably facilitated; but beſides other difficulties which they had to encounter, the making a road for heavy guns through a foreſt of ſixty miles, where the whole way is cloſely interwoven with thick

jungles

jungles, or over ſoft paddy fields, is a ſtrong proof of the indefatigable exertions of the army at large.

Besides the difficulties attendant on aſcending at Poodicherum, and deſcending at Sedaſier, this ſtupenduous barrier, for a diſtance of about thirty miles, appears from nature to bid defiance to invaſion. All the rivers that water the Malabar coaſt, and ſome of thoſe that enrich the ſouthern diſtricts of the Carnatick, take their riſe on theſe mountains, which although in general covered with almoſt impenetrable jungles, are here and there divided by vallies of extraordinary fertility. A tribe of the Hindoo religion called Coorgs, a people in their manners and appearance ſingular as the country itſelf, inhabits theſe wilds from the confines of Bedanore nearly to the ſouthern extremity of the table land.

Habituated from an early period in life to hunt the deer, the hog, and the fox, as well as to guard againſt the aſſault of the elephant, the tyger and the bear, the principal boaſt of the Coorgs is in the dexterous management of their arms, yet they are by no means negligent with reſpect to the cultivation of their lands. From the height of the mountains that riſe on all hands, the vallies are conſtantly watered by the breaking of clouds around their ſummits, ſo that the country, however wild in appearance, is a granary which peace and induſtry muſt render inexhauſtible. Nor were the advantages, which might have been derived from theſe circumſtances in the event of beſieging Seringapatam as at firſt intended, ſuffered to paſs in neglect. The weſtern force continued for a time to collect a

ſtock of proviſions in the Coorga country, which, if it became requiſite, might eaſily be brought forward from thence, after a junction of the two armies; an employment than which none more uſeful could poſſibly attract their attention.

ALTHOUGH the equipments of our weſtern force for the firſt campaign, were not ſo complete as thoſe at the heads of departments could have wiſhed, the exertions that effected ſo much, rather than any deficiency, raiſes admiration. The hardſhips attendant on want of conveyance, had already been ſeverely felt at Bangalore; but whether a Britiſh army can at all traverſe the plains of Hindoſtan, with ſtores and proviſions adequate to momentuous military undertakings, without ſome dependance on aſſiſtance from local contingencies, is a matter which admits of much doubt; nor is it hazardous to affirm, that the wiſdom and addreſs of Earl Cornwallis, in conciliating the Brinjaries, and in ſecuring their ſervices by protection and liberal payments, contributed to our ultimate ſucceſs, not leſs than the exertions of the ſeveral ſubordinate preſidencies, his own ſuperior policy and happy arrangement, or the extreme valour and rigid diſcipline of his troops. Without the aid of theſe induſtrious carriers, even the united force which Bengal, Madras, and Bombay had ſent abroad, although it amounted in all to about forty battalions of infantry, and ſix regiments of horſe, together with the myriads of our Poona and Hyderabad allies, would ſcarcely have enabled us to advance to Seringapatam, ſo as to ſit down for the reduction of the place with any certainty of ſucceſs.

UNTAMED

UNTAMED as the elephants and tygers that inhabit the weſtern barrier of the Myſorean dominions, the Coorgs ſpurning a foreign yoke, maintained perpetual hoſtilities with the Houſe of Hyder, ever ſince his firſt attempt at their ſubjection. Repeatedly have they been reduced to fly their country, but never have been brought to acknowledge a maſter, who aimed not only at the converſion of their principles, but at the extirpation of their race. Their preſent Prince, whilſt a captive at Seringapatam, after being compelled to endure the painful rituals of the creſcent, found means to make his eſcape; but the diſgrace to which he had been neceſſitated to ſubmit, rivetted his mind to juſt revenge.

SENSIBLE of the advantages which his aſſiſtance muſt have afforded, the Sultaun at an early period of this war, for the firſt time ſought an alliance with the Chief of the Coorgs; and, in order to eſtabliſh a friendſhip between them on a ſolid baſis, he is ſaid to have offered one of his daughters in marriage. Mercara, the capital of thoſe wilds, had been for a length of time in the poſſeſſion of the Myſorean Prince. It was cloſely inveſted by the Rajah at the time the Britiſh army paſſed through his dominions; but in the true ſpirit of chivalry, he with much profeſſion of gratitude, refuſed aſſiſtance. On a prior occaſion, in return for ſervices rendered this Prince, during his captivity, by an officer who had been ſent with a detachment to relieve Mercara, he not only ſuffered the whole party to eſcape, although completely in the power, but he permitted them to throw their ſuccours into the place. However, to do away any unfavorable impreſſion

impreſſion to which a conduct of this nature might give riſe, he explained his motives to the perfect ſatisfaction of General Abercromby. He ſtated, that this return for former kindneſſes could avail the Sultaun nothing, for that it would contribute to leſſen his magazines of proviſion, without retarding the fall of Mercara many weeks; and in the metaphorical ſtile of his country, proteſted that he had but one heart, and that it was locked up in a ſtrong box, of which the key had been ſent to the King of England.

The policy of Hyder in the eſtabliſhment of his houſe, was uniform throughout. Fomenting the quarrels of his neighbours, he conſtantly overthrew the ſtronger of the contending parties, by taking the weaker under his protection; and, whilſt ſo decided a ſuperiority enſured the deſtruction of the former, the latter became an eaſy prey to his ambition. It was thus that he ſeized, and for a time held, not only the country of the Coorgs, but Bedanore and all the diſtricts of the Nairs, even to the confines of Travancore. The barbarities that took place in quelling the ſubſequent inſurrections, particularly thoſe inflicted on the Coorgs, however ſhocking to humanity, only ſerved to heighten the diſcontents of that people and to whet their revenge: nor is the period diſtant, at which, after collecting the whole force of their nation, they fell ſuddenly and ſilently on a brigade of the Sultaun's troops, then eſcorting a rich convoy from the Malabar Coaſt towards Seringapatam. The remains of this corps, unburied as our army paſſed the place, lay ſcattered all over the ſcene of action, and fully confirmed the truth of this relation.

OPPRESSED and weakened by repeated ſtruggles to recover their rights, the whole force of the Coorgs at the commencement of this war amounted only to about five thouſand fighting men. Deſolated from repeated invaſions, their neglected fields, ſometimes, ſcarcely yielded a ſufficiency for the maintainance of their cultivators; yet ſo ſincere was the Rajah in his endeavours, and ſo punctual in the performance of his engagements, that conſiderable advantages were derived from his aſſiſtance; the firſt inſtance whereof, appeared in an early and valuable ſupply of bullocks. This piece of ſervice was cloſely followed by the moſt ſpirited exertions to forward the tranſport of our equipments acroſs his country. Unaffected in his manners, he cultivated the acquaintance of our officers, and as his heart was a ſtranger to guile, he was readily admitted to their ſociety without diſtruſt.

THE detention of the Coorga Rajah at Seringapatam, although it excited his indignation and juſtified his vengeance, was ſtill attended with conſequences that ultimately turned out highly advantageous to his intereſt. Compelled to abandon the prejudices of his education and religion at an early period, his mind was prepared to receive inſtruction from every channel of information, to which he could find acceſs. Active, by nature, and deſirous of intelligence the regularity of our ſhipping, attracted his particular attention on repeated viſits; but it was on horſe-back only, that he acknowledged the ſuperior advantages, and conſequently appeared in our dreſs. The attachment of the Coorgs to his perſon was heightened by his ſufferings, and their

readineſs to obey his commands, proved of the moſt eſſential benefit in paſſing through his dominions.

As the weſtern army deſcended into the plains of Myſore at Sedaſier on the 15th of May, they diſtinctly heard a canonade in the direction of the enemy's capital; they encamped on the following day at a ſhort diſtance from Periapatam, an extenſive country fort, which had been diſmantled and abandoned by its garriſon; ſeveral baſtions had been blown up, but an iron twelve-pounder, with its carriage and yokes complete, ſtood at the gate-way. Here, after throwing the 12th battalion into the place, in order to ſecure the general hoſpital and public ſtores, the encampment was changed to a ſtrong ground on the ſouthweſt face, where they continued for ſome days, in perfect readineſs for contributing to a ſpeedy termination of the war. To a well regulated camp, and happy arrangement in the detail of duty, every thing neceſſary to good order and protection was added.

The troops were divided into three brigades. The advance compoſed of the two flank battalions, with his Majeſty's 73d and 75th regiments, was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hartley. The 77th regiment, the 2d, 10th and 14th battalions of native infantry, under Colonel Balfour, formed the 1ſt brigade; and the Bombay regiment, with the 7th and 12th battalions of ſepoys, were called the ſecond. The whole encamped in one line on riſing grounds, where the two brigades on the right were covered in front by a low ſwampy valley of conſiderable width, which was ſtrengthened with jungles, and the other extending towards the fort, was completely protected

tected on the left by the 12th battalion. Beyond the ſwampy valley in front, there was an open dry height on which the piquets of the army were poſted.

SECURED from inſult by the ſtrength of their poſition, and ready to act their part in whatever meaſures ſhould be judged moſt adviſeable for bringing the war to a cloſe, our weſtern force awaited orders in this encampment. But as all their operations had a cloſe reference to thoſe of the other diviſion, and as no juſt idea of their movements after this period can be conveyed, without previous acquaintance with the operations carried on by Earl Cornwallis, it will be neceſſary for the reader to return to the grand army, which has been left at Bangalore, from whence it was to proceed towards the enemy's capital.

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SKETCH

OF THE WAR WITH

TIPPOO SULTAUN.

CHAPTER THE THIRD.

ALTHOUGH the havock amongſt our cattle, from a ſcarcity of forage or ſuſtenance of any kind during the operations at Bangalore, had been in ſome degree remedied by the ſupplies which Lieutenant Colonel Oldham had brought from the Carnatic, yet, the bullock department was in a ſtate miſerably inadequate to the tranſport of neceſſaries ſufficient for the ſiege of Seringapatam. This deficiency rendering it requiſite for Earl Cornwallis to call forth the exertions of individuals(1), public ſpirit, zeal in the cauſe of their coun-

(1) *G. O. April* 25, 1791. The Commander in Chief has experienced ſo perfect a readineſs in the officers and ſoldiers of this army to undergo very great fatigues with the greateſt chearfulneſs, that he cannot for a moment doubt of a correſponding inclination to ſubmit to any temporary inconvenience which may conduce to the ſucceſs of the important object the army is now proceeding to attempt. The number of public cattle and carriage bullocks in particular, having from various cauſes diminiſhed to a very alarming degree within theſe two laſt months, and there being very little reaſon to hope that the contractors can replace the deficiency with ſo much expedition as the preſent emergency requires, it is directed, that the commanding officers of the reſerve, and of the right and left wing do ſeparately aſſemble the commanding officers of brigades and regiments under their command, as ſoon as convenient, and from an inſpection of the preſent ſtate of corps, do allot for each regiment, in conjunction with the commanding officers of brigades, as ſmall a proportion of camp equipage as poſſible. The commanding officers of artillery will make a ſimilar arrangement in that corps; and the Commander in Chief is convinced that the commanding officers above-mentioned, the gentlemen at head quarters,

try, and perſonal attachment to the General, was diſplayed to a very conſpicuous height. Even amongſt our Nizamite allies, the example ſhewn by the Britiſh troops had ſo good an effect, that for a trifling reward their principal people afforded conſiderable aſſiſtance; but without any advantage whatſoever, and, with all the chearfulneſs of men acting for the advancement of their own private fortunes, the very ſubalterns of the Britiſh army might be ſeen with from twenty to ſixty cannon balls daily piled up at their tents (1), at a time when they laboured under every diſadvantage that dearth of cattle, deſertion of ſervants, and ſevere duty, could create.

But although many diſheartening circumſtances oppoſed the deſign, others that counterbalanced them preſſed the General to attempt an attack on the enemy's capital at an early period (2). The propriety of bringing an expenſive war to a ſpeedy concluſion, various rumours of a rupture with the Houſe of Bourbon, an expectation

quarters, and all other officers, and perſons on the ſtaff, will be diſpoſed to give the utmoſt aſſiſtance, by reducing as much as the buſineſs of their ſtation will allow, their own camp equipage on this occaſion. Whatever camp equipage can by this means be diſpenſed with, is to be ſent to Bangalore, whenever the army takes up its poſition near it; and the public cattle which can be ſpared in conſequence, are to be ſent, with their proportion of drivers, to the commiſſary of ſtores, as ſoon after as poſſible; but as this meaſure may ſtill be inſufficient to equip the army ſo amply as the Commander in Chief would wiſh, he heſitates not, on ſuch emergency, to call forth the ſpontaneous exertions of all the officers of the army: truſting, that they will be prevailed upon to depoſit, alſo, every article of ſuperfluous private baggage they can poſſibly ſpare, in the garriſon of Bangalore; and to apply whatever means of carriage they have in their power to command, to the ſervice of the public, either by transfering, for the few days they can be required, their carts or cattle, to the commiſſary of ſtores, with the drivers of them; or, if more agreeable, by taking up from the park, ſuch a number of loads as they can find conveyance for, retaining the charge and direction of their own cattle and ſervants, and uſing their moſt careful endeavours to return again to the park what they take charge of when the army arrives before Seringapatam. It is hoped the officers of the Bengal eſtabliſhment, who have cattle for the carriage of their camp equipage or private property, will apply, in like manner, ſuch proportion of them as may be in their power, to the ſervice of the public.

(1) *G. O. 28th April*, 1791. Lord Cornwallis takes this public method of expreſſing the high ſenſe he entertains of the zeal of the officers of this army, and of the troops in general, in their exertions to ſupply, to the utmoſt of their ability, the deficiency of carriage for public ſtores and proviſions. His Lordſhip can only expreſs to the officers his ſenſe of their public ſpirit, at this time, by offering them his warmeſt thanks: and as he has likewiſe underſtood the Commanding officers of corps have an intention to prevail on many of their followers to carry ſhot to Seringapatam, he authoriſes them to offer a premium to every follower upon whoſe care they can place any dependance, in charge of ſhot intruſted to them, of one rupee and a half for every twenty-four pound ſhot, and one rupee for every eighteen that they return to the park on the arrival of the army at Seringapatam.

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of deriving eſſential aſſiſtance from our allies, a certainty of the north eaſt monſoon's near approach, and the probability of finding with General Abercrombie a ſupply of grain ſufficient for the ſiege, ſuperceded every other conſideration, and with the candid and liberal will for ever juſtify the meaſure.

AFTER the utmoſt ſtretch of exertion, Earl Cornwallis found it impoſſible to move from Bangalore with proviſions ſufficient to laſt for more than twenty days, and that only for his fighting men; his Lordſhip, in order to facilitate the tranſport of food, iſſued as much grain as the ſoldiery could carry, without a charge on that account; and as liquors could not be procured at any price, officers were indulged with permiſſion to draw from the public ſtores an allowance equal to what has always been granted to the privates (3). Through uncommon activity the train had been put in a ſtate of complete repair, and drawn out on the eſplanade, during the abſence of the army; but, beſides the number of cattle requiſite to move our ſtores, ammunition, fifty-two field pieces already in camp, together with a few howitzers, bullocks ſufficient for the draft of fifteen battering guns, could only be procured.

(2) *Earl Cornwallis to the Right Honourable W. W. Grenville, dated 21ſt of April*, 1791.— Our ſucceſs at Bangalore has tended to eſtabliſh, in the general opinion of the natives, the ſuperiority of the Britiſh arms; and it has, in particular, made an impreſſion on the minds of our allies, which I am perſuaded will contribute to induce them to uſe vigorous exertions in proſecuting the war to an honourable concluſion. At preſent we can only look for the ſpeedy accompliſhment of that deſirable object, by proceeding to attack the enemy's capital, which I clearly foreſee will, from the near approach of the ſeaſon of the periodical rains, and the danger of a ſcarcity of proviſions and forage, for the large bodies of troops that are to be employed, be attended with ſo many difficulties, that upon any other occaſion I ſhould have thought it adviſeable to have deferred the attempt to the end of the enſuing monſoon. Having, however, been informed of the critical ſituation of political affairs in Europe, and being ſenſible that the finances of the Company require the adoption of thoſe meaſures that are moſt likely to bring the conteſt to an early deciſion, I have thought it my duty to hazard the undertaking; and having received the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of exertions from the chiefs of the Nizam's cavalry that are now with me; and the Marattas having alſo promiſed an hearty co-operation againſt the common enemy, I am encouraged to entertain ſanguine hopes, that all obſtacles will give way to our efforts, and that the enterprize will ſucceed.

(3) *G. O. May 1ſt*, 1791. As it may be convenient for many officers to draw a certain proportion of arrack from the commiſſary of ſtores, when their own ſtock happens to be expended, the Commander in Chief authoriſes the commiſſary to comply with their indents, on their being counterſigned by commanding officers of corps. The indents are only to be made in caſe of neceſſity; and when the neceſſity ariſes, they are to be given daily, and to the ſame amount as is drawn for the ſoldiers at the time. The payment to be made on receipt, at the eſtabliſhed price, agreeable to the regulations.

THUS

THUS equipped, after being joined by the 76th regiment, the 14th Bengal battalion, and the ſecond battalion of volunteers from Bangalore, the army, conſiſting of one regiment of European cavalry, five regiments of native cavalry, three battalions of artillery, ſeven regiments of European infantry, ten battalions of Coaſt ſepoys, with ſeven battalions of ſepoys from Bengal, and fourteen thouſand irregular horſe, marched on the 4th of May in a weſterly direction, over a country which from the ruggedneſs of its ſurface, occaſioned the loſs of ſeveral carts and much baggage. In order to obſtruct our advance, the direct road by Chinapatam, and Ramgherry, had been ſtrengthened with redoubts and batteries, at this time occupied by the Sultaun's principal force. A movement to the northward, by Magree, and Bumanelli, beſides thwarting the intention of an early junction with General Abercombie, as it would lead wide of the fords ſuppoſed paſſable, below Seringapatam, was exceptionable from being threatened by Savandroog, Outradroog, Hooleadroog, and ſeveral other hill forts; it became therefore neceſſary to advance by Cankenelli, and Sultaunpet, a route which inclining to the ſouthward, led through a valley ſo jungly and uneven, as to render it impoſſible to convey any adequate idea of the difficulties which the army had to encounter.

FOLLOWING the policy of his father, when attacked by a ſimilar confederacy in 1767, Tippoo Sultaun now contrived to reduce to aſhes, not only the villages in this direction, but every veſtige of ſtraw and forage above ground. From the roughneſs of the roads, heavy rains, and the low ſtate to which they had been already reduced, the cattle exhauſted in their yokes, fell down in hundreds; and

and notwithſtanding the extent over which our army of neceſſity ranged, not one inhabitant could be found, to act as a guide, or to diſcover where the grain had been concealed; but it is difficult to determine, whether this muſt be attributed to inviolable attachment to their Prince, or to the activity of a party ſent to drive away the villagers by his command. It is certain, however, that our puſillanimous allies, either under the influence of fear, or actuated by ſome deteſtable Aſiatic chicanery, reſiſted all entreaties, and could not be prevailed on to face this enemy, although in a tenfold proportion as to numbers (1).

PRESSING onward, after paſſing Gopauldroog, one of the Sultaun's principal ſeites, for excerciſing his invention to inflict cruelties, with ſome other hill forts of leſs note, and leaving Cancanelly (2), and Sultaunpet (3) in the rear, the army quicted the jungles, and took poſſeſſion of Mallavelly (4), a ſtone fort in which a conſiderable

(1) *Earl Cornwallis to the Court of Directors, September 7th*, 1791.—It ſoon appeared, that only a ſmall number of the enemy's irregular horſe had been appointed to attend to that road; but by an extraordinary activity on their part, and a moſt unaccountable ſupineneſs and want of exertion on the part of the Nizam's cavalry, which neither my requiſitions nor orders could overcome, we ſuffered ſome loſs, both in baggage and followers, on the march; not only the villages were laid in aſhes, but all the inhabitants of the country, on the whole of the road to Seringapatam, were alſo, with the moſt unrelenting barbarity, carried off, and more completely removed beyond our reach than could have been ſuppoſed to be practicable. Thoſe ſevere meaſures of the enemy, and the inactivity of the Nizam's cavalry, who could not be prevailed upon to forage at a diſtance, frequently occaſioned a ſcarcity in camp, both of forage for the cattle, and proviſion for the followers; and in a country of which no account or minute deſcription has hitherto been publiſhed, or till now obtained by any European, I experienced the greateſt inconvenience, in many ſhapes, by the removal of the inhabitants.

(2) Cancanelli, a ſmall mud fort of no ſtrength, is ſituated in a beautiful and fertile valley, which is narrowed by jungles and hills on each ſide, and watered by a conſtant and clear ſtream. In this fort there was a machine for boring muſquets, with ſeveral anvils, forges, and other articles neceſſary for a foundery. As the army approached Cancanelli, the enemy's horſe rocketed our rear guard; but our allies, inſtead of attacking, puſhed to the front on all hands, and could not be prevailed upon to face about, until beyond the reach of danger.

(3) Sultaunpet is an extenſive village ſituated in a fertile plain. The road to this place was by no means bad, yet the public cattle were ſo completely diſabled, that notwithſtanding great quantities of ſtores had been left behind, and ſeveral carts deſtroyed, the rear guard was not at its ground of encampment till nine at night. In paſſing a narrow defile the enemy was ſo daring as to render it neceſſary to unlimber ſome of the guns, and to fire ſeveral rounds of grape.

(4)

		Miles	Fur.
May 3d.	Baſentiporam,	6	—
4th.	Cagliagerry,	10	—
5th.	Soominapelly,	10	2
6th.	Cancanelly,	8	2
7th.	Sultaunpet,	15	2
10th.	Mallevelly,	9	6

ſupply

ſupply of grain was found; yet, the quantity loſt on the march rendered it neceſſary, at this period, to reduce the iſſue of rice (1) for the troops to one half the uſual allowance. Here delightful plains all around, whilſt they furniſhed a pleaſant contraſt to the cloſely interwoven thickets through which we had lately paſſed, afforded at the ſame time abundance of paſture for our half-famiſhed cattle (2). This favourable change, together with a heavy fall of rain, occaſioned a halt for one day, during which the Cauveri was examined at different fords, but found every where impaſſable.

As there was no place of ſtrength near the capital to the northward, in which the heavy guns and ſtores could be lodged in ſecurity for a few days, with a moderate garriſon, Earl Cornwallis was in hopes he might be able to ford the river, with the whole of his army, below Seringapatam, and to effect a junction with General Abercrombie before he ſhould find it neceſſary to approach near to the ul-

(1) *G. O. May 10th*, 1791. — Lord Cornwallis having been informed, that large quantities of grain, of various kinds, which it is not in the enemy's power to deſtroy, can by a moderate degree of induſtry be diſcovered, or dug up, either in the villages, or in the fields adjoining to them, over the whole face of the country in which the army is now arrived, and being deſirous to adopt a meaſure which will equally tend to facilitate the ſucceſs of our future operations and to promote the private intereſt of the ſoldiers; he has on the one hand directed, that in future one half ſeer of rice, or in lieu of it one ſeer of paddy, ſhall be iſſued as the daily allowance to each European and native ſoldier; and on the other hand he has given orders, that no charge whatſoever ſhall be made to the natives, for the rice or paddy ſo delivered, and that an equivalent in money ſhall be paid to the Europeans, for the quantity of grain to which they are entitled by the regulations. Conſiderable magazines of grain will in general be applied to increaſe the public ſtock of proviſions; but, except in ſuch caſes, for which particular orders will be given, Lord Cornwallis expreſſly prohibits either corps or individuals from poſting guards, or giving the ſmalleſt interruption, either to the ſoldiers or followers, in carrying off the grain that they can find either by ſearching or digging in any places where they may think proper to uſe their induſtry, under the protection of the piquets or detachments of this army. This order is not to interfere with the general inſtructions which the quartermaſter-general has received, to preſerve the forage of all new encampments, as far as it may be poſſible for the public departments. It is to be conſidered, by the field officer of the day, as an object of his attention, to protect as many villages in the day time as he conveniently can, without expoſing his poſts to any material hazard. The provoſt marſhall is not to go on with the advanced guard, nor to confine any perſons, on pretence of their going into villages, or ſearching houſes, until further orders.

(2) *G. O. May 8th*, 1791.— Lord Cornwallis is highly pleaſed with the exertions of the troops in aſſiſting the ſtore-carts yeſterday and the day before, and directs that working money ſhall be drawn for the companies ſent for that duty on thoſe days; as alſo working money for thoſe days, for ſuch detail of the rear guard as ſhall be certified by the commanding officer of the rear guard, to have exerted themſelves to aſſiſt the carts.

timate

timate object of the movement: to favour this intention, in the event of being able to croſs, the fort of Myſore, from its ſituation, promiſed a convenient and ſecure place of arms, whilſt a body of troops, lightly equipped, might approach the other diviſion. However, from obſervation, and other intelligence, it ſoon appeared, that the bed of the Cauveri, for ſome diſtance below the capital, was ſo deep, rocky, and uneven, as to render the conveyance of heavy guns over it utterly impracticable; even the ford of Arickery (3), at which place the army arrived on the 13th, although reckoned by far the beſt, was after the moſt particular examination, reported impaſſable. But as the account which Lord Cornwallis has given of the tranſactions at this period, is ſo full, as to require neither elucidation nor comment, it is here ſubjoined, without any attempt at alteration. The language of his Lordſhip runs thus; "After minutely re-examining every perſon in the army, who was acquainted with the river, my "expectations of being able to form an early junction with General "Abercrombie reſted ſolely on aſſurances, that the ford near the village "of Cauiambaddy, about eight or nine miles above Seringapatam, over "which it was poſitively aſſerted that Hyder Alli had frequently paſ-"ſed twelve pounders, and ſome heavier guns, would be found prac-"ticable. In the mean time, however, I conceived, that Tippoo had "furniſhed an opening which would enable me to force him to riſk "an action, and I reſolved not to let ſlip ſo favourable an opportunity

		Miles.	Fur.
(3) May 12th,	Candoorconda,	13	6
13th,	Arickery,	10	—

to

" to endeavour to obtain the reputation to our arms, which muſt ne-
" ceſſarily reſult from a victory in the ſight of his capital; and, in the
" event of my being able to cut off the greateſt part of his army, to
" be prepared to follow up the advantage to the greateſt extent that
" might be poſſible.

" UPON my arrival on the ground which was marked for the en-
" campment at Arickery, I ſaw a conſiderable body of the enemy
" at the diſtance of about ſix miles in our front, who were drawn up
" with their right to the river, and their left to a mountain of a
" very rugged and inacceſſible appearance; but I conſidered them in
" no other light, at that time, than a large detachment, ſent to ob-
" ſerve our motions, without any deſign to wait for our approach.

" My intention to paſs the river at that place, if the ford could
" be rendered practicable, and the hopes that were at firſt held out,
" of the ſucceſs of our working parties, occaſioned my halting on the
" 14th, in the camp at Arickery; and I then obtained certain intel-
" ligence, that although only a ſmall part of the enemy's forces
" could be ſeen from the ground in our poſſeſſion, yet that Tippoo,
" with his whole army, had encamped between us and Seringa-
" patam, his right covered by the Cauveri, and his left extended along
" the front of a high mountain, with a deep ſwampy ravine, the
" paſſage of which was defended by batteries running along the whole
" of his front, and that being encouraged by the advantages of this
" poſition, as well as thoſe of the intermediate ground, which, by the
" river on one ſide, and a ſteep ridge of hills on the other, was nar-

rowed

"rowed to a ſpace nowhere between the two encampments exceed-
"ing a mile and a half, and within cannon ſhot of his line not above
"one mile in breadth, he had determined at a hazard of the event of
"a battle, to endeavour to prevent our nearer approach to his ca-
"pital.

"In conſequence of this information, and from my having aſcer-
"tained, from the few people in camp, who had any knowledge of the
"adjoining country, as well as from the obſervations of intelligent
"perſons who were employed for the purpoſe, that it was practicable
"though difficult, to croſs the ridge on our right, from the great
"road on which we were encamped to a road which leads from Ce-
"nepatam to Seringapatam, I reſolved upon that knowledge, to at-
"tempt, by a night march, to turn the enemy's left flank; and by
"gaining his rear before day-light, to cut off the retreat of the main
"body of his army to the iſland and fort of Seringapatam.

"Orders were accordingly given, with the utmoſt ſecrecy, to
"the principal officers who were to be employed, that the 19th
"dragoons, the three ſtrongeſt of the native regiments of cavalry,
"His Majeſty's ſix regiments, and twelve battalions of native infan-
"try, with field pieces only, ſhould be in readineſs to march at ele-
"ven o'clock at night, leaving their piquets and camp guards be-
"hind, and their tents ſtanding; and Colonel Duff with thoſe de-
"tachments, and the remainder of the army, (except the Nizam's
"horſe, who were directed to follow me at day-light) was left in
"charge of the encampment, proviſions, ſtores, and heavy artillery.

" We had ſuffered greatly during the preceding week, by rains " uncommonly frequent and heavy ſo early in the ſeaſon; but un- " luckily, on that particular night, we had for ſeveral hours the moſt " violent thunder, lightning, and rain that I have ſeen in this part of " India.

" The ground of our encampment having been interſected by " ſome ruined villages and incloſures, and ſeveral deep ravines, much " valuable time was loſt before it was poſſible to form the troops in " the order of march which was directed; and, owing to the heavy " rain and exceſſive darkneſs of the night, I was obliged to halt ſo " frequently after I had begun to move forward, either on account " of many of the regiments loſing at different times the line of march, " or of the weakneſs of the gun bullocks, which were ſo jaded and " exhauſted by the ſeverity of the ſtorm, that I had only advanced a " few miles when the day began to dawn.

" All hopes were then at an end of being able to execute my " original plan; but having accompliſhed the part of the march that " had been deſcribed to me as the moſt difficult, add having the ut- " moſt confidence in the valour and diſcipline of the King's and Com- " pany's troops, I determined to perſevere in endeavouring to force " Tippoo to hazard an action on ground which I hoped would be leſs " advantageous to him than that which he had choſen; with the ex- " pectation that a complete victory might not only relieve many of " our temporary diſtreſſes, but tend to bring the war to a very ſpee- " dy concluſion.

" The

" THE army, therefore, continued its march, and the movement " had been ſo entirely unexpected by the enemy, that we had begun " to deſcend the heights on the Eaſtward of the deep ravine that I " have mentioned, and at the diſtance of four or five miles from the " left of their camp, before they took the alarm.

" AFTER ſome movements, the object of which could not for a " ſhort time be clearly aſcertained, it appeared that Tippoo, not- " withſtanding that we were advancing by a route for which he was " not prepared, did not decline to riſk the event of a battle in a " new poſition. He detached immediately from his main body a large " corps of infantry and cavalry, with eight guns, to occupy the ſum- " mit of a riſing ground about two miles from the extremity of his " left, which terminates to the northward in an abrupt precipice in the " middle of a plain; and though the aſcent is broken by large rocks, " ſome intermediate leſſer heights riſe gradually for about a mile and " a half or two miles, from a valley that was in our front, and " which continued to the Cauveri, and divided the ridge of hills " that we had croſſed during the night from another ſteep ridge, " conſiſting principally of two large mountains (on a projecting point " of the ſouthernmoſt of which ſtands the Carigat pagoda) running " nearly at right angles to the former, at the diſtance of about a mile " and a half, and extending very near to the Cauveri, oppoſite the " iſland of Seringapatam.

" WHILST the corps was on its march, to poſſeſs itſelf of the ſum- " mit that I have mentioned, Tippoo was employed in changing the " front of his army to the left, covering his left flank with the ſteep " hill, which had been in his rear, and his right flank with the ravine " which ran along his former front.

" THE diſpoſition on our ſide for action could only be made on " the aſcent of the heights, to the ſummit of which the enemy's

" detach-

"detachment, was then moving, and from which it was abſolutely
"neceſſary to diſlodge it before I could attack their main body.

"OUR march was therefore continued in that direction acroſs
"the valley, through which ran a continuation of the ravine, which
"covered the enemy's right; but, owing to the depth of that ravine,
"the weak ſtate of the gun bullocks, and the near approach of a large
"body of the enemy's horſe, that, though repulſed in ſeveral at-
"tempts, appeared to be prepared to take advantage of the leaſt diſor-
"der in any of our battalions, it was upwards of two hours after the
"paſſage of the head of the column, before the whole infantry could
"croſs to the ſame ſide of the ravine with the enemy, and conſe-
"quently before the diſpoſition for action could be completed; and
"during that time we ſuffered ſome loſs from the guns on the height,
"oppoſite to the head of the column, but were ſeverely galled by a
"well-directed though diſtant fire from the artillery of the enemy's
"main body, which had formed nearly parallel to the direction of our
"march.

"UNDER theſe difficulties, and under the diſadvantage of the
"want of all ſatisfactory local information beyond what could be
"ſeen, of the intended field of battle, and of the adjoining country,
"nine battalions were formed oppoſite to the enemy's main body,
"in a firſt line, under the command of Major General Medows and
"Lieutenant Colonel Stuart; four battalions in a ſecond line, un-
"der Lieutenant Colonel Harris; and five under Lieutenant Colo-
"nel Maxwell were deſtined for the attack of the enemy's corps on
"the ſummit of the hill upon our right: This attack had been un-
"avoidably poſtponed until the other parts of the diſpoſition could

"be

"be made, and by that means Tippoo ſhould be effectually awed,
"and prevented from making any attempt on the flank or rear of
"thoſe troops, whilſt they were moving forward to drive his detach-
"ment from their poſt. Our own cavalry, and the Nizam's horſe,
"were left out of the reach of the cannonade on the deſcent of the
"riſing ground on the oppoſite ſide of the ravine, in readineſs to
"take advantage of any confuſion they might obſerve in the enemy's
"army; and orders were given to Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell,
"after ſucceeding in his attack, to leave only a ſufficient force to
"retain poſſeſſion of the ſummit of the hill, and to advance imme-
"diately with the remainder of his corps, and endeavour to poſſeſs
"himſelf of the mountains which covered the left flank of the main
"army of the enemy.

"A ROCKY height afforded conſiderable protection to the troops
"from the enfilade from the hill on our right, during the time that
"was neceſſarily employed in making the diſpoſition, and forming
"the lines; which being accompliſhed, I began the action, by or-
"dering Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell's corps to attack the hill on our
"right, and upon obſerving that he had without much loſs or diffi-
"culty, completely ſucceeded, I moved forward with the main body
"of the army, and the action ſoon became general along the
"whole front.

"THE enemy's cavalry that had harraſſed us, and frequently at-
"tempted to break in upon the infantry, whilſt the column was
"paſſing the ravine, made no ſtand after we were prepared to advance.
"Part of it retreating to the weſtward of the ridge on which the Ca-
"rigat pagoda ſtands, with the infantry that had been driven from

"the

" the hill by Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, and the remainder falling " into the rear of the main army. Their infantry on this occaſion " ſhewed a much better countenance than uſual, which perhaps " may be principally attributed to Tippoo's own preſence and exer- " tions amongſt them; but, in a ſhort time, they began to waver, " and ſoon after, upon the cavalry moving towards their right, and " three battalions of Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell's corps advancing " rapidly to gain the heights on their left, they entirely gave way.

" At this moment our own cavalry made a gallant charge; but, " after diſperſing and almoſt deſtroying a ſmall body of infantry that " made a very determined reſiſtance, were ſoon obliged to fall back, " from a more conſiderable body of infantry, that had rallied and made " a ſtand on a ſpace of broken rocky ground, extremely diſadvantage- " ous for cavalry; and at the moment of their retreat, and whilſt " the whole of our firſt line was impeded by it, the Nizam's horſe " who had followed Colonel Floyd acroſs the ravine, with very " good intentions, but very injudiciouſly, threw themſelves in an un- " wieldy maſs, into the front of our left wing, on a piece of ground " ſo rugged and rocky, as well as ſo near to the enemy's batteries " on the iſland of Seringapatam, that they could not act with effica- " cy in front, and continued to prevent our line of infantry from " advancing; by which means an invaluable though ſhort ſpace of " time was loſt, which enabled the enemy to avail themſelves of the " vicinity of the batteries upon the iſland, and, by retreating to their " protection in the utmoſt confuſion, to ſave their army from " entire deſtruction.

" Fatigued

"FATIGUED and exhauſted as the troops were by the badneſs "of the night, the tedioufneſs of the march, and by their long and "extraordinary exertions during an exceſſive hot day; and covered "as the beaten enemy were by the works on the iſland, and by the "guns of the fort, nothing more could then be attempted: and the "army accordingly, after the arrival of the tents from Arickery, en- "camped juſt beyond the reach of the cannon on the iſland, and "nearly on the ground upon which the action had terminated.

"THREE of the enemy's guns were taken, on the hill that was "attacked by the corps under the command of Lieutenant Colonel "Maxwell, and one gun, with a great number of ſtandards and co- "lours, were taken from their main body. Their loſs in men was "very conſiderable, but the number could not be aſcertained (1)."

THAT the enemy ſhould have made a better ſtand in this action than on any former occaſion, cannot be wondered at when the extraordinary advantages of their poſition are conſidered. Superior in numbers, and individually valorous, they could not have been driven from hills, rocks, and ravines, ſuch as they occupied, but by the uniform exertions of troops linked together in ſtrict diſcipline, and holding the moſt implicit confidence as well in their leader as in one another. Although a total defeat within the range of cannon mounted on the outworks of his capital muſt have made a deep impreſſion, not only on the Sultaun, but on the minds of all the troops whom he

(1) *G. O. May* 16, 1791. — Lord Cornwallis congratulates the army on the ſignal victory which was obtained yeſterday over an enemy who for the firſt time ſince the commencement of this war, came to a reſolution to try his fortune in a general action. The movements of the enemy, and the diſpoſitions which became neceſſary on our ſide, in conſequence of them, afforded opportunities to all the officers and ſoldiers of the army to manifeſt at different periods alacrity and firmneſs either in immediate action, or in ſuſtaining the heavy cannonade to which they were for ſome time expoſed, that did honour to their courage and diſcipline. On an occaſion where the behaviour of all has ſo eminently been diſtinguiſhed, His Lordſhip offers the tribute of his private thanks to the whole army in general, and requeſts that both officers and ſoldiers may be aſſured, that he is truly ſenſible of what he owes to their uncommon ſpirit and zeal for the public ſervice ſince he had the honour to command the army. For a Return of killed and wounded, ſee the 1ſt Vol.—Appendix, No: 21, Art: B.

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headed, yet, notwithſtanding the victory was ſo complete, the penetration and judgment by which it was acquired, pointed to the propriety of reſting ſatisfied with the advantages already obtained; and of abandoning all flattering hopes from an attack on Seringapatam, until the attempt became leſs liable to failure. From the ſufferings of a well-fought day, after a night ſo uncommonly ſevere, it became adviſable to deſiſt from action or purſuit until refreſhed from fatigue, and ſtrengthened by the additional force then at Periapatam; and in order to ſecure in quietneſs the ground on which the battle had been fought, Major Fraſer with his own regiment was directed to carry a poſt which the enemy ſtill occupied, on the ſummit of the higheſt hill. This ſervice was effected, and the camp equipage having arrived in the night, the troops reſted until the 18th of the month. During our encampment on this memorable ground, the pioneers were employed in burying the ſlain, whilſt the wounded were treated with every poſſible attention.

From the field of battle two marches brought the army to Caniambaddy: but, notwithſtanding the preſſure for time, the miſerable ſtate of the cattle rendered a halt for one intervening day abſolutely indiſpenſible. The whole country, where rocks and ſtones had not been removed, was from an inceſſant deluge of rain ſo ſoft, that the wheels of the carriages ſunk down to the axles; conſequently, large detachments of fighting men were neceſſitated to pull at the traces; but although they performed ſervices to which bullocks in their beſt ſtate muſt have been very unequal, ſome of the heavy guns, diſunited, from the nature of the country, ſtill remained at a conſiderable diſtance in the rear. Advancing ſlowly, from theſe circumſtances, the troops in front alarmed an extenſive encampment,

which

which had been pitched cloſe to the ford at Caniambaddy, on each ſide of the river. To take advantage of this diſcovery, the advance, ſtrengthened by a brigade of ſepoys under Colonel Cockerell, immediately puſhed forward; the expedition, however, with which the Myſoreans decamped, although it occaſioned conſiderable loſs in croſſing the river, left nothing to their enemies beſides a few bullocks loaded with grain. Towards nine at night, after the moſt ſevere fatigue, the rear guard reached the intended ground of encampment (1). It was not until now that we felt in full force the bad effect of the unavoidable delay which the reduction of Bangalore, and our ſubſequent junction with the Nizamites, had of neceſſity occaſioned. In truth, at this period, but little was known relative to the changes of the weather in that country.

HERE, amongſt other cauſes, the lateneſs of our arrival, the ſeverity of the monſoon, the deficiency of proviſions, and the very extraordinary inactivity of our allies, diſcovered the futility of attempting the ſiege of Seringapatam; until a more favourable ſeaſon, freſh equipments, and an addition of ſtrength, ſhould afford better proſpects of ſucceſs. "It was not, however," ſays Lord Cornwallis, "till after "I had received the reports from the different departments on the "following morning, of the general wretched condition of the pub-"lick cattle of the army, that I ſaw the impoſſibility of moving the "heavy guns and ſtores from the ſpot where they then were; "and that it became neceſſary for me to decide on relinquiſhing "entirely the proſecution of the plan for the campaign, in which

(1) May 15. North Eaſt of Seringapatam, — — — — Miles, 6 Fur. —
18. Five miles North of Seringapatam, — — — — 9 —
20. Caniambaddy, — — — — — 11 —

" General Abercromby had been inſtructed to co-operate. I then " loſt no time in communicating my determination to General " Abercromby, who had advanced as far as Periapatam; and direct- " ed him, after deſcending the ghauts, with the troops under his com- " mand, to put them into cantonments on the coaſt of Malabar du- " ring the rains, and until the proper ſeaſon ſhould return, for re- " commencing our operations."

THUS neceſſitated to abandon the enterprize, orders were iſſued on the 22d of the month, to burſt three twenty-four and eight eighteen-pounders, to bury and deſtroy all military ſtores for which conveyance could not be procured, and to diſtribute the whole of the public grain amongſt the troops. Two brigades ſent acroſs the river on the 24th, in order to intimidate a large body of the enemy then on its march to the weſtward, from any attempt againſt the Bombay army, having been re-called, Earl Cornwallis moved from Caniambaddy on the 26th, in the direction of Bangalore; but as the deſigns of General Abercromby, from their immediate connection with the plans of Earl Cornwallis, had undergone a total alteration at this period, it will be neceſſary to detail the effect which a change of meaſures at head quarters had on the operations at Periapatam, before any deſcription of our return to the eaſtward is attempted.

WHILST the weſtern army remained above the ghauts, a total want of horſe, the cautious conduct of the Sultaun, and the naked ſituation of the country, however diſcretional his powers, left no opening for General Abercromby, either to diſtreſs the enemy, or to add to his own fame. The body of Myſorean cavalry which had been ſeen on the 23d, from Caniambaddy, nowiſe affected by the move-

ment

ment of Colonel Stuart acroſs the river, approached on the evening of that day to the ſkirts of the encampment at Periapatam. As this was the firſt appearance of the Myſoreans before the Bombay troops, the cattle of that army grazed until then without moleſtation; and as the native drivers, who are never on their guard until they have experienced danger, ſuffered conſiderable numbers of them to wander at a diſtance, notwithſtanding the moſt poſitive injunctions to the contrary, ſome were unavoidably captured.

THE encampment of the enemy having been ſeen at no great diſtance, towards evening, in order to prevent further loſs, it was determined to attack this force at break of the enſuing day; but the arrival of a meſſenger from Earl Cornwallis about ſun-ſet left the General no longer at liberty to purſue any active meaſures, except ſuch as in his opinion appeared neceſſary for conducting his troops to the coaſt. At an immediate conſultation of the principal officers, it was judged adviſeable not to advance on the enemy, but to fall back about the hour of eleven. Inſtructions to that effect were conſequently communicated to the heads of departments without a moment's loſs of time. The tents were ordered to be ſtruck; the baggage maſter, directed to aſſemble his people about nine o'clock, on the main road which led to the ghaut, was commanded to proceed with all poſſible diſpatch; and the ſurgeon-general, in particular, after being furniſhed with cattle to ſupply the deficiency of doolies, had, with the earlieſt notice of the intended movement, ſtrict cautions regarding a timous removal of the ſick.

ALTHOUGH

ALTHOUGH the monſoon does not in general ſet in with full force at this ſeaſon of the year, ſtill, towards the middle of May, heavy rains occaſionally fall all over the Malabar coaſt. Hitherto the weather, in this quarter, had been clear and open; unfortunately, however, on this night it rained exceſſively; it was dark and diſmal; and to add to the natural torpor of the followers on ſuch occaſions, all of them, conceiving that the movement was intended to effect a junction with Earl Cornwallis on the enſuing day, conſidered the rear as the ſituation of moſt ſafety. The heads of departments excepted, there were ſcarce any amongſt our troops who did not expect to advance; conſequently few indeed were ſolicitous about baggage. The ſervants of all were negligent. From theſe circumſtances, from the inclemency of the weather, the badneſs of the night, and the reluctance with which the publick followers came together, difficulties and delays aroſe that could not have been guarded againſt, as they were totally unexpected. In ſhort, it was day-break before the 12th battalion of ſepoys, which was ſtationed in the rear, took up its ground on the road.

THE ſtores, with the principal part of the baggage, had by this time gone on towards the paſs, but that of ſome officers moving in a contrary direction, from cauſes already aſſigned, was taken by the enemy; a number of tents were ſo heavy, from the rain, that they ſhared a ſimilar fate; however, from the diſlike of retreat, and various loſſes, as ſeveral of this army ſuffered ſome diſappointment or other, murmurs prevailed; but in truth, the loſs which chiefly deſerved to be lamented, was the capture of Enſign Mackie of the 77th, with about ſixteen men, who, through ſome unaccountable neglect in the hoſpital department, were left to a mercileſs enemy. Towards eight o'clock

bodies

bodies of horſe which made their appearance in the rear, were kept in check by a company of the 12th battalion; yet as they contrived to wound two or three followers, whole groups of that daſtardly people threw down their loads and took to their heels. The day clearing up, the troops, after a march of eleven miles, encamped at the muddy tank in the Coorga country.

THE movement from this tank to Ahmoonah, about ten miles, was performed without much difficulty; but the dragging of the heavy guns on the 26th, for thirteen miles, the diſtance from thence to the top of the paſs, was attended with the utmoſt labour. Here as the troops deſcended on the 28th, the gullies which in advancing had been filled up with earth, from the inceſſant pour of rain became ſo miry, as to render the conveyance of heavy guns utterly impracticable. That, and the ruts made by water-courſes in a road originally ſteep, narrow, and difficult of paſſage, pointed to the propriety of not waſting the troops in attempting to drag heavy guns; eſpecially as theſe troops muſt have been expoſed to the moſt inclement weather, and unavoidably without any ſhelter. Four heavy pieces of ordnance were conſequently buried on the top of the paſs. Indeed, even the tranſport of the field pieces took the hard work of ſix long days. However, after the moſt extreme fatigue, which beſides much injury to the troops, had almoſt deſtroyed all the cattle, the field train and ſtores arriving at Iliacore, they were ſent from thence to the coaſt by water: and the ſeveral corps having finiſhed their fatigues for a time, about the 10th of June, they were cantoned in Biliapatam, Canarore, Durrampatam, and Tellicherry. But to return to Earl Cornwallis.

AT

At the cloſe of the firſt march from Caniambaddy, his Lordſhip was agreeably ſurprized with the arrival of about forty thouſand Marratta horſe, accompanied by two battalions of Bombay ſepoys, under Capt. Little, of that eſtabliſhment. There was alſo a crowd of irregular infantry. This immenſe reinforcement, headed by Hurry Punt and Purſeram Bhow, beſides upwards of twenty pieces of cannon, with an adequate proportion of ammunition, had with them proviſions and ſupplies of every deſcription in abundance; but, taking advantage of our neceſſities, in a two-fold degree, they produced the articles moſt wanted, with a very ſparing hand, ſcrewing up their prices to a moſt exorbitant height, whilſt they lowered the value of our coin a rupee in every pagoda; indeed, ſilver was the only coin which would paſs current amongſt them for near its value; and, as our troops had been for a length of time paid in gold, the exorbitant prices at which they ſold grain, and their diminiſhing the value of our ſpecie, almoſt precluded the poſſibility of our becoming purchaſers, ſo as to relieve the diſtreſſes of our followers.

The deſtruction of our guns became now matter of concern to all. Inſtigated by revenge, the chiefs diſcovered an uncommon degree of eagerneſs to proſecute the war; but they felt conſcious it was to the tardineſs of their own movement to co-operate in the reduction of the capital, they could alone attribute the reſpite which muſt of neceſſity be allowed to the Sultaun; however, that the time which ought to be employed in repairing misfortune might not be waſted in unprofitable regret, Earl Cornwallis, accompanied by Major General Medows, held a conference with the Maratta leaders,

on

on the 29th, in tents pitched between the two encampments for that purpoſe; here, according to his Lordſhip, " as it was of great con-
" ſequence, to cultivate a good underſtanding with them, I ſaid very
" little on the juſt grounds which I had to complain of the lateneſs
" of their arrival, and contented myſelf, at the firſt meeting, with
" obtaining a knowledge of the nature of their inſtructions, and of
" their future intentions.

" THEY made the moſt explicit declarations, that they were ordered
" by the Peiſhwa, and it was equally their own inclination, to act
" entirely in concert with me; and in the courſe of two or three
" conferences, it was not only ſettled, that all the confederate forces
" ſhould keep the field in the Myſore country, during the rains, but
" they alſo acquieſced in a general arrangement that I propoſed, for
" the diſpoſition of the armies, the principal objects of which were
" to give me an eaſy and ſafe communication with the Carnatic, to
" enable me to draw from thence the ſupplies of artillery and ſtores,
" that would be neceſſary for proſecuting the operations of the enſu-
" ing campaign, to ſubſiſt the allied armies, as much as might be
" poſſible, at the expence of the enemy, and to endeavour to deprive
" him of the revenues and reſources of all the northern parts of his
" dominions.

" HAVING ſtated to the Maratta chiefs the danger of attempting to
" maintain the communication with their own country, by the route
" to the weſtward of Chittledroog, by which Purſeram Bhow had
" marched from Darwar, they agreed to relinquiſh it, and to be ſa-
" tisfied with that by Sera and Roydroog, which I recommended as
" preferable, on condition that I would delay my march to the eaſt-

" ward

" ward until the detachments which Purſeram Bhow had left upon " his route could join the army, or be ſent back acroſs the Tumbu- " dra, to which, upon their aſſurances that we ſhould be able to pur- " chaſe from the grain dealers attached to them, a ſufficient quantity " of grain to ſubſiſt our troops and followers for ſome time to come, " I conſented.

" In order, therefore, to effect theſe purpoſes, we halted frequently, " and having ſoon after the junction of the Marattas, ſent back to the " Nizam, all thoſe of his troops that had, either from the loſs or the " weakneſs of their horſes, become unfit for ſervice, the confederate " force moved together gradually, though ſlowly, towards Banga- " lore, and upon our arrival within about twenty miles of that place, " it was thought adviſable to acquieſce in Purſeram Bhow's wiſhes, " to move, with the army under his own immediate command, to- " wards Sera, to ſecure that communication, and to poſſeſs himſelf " of the adjoining country, according to the plan that had been ar- " ranged; Hurry Punt, with his diviſion, and the Nizam's cavalry, " remaining with our army." (1)

SENSIBLE that the ſuſpenſion of his ruin depended on ſowing diſ- ſention amongſt the confederates, and on keeping them at the utmoſt poſſible diſtance from each other, the Sultaun, by means of his irregu- lar horſe, and faithful villagers, contrived that out of about forty meſ- ſengers diſpatched at different periods by the Marattas, whilſt on their way to join, not one ſhould reach the Britiſh camp. Far from neglecting the eſſential point of communication with Earl Cornwallis, hircarras in ſucceſſion were from time to time diſpatched, by Hur- ry Punt, as well to camp, as to Bangalore; and had any of theſe made

(1) This and the two foregoing extracts will be found in a letter from Earl Cornwallis to the Court of Direct- ors, dated the 7th September, 1791.

their

their appearance, we ſhould have avoided all the public and private evils which enſued (1). Surrounded by enemies, and diſheartened from recent defeat, it required management in a ſuperior degree to convince the Sultaun's people that their reſpite from the impending deſtruction was not nearly at an end; and although a ſalute fired at Seringapatam on the 26th was ſaid to announce ſome advantage gained by Sayed Sahib, over the rear of the Bombay army, the real intention muſt have been, to buoy up the ſpirits of his people from ſinking under circumſtances of accumulated diſtreſs.

However incredible, that two large armies ſhould march near three hundred miles towards a third engaged in the ſame cauſe, without any mutual communication or intimation of each other's approach, yet to this very fortuitous circumſtance the Sultaun owed poſſeſſion of his capital; for, had a junction of the Marattas with the Britiſh armies been effected before the deſtruction of our battering guns, his whole force muſt have been ſhut up in the iſland of Seringapatam, to the total deſtruction of his cavalry, and utmoſt diſtreſs of his people at large. As an additional prop to the remains of his tottering empire, a flag of truce, accompanied with a preſent of fruit and vegetables, conveyed propoſals for accommodation from the Myſorean ruler to Earl Cornwallis, on the 27th; but the preſent was returned untouched, and in the ſame manly ſpirit of perſeverance, it was ſtill declared, that no negociation could be entered upon unleſs the propoſals came addreſſed to the con-

(1). It is ſaid, that one of theſe meſſengers delivered his diſpatches at Bangalore, for which the Punt produced Colonel Oldham's receipt, and that it was forwarded from thence to Earl Cornwallis early in May, but intercepted on its way by the enemy. Had ſeveral ſucceſſive copies of this diſpatch been tranſmitted, as the army was at ſuch an inconſiderable diſtance, it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe that ſome one muſt have arrived ſafe. But, whether the Commandant of Bangalore had permiſſion to open his Lordſhip's public letters, or otherwiſe, it is not for me to determine. As the ſucceſs or failure of the moſt momentous military operations frequently depend on ſlender links like theſe, 'tis pity that officers in command of ſtations, do not, from a conſciouſneſs of right intention, conſider themſelves more at diſcretion,

federacy, and until a general releaſe of all the Britiſh ſubjects in the Myſorean dominions was granted. However, truſting that he could breed diſcord in the league, he could not be prevailed upon publickly to acknowledge its exiſtence, and ſtill perſiſting that no Britiſh priſoners were detainde in Myſore, he flatly objected to a truce that had been recurred to as a preliminary which of neceſſity muſt have preceded accommodation.

ALTHOUGH fantaſtical figures, like thoſe that have been deſcribed in the detachment of Nizam Ally were not to be ſeen in ſuch numbers amongſt the Marattas, yet their appearance, upon the whole, reſembled that of a banditti, anxious to ſhare the ſpoils of Seringapatam, rather than of a regular force, determined to humble an overbearing foe. In conſequence of the junction, however, our affairs wore a very different complexion; naturally enterprizing, our new allies ridiculed the Subah's troops for inactivity; their foraging parties ranging to a conſiderable diſtance, brought in large ſupplies of cattle; the neceſſity of a precipitate return to Bangalore was done away; famine was no longer to be dreaded; but the Nizam's troops, whoſe attendance, independent of political conſiderations, we had every reaſon to deprecate, ſtill gave us room to regret their preſence, as they ruſhed into the Maratta camp, and bought up all the grain and proviſions they could find. It was on the ground where this junction took place, that Hyder drew out his army, in 1772, when upwards of fifty thouſand Marattas, under Madharou, advanced to attack his capital; but the Myſorean was defeated with ſuch ſlaughter, that upwards of twenty thouſand of his men were left on the field of battle; however, ſo abundant were his reſources, even at this early period, that he, in a few months,

months, appeared again in the field, with a powerful army. On the ground where this battle was fought a neat tomb was erected to the memory of Seif Sahib, an officer of rank, who there was mortally wounded, by the thruſt of a ſpear, in the loins; the remains of his ſon Budder ul dien Cawn, who was ſlain at Sattimungulum, were depoſited cloſe to thoſe of his father, under the Milgottah pagoda (1). Whilſt the army remained in theſe diſtricts, a quantity of grain captured in Nagmungulum was given over by Purſeram Bhow to the thirteenth and twenty-eight battallions of bengal ſepops, who had been detached for that purpoſe.

Moving leiſurely, as well to favour the advance of ſeveral convoys that the Marattas expected, from the Sera diſtrict, as to weary the enemy into a compliance with reaſonable terms by helping to exhauſt his ſupplies, the army on the 18th croſſed the Madoor river, a beautiful ſtream then about knee deep, and encamped in ſight of Hooliadroog (2). This fort, ſituated on the ſummit of a high circular rock, is nearly ſurrounded by an extenſive pettah. Colonel Roſs, the chief engineer, attended by the 6th brigade, was directed to ſummon Hooliahdroog. It was of great ſtrength, but the appearance of ſo powerful an army within three miles induced the killedar to ſurrender, on a

(1) This pagoda ſtands on the top of a hill, bearing the ſame name, which is the principal in a range of conſiderable height that trends with a curve from north to ſouth. In a populous village, cloſe to the baſe of Milgottah, there was a large quantity of grain, with a vaſt number of cattle, until the arrival of the Marattas: However, from want of intelligence, we did not benefit by that circumſtance. At a ſhort diſtance from thence the lake of Mooty Tallaw is formed by an embankment between the hills; but as a minute deſcription of this romantic ſpot is given by Mr. Colebrooke, the reader is referred to the explanation of that gentleman's view in Myſore.

(2).

			Miles,	Fur.
May,	26.	Six miles north weſt of Seringapatam,	7	—
	27.	Five miles north of Seringapatam,	3	4
	29.	Toudanoor,	4	—
June,	4.	Mooty Tallaw,	2	—
	6.	Milgotta,	8	4
	7.	Near Rajahmungulum,	9	—
	9.	Yekaty,	6	4
	14.	Boomanelly,	6	4
	18.	Near Hooliadroog,	10	4

promiſe

promiſe of ſecurity for private property and perſonal protection to the multitude that it ſheltered. The terms of capitulation were rigidly adhered to; but our allies following their wonted habits, attempted to plunder the crowds of inhabitants, as they returned to their villages. Sepoy detachments, however, ſent to protect them, were true to their truſt; and it was not until ſeveral lives were loſt that the plunderers could be prevailed upon to deſiſt.

DURING former periods of public diſturbance in Myſore, the inhabitants took refuge in diſtricts at a diſtance from the invaders, on the tops of high hills, or in the midſt of thick jungles; but the complete eſtabliſhment of new maſters in every direction, now reduced ſuch as refuſed allegiance to the neceſſity of ſeeking protection around the fortifications, conſequently, the villagers ſwarming under cover of the guns clung to the ſeveral droogs, and in particular to this rock, like bees around a hive. Here they were induced to conſider themſelves in ſecurity, as the only acceſs to the principal work, is, in general, by ſingle ſteps cut obliquely in the face of the ſolid rock, at one part of which the aſcent is by a ladder about twenty feet in length, and through a natural arch, which a few reſolute men might defend againſt the aſſault of whole armies. This hill, which meaſures upwards of a hundred yards in height, is about one mile in circumference around the baſe (1).

(1) If guns of a large calibre were placed on the weſtern extremity of a range of hills which ſtand to the eaſtward of this rock, the ſhot would in my opinion, reach the works; but as its baſe is on every ſide, except where it is acceſſible by the ladder, narrower than toward the top, it might reſiſt an enemy who neglected that advantage, for a length of time. The Pettah, at firſt ſight, has the appearance of being built on ground, raiſed for that purpoſe, conſiderably above the level of the country: its walls were not of ſufficient ſtrength to reſiſt cannon-ſhot; and, as the Killedar had only three Malabar guns on the rock, to protect the whole, he was induced the more readily to accept of terms; whatever credit he might acquire by a reſolute defence, he knew that the place was in itſelf of no political importance. Pettahs in general, and this one in particular, appear, conſtructed more for the convenience of providing garriſons with bazar's, and for procuring a maintenance for the Killedar, and other public officers, than for ſtrengthening or defending the principal fortifications.

AMONGST

AMONGST a number of captives that were bound in chains of various conſtructions, at Hooliadroog, ſeveral who had their ancles faſtened aſunder by a heavy iron bar of about eighteen inches in length, had from habit acquired a ſtraddling amble, which, when liberated, they could not for a length of time alter or amend; ſome from having been cloſely pinioned could move neither arm; others had acquired a ſtoop, from which they were unable to ſtand erect; in ſhort, as moſt of them had been confined in this wretched ſtate for a period of about ten years, there were few indeed who had not loſt the power of ſome limb or other. Here, after ſecuring ſeveral thouſand head of cattle, with large quantities of grain, the guns and tanks were deſtroyed; and the works were blown up, and otherwiſe diſmantled.

MOVING from thence by eaſy marches, on a road which winded round a variety of eminences, covered with jungle, or led through vallies interſected by numerous ſtreams, the army, after ſummoning Outradroog (2), and reconnoitring Savandroog (3), without any proſpect of ſucceſs, encamped on the 11th of July, at a ſhort diſtance to the weſtward of Bangalore (4). During this movement, the Sul-

(2) Lieutenant Macleod, of the intelligence department, was ſent with a flag of truce to ſummon Outradroog: the fort, at firſt, firing on the party, it was evident that the garriſon was not of a diſpoſition to ſurrender; but the killedar afterwards ſent an anſwer which was couched in terms highly proper. He declared by a meſſenger, that he could not for a moment think of a ſurrender; that as a confidential ſervant, entruſted with a ſtrong hold, he could not after eating the ſalt of Tippoo Sultan, for upwards of twenty years, deliver it up, until his maſter would ſhew the example at Seringapatam: that as the children of an indulgent parent, the people were determined to hazard their all in his ſupport; even their lives, or what was ſtill more near and dear. This ſimple, but determined anſwer, left them in undiſturbed poſſeſſion of the place for a while.

(3) On the 29th of the month, under cover of the 7th and 13th Bengal ſepoy battalions, the chief engineer reconnoitred Savandroog, on the north face, and from the weſtward. The next day, his Majeſty's 52d regiment, accompanied by the 13th, 14th and 26th battalions of Bengal ſepoys, with the 9th coaſt battalion, marched in order to protect the engineers, whilſt they examined the hill from the ſouthward; after ſeveral minute views of this immenſe rock, the troops returned to camp. No attack was made on Savandroog, as it was conſidered by many totally impracticable. All agreed that the army, in its preſent crippled ſtate, could reap no benefit from the attempt, that would compenſate for the loſs which in all probability would enſue; and from the waſte of time which muſt have been employed in its reduction.

(4)

			Miles,	Fur.
June	22d,	Hoolooloocundah,	11	4
	25th,	Coonigul	8	4
	26th,	Outradroog	5	4
	28th,	Soomaiſengoody,	6	—
	29th,	Maggree,	2	4
July	2d,	Goodimanelly,	10	—
	4th,	Sandicoopen,	7	4
	8th,	Kittanhelly,	6	4
	11th,	Weſt of Bangalore,	6	—

taun

taun attempted nothing againſt the main force of the confederates In order to ſecure forage, as well as to avoid a country confined by much bruſh-wood, our allies made a circuit of ſeveral miles, through open diſtricts to the northward. Three battalions of ſepoys were ordered from the left wing with Captain Archibald Brown, to ſtrengthen a convoy under Captain Alexander Read, which eſcorted towards Bangalore a body of brinjaries, then threatened by a party of Myſorean cavalry in the neighbourhood of Venkitaghery; and, as it had been judged adviſable, during the monſoon, and the time neceſſarily employed in freſh equipment, to ſtraiten the enemy within the leaſt poſſible bounds, the army of Purſeram Bhow retired towards Sera, and the other diſtricts which had been wreſted from the Sultaun, in that direction. Amongſt the horſes of our Nizamite auxiliaries, but few were at this period in a ſtate capable of keeping the field; the greater part of them were conſequently permitted to return home; whilſt the ſquadrons under Lieutenant Colonel Floyd, equally in want of being recruited, were directed to proceed to the Carnatic. Much to the credit of Lieutenants Turner and Grant, who commanded the body guards of Earl Cornwallis and General Medows, it muſt be acknowledged, that their troops were in a very different ſtate; they therefore continued with the army, without any reſpite from fatigue.

AGREEABLE to the plan which had been concerted amongſt the leaders of the allied forces, it was now judged adviſeable to open a communication with the Carnatic, by whichever road was reckoned the moſt eaſy of acceſs. The able exertions of Sir Charles Oakley had ſo ſeconded the deſigns of the Governor General, all along, that nothing

thing remained but to determine on the moſt judicious route for conveying the freſh equipment to Bangalore. The direction of the Mugly paſs, although advantageous on many accounts, led ſo far to the northward, that it muſt have either diſunited the armies for its protection, or allowed a greater range to the enemy than was neceſſary. The Padneigdirgum paſs had long been conſidered practicable, amongſt the ſenior officers on the Coaſt, provided a ſufficient eſtabliſhment of troops ſecured the diſtricts in the vicinity of Venkitaghery; but it was known to be exceſſive ſteep, and difficult of draft for heavy guns. The footpaths by Cuddapanatam, Cungoody, Neelghery, Malicandroog, and Alumbaddy, were conſidered totally impracticable for the conveyance of a battering train. In ſhort, after a minute examination of the whole range, from the entrance at Mugly, to the Cauvery river (1), the paſſage which leads by Oodiadirgum and Palicode was conſidered by far the moſt eaſy of acceſs. In addition to other recommendations, poſſeſſion of this paſs, whilſt it confined the enemy within the leaſt poſſible bounds, muſt have threatened any detachments which he might think proper to employ againſt our acquiſitions to the ſouthward.

THROWING the ſick, and one half the tumbrils of the field pieces into Bangalore, the army marched with four battering guns from

(1) Whilſt the army halted at Moodagampelly, about the beginning of Auguſt, the 13th Bengal and 27th Coaſt battalions, were detached on this ſervice, under the command of Capt. Norman Macleod. It was intended alſo, that a ſtrong party of the Nizam's horſe ſhould have accompanied the ſepoys; but as uſual, very few could be found, with inclinations to proceed. This detachment advancing to the ſouthward, paſſed Denaincottah, an extenſive village, protected by a mud fort and inhabited ſolely by weavers, on the 4th of the month. As the troops made their appearance at this place, the villagers, abandoning their cloths, cotton, and other valuables, fled in every direction. On the 6th the battalions deſcended by a narrow paſs into a ſmall valley encloſed in jungles. Here they took poſſeſſion of a pagoda fortified on the top of a hill. It was called by the natives Mollygerrydirgum. It had a pettah crowded with people, and a great number of cattle which were driven away for the uſe of the army. As the guns could not be carried any further, from the badneſs of the roads, the 27th battalion returned with them to camp. A detachment from the thirteenth proceeded to the bank of the Cauveri, and fully aſcertained that there was not any road to the ſouthward of the Pallicode paſs, by which troops with guns could enter the Barrahmahl. A party of Polygars attempted to oppoſe the ſepoys in their progreſs, but they were driven back after a ſlight ſkirmiſh. In all this track there appeared but one pathway which was acceſſible even for foot paſſengers. Satisfied on theſe points, the battalion returned to camp.

thence,

thence, and on the 15th encamped near the village of Satrum, having previouſly detached Major Gowdie, with his brigade, to ſummon Ouſſore. This fort is a parallellogram of conſiderable ſtrength: its defences had been far advanced in their repair. Inſtead of baſtions on the ramparts, it had ſeveral circular towers. A deep ditch, about eighty feet in breadth, with which it was ſurrounded, might be filled at any time from a large tank which had a ſluice on the eaſt face, cloſe to the gate; but like moſt of the leſſer forts which are ſpread over the plains, it was commanded from a neighbouring height. Ouſſore was abandoned on the approach of Major Gowdie. The garriſon blew up one of the angles; fortunately, however, they failed in their attempt on the magazine, through ſome interruption in the train. After depoſiting the guns, this poſt, with the ſecond battalion of volunteers, and Captain Glaſs's company of artillery, was given in charge to Captain Thomas Welſh, of the Bengal eſtabliſhment. As a wide road, with an avenue of trees, ſtretched from the fort to Bangalore, and towards Kiſtnagherry, it was certainly intended as a place of great importance.

THE horrors of a piteous tale told by the inhabitants of Ouſſore, in their own ſimple but pathetic ſtrain, cannot be heightened in relation. Piqued at the bold meaſures of Earl Cornwallis, and in order to prevent detection in falſe aſſertions, the Britiſh forces had advanced but a ſhort way into Myſore when the Sultaun iſſued a mandate for the aſſaſſination of three Europeans who had been priſoners in this fort for ſeveral years. The fact is too well authenticated to admit a doubt. A manuſcript written in the Engliſh language by one of the ſufferers was found in the arſenal. It detailed carpenter's work which this unfortunate man had been neceſſitated to perform. His name was Hamilton. He had been an officer in the Britiſh navy, but deſpairing of freedom, he contracted an intimacy with

with a companion of the other ſex, from which a family ſprung, that naturally impelled him to every honeſt endeavour for their maintenance.

When the bloody mandate was about to be put in execution, the people ſurrounding the houſe of their killedar, with prayers and lamentations intreated to ſpare the whole, but for the life of Hamilton they were clamorous. Beſides the ties of a family and connexions, he had become perfect in their language: he improved the mechanics in their ſeveral occupations; his advice was the guide in all common tranſactions; he was umpire in matters of diſpute; in ſhort, as he dignified a ſuperior underſtanding by a life perfectly harmleſs, he was univerſally known by the diſtinction of father. Hamilton was for a time given to their intreaties; but the other two were beheaded with the ſabre. His reprieve was of ſhort duration. On the fall of Bangalore his doom was irrevocably fixed; and, a ſpecial meſſenger, habituated to the ſcene, was forbid the preſence until he ſaw performed the murderous office. Their behaviour in death was diſtinctly told by witneſſes nowiſe intereſted in colouring the narrative. It was manly and firm. After paſſing ſome minutes in fervent prayer, they bent forward, reſting their hands upon their knees. The heads of the two former were ſevered from their bodies at the firſt blow; but with Hamilton it required repetition. Their graves were pointed out to ſeveral Britiſh officers. Their remains confirmed this relation; and, a lock of hair from each head, which is now in the writer's poſſeſſion, will, when depoſited in a Britiſh repoſitory, contribute to ſtamp the appellation of tyrant on Tippoo Sultaun amidſt thouſands as yet unborn.

THE army, proceeding from Ouſſore, towards the Palicode paſs, took poſſeſſion of Anchittydirgum on the evening of the 18th. On the 20th Neelghery (1) and Ruttonghery ſubmitted without reſiſtance, but the garriſon of Ryacottah refuſing to ſurrender, Major Gowdie, with his own brigade, after carrying the lower fort in a ſpirited aſſault, got poſſeſſion of the upper one by capitulation. Ryacottah is defended by three diſtinct fortifications, each of which admits of a ſeparate defence. The principal work, towards the ſummit of the rock, is nearly of a circular form; that in the centre, conſtructed on the face of the hill, is acceſſible only by one narrow paſſage, which is exceſſive ſteep and rugged; and the pettah, or lower fort, beſides the advantages of its own works, is protected by the guns of the other two. Confident, from the ſtrength of the place, and the numbers by which it was defended, the killedar not only refuſed to ſurrender, but fired on the flag that conducted the firſt ſummons. Early on the morning of the 20th, a detachment conſiſting of about three hundred and fifty men, with a brigade of guns, advanced under Captain Oliver, to attack the pettah. The gate was ſoon blown open; but the garriſon, ſtrengthened by the neighbouring inhabitants, fired briſkly from the top and center works. Major Gowdie now led the attack in perſon; animated by his example, the troops entered, and took poſſeſſion of the ſecond fort; ſtill the enemy occupied the upper work, nor could they be prevailed upon to

(1) As the havildar who was ſent with a flag to ſummon Neelghery, approached the fort, he was fired upon and killed by the enemy. The place ſurrendered in the courſe of the day, and the man by whom the havildar had been ſlain being demanded, he was immediately given up; but as it appeared that he was totally unacquainted with the nature of a flag of truce, he eſcaped puniſhment. Fearful of their maſter's diſpleaſure, almoſt all the Myſorean forts fired leſs or more ſhot before their ſubmiſſion. The quantity was in general regulated by their degree of ſtrength; but few of them directed their guns ſo as to do much execution. On a former occaſion one of their garriſons propoſed not to deliver up the poſt until a certain number of guns had been diſcharged.—See the firſt volume, page 63.

capi-

capitulate, until a reinforcement was ſeen, conducting ſome additional heavy guns to the beſiegers.

KENCHILLYDROOG, Tyandroog, Chinroydirgum, and Oodiadirgum, with ſeveral inferior hill forts, offered little or no oppoſition, at a change of maſters. Conſiderable quantities of grain, ſtores, and cattle, were found in and about thoſe caſtles, all of which were occupied by the ſeventh Coaſt battalion, under Captain Chaſe, or diſmantled of their defences. On this ſervice we had to lament the fall of Lieutenant Crie, of the Madras engineers; a few ſepoys were alſo ſlain; but the number wounded was conſiderable.

A

SKETCH

OF THE WAR WITH

TIPPOO SULTAUN.

CHAPTER THE FOURTH.

ALTHOUGH the Myſoreans were thus hemmed in on all ſides, they occaſionally found means to burſt through the ſurrounding multitude. Their horſe, deprived of the range neceſſary to feed in, were enfeebled from want of forage beyond the ſufferings of the moſt ſevere ſervice, yet their exertions were wonderful; whatſoever of the country's produce was ſpared in pity by the diſciplined troops, was conſumed through the ravages of unfeeling followers. Of that vaſt empire which at the commencement of hoſtilities, acknowledged the ſuperiority of Tippoo Sultaun, Bednore was the only province which had not now been laid waſte by either of the powers in alliance; and in order to draw ſupplies from thence, as well as to check the depredations of Purſeram Bhow on the diſtricts around Chittledroog, the Sultaun moved to the northward, with his principal force, whilſt a ſtrong detachment endeavoured to recover the provinces which had been wreſted out of his poſſeſſion at the beginning of the war.

As

As the army under General Medows fell down along the northern bank of the Cauveri, towards the cloſe of the firſt campaign, a large reinforcement of ſepoys croſſed that river, in order to ſecure our acquiſitions to the ſouthward. Charged with the defence of theſe diſtricts, Major Cuppage, after examining the poſt at Coimbatore, directed that the heavy guns, ammunition, and ſtores, ſhould be removed to Paligautcherry. Coimbatore was not conſidered tenable againſt diſciplined troops with artillery: it was intended ſolely, as a check on irregulars and horſe who might threaten to moleſt Mr. Vincentia Corbet, whilſt employed in collecting the revenues (1). The fourteenth battalion of Coaſt ſepoys having been therefore withdrawn, it was ordered to eſcort the convoy from thence to its place of deſtination; and a body of Travancorean troops being placed in the pettah, Lieutenant Chambers, of the Madras eſtabliſhment, with his own corps of topaſſes, was left in charge of the whole.

GREAT quantities of damaged powder, with a number of guns which had been conſidered unſerviceable, were found in Coimbatore. Of theſe guns three ſtood a proof. Mr. Chambers, therefore, contrived to mount them on carriages that he patched together from wheels and fragments which lay ſcattered about the fort. Two three pounders, with one four pounder, were thus put in a ſtate of com-

(1) Iam directed by Major Cuppage to communicate to you the following inſtructions as a guidance for your conduct in the command of the troops and poſt at Coimbatore, to which the Commander in Chief has been pleaſed to nominate you. Coimbatore is to be conſidered as a poſt of protection againſt cavalry, or other force of the enemy that may appear before it, without having the means of attacking it, with any probability of ſucceſs, in oppoſition to the reſiſtance which may be made with effect by the troops under your orders. Major Cuppage does not conceive it in the power of the enemy's whole force to poſſeſs themſelves of Coimbatore, without bringing heavy cannon againſt it, which he deſires may be underſtood as the interpretations of the words mean. The Travancore battalion and topaſs corps to remain under your command; the Major recommends your placing the Travancore battalion in the pettah, and the topaſſes in the poſt. Mr. Corbet is deſired to place immediately in Coimbatore rice and proviſions for 100 men, ſufficient for four months; you are to give every aſſiſtance he may require in the protection of it, and report to Major Cuppage, from time to time, the quantity provided; as far as is conſiſtent with the nature of your poſt. You are to comply with the requiſitions made to you by the collector, Mr. Corbet, for military aid in his collections. You are without delay to report every material occurrence to Major Cuppage; particularly any intelligence you may receive, in regard to the movements of an enemy, towards your quarter.—*Major of Brigade Bannerman to Lieutenant Chambers. 2d February* 1791.

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plete repair; on an application to Major Cuppage a ſupply of five hundred ſhot was furniſhed from Paligautcherry; to theſe two hundred ſtone ones were added by ſome of the topaſſes who had been employed about guns whilſt in the ſervice of Mahomed Ally; and as Mr. Chambers conceived that extraordinary exertions might poſſibly keep out an enemy for ſome days, the whole garriſon ſet to work at a barbet battery, which had been begun by a regular engineer on the pettah face.

TOWARDS the firſt of May, 1791, the troops intended for the defence of Coimbatore, were reduced by detachments (2) and otherwiſe, to one hundred and twenty topaſſes, with two hundred of the Ram Rajah's ſepoys. From theſe, ſmall parties were repeatedly ſent out, to ſcour the country; but, oppoſed by Cawder Ally Cawn, an active dewan who had been appointed by the Sultaun to the Sattimungulum diſtrict, and without the countenance of an European leader, they were as often driven back. On the 10th of the month, Captain La Combe, an enterprizing Frenchman in the employ of the Rajah, made offer of his ſervices at Coimbatore. Under this zealous officer, about one hundred men were puſhed on in advance; they attacked and beat back the dewan, and continuing in the field, they kept his people at a diſtance for the reſt of the month. However, before the firſt week in June had elapſed, reports of the deſcent of an

(2) I am directed by Major Cuppage to acquaint you, that one Commandant, three Subadars, two Jemidars, eight Havildars, ſix Naigues, three Drummers, three Fifers, and two hundred ſepoys of the Travancore battalion, now doing duty at Coimbatore, will in a day or two be ordered to proceed to this place, where they are to remain. Should the detachments from your poſt render it inconvenient for you to ſend the above detail, you will loſe no time in calling in a ſufficient number, to enable you to ſend the number intended for this garriſon when ordered.—I am further directed to ſignify to you, that one Serjeant, one Corporal, and twenty-five topaſſes, will be ordered to proceed to this place at the ſame time with the Travancoreans; they are alſo to do duty at this place; you are to ſelect from the topaſſes ſuch men as have been brought up to the gun exerciſe, as they are intended for that ſervice.—The 14th battalion will march in a few days to join General Abercromby, when the detail for this place coming from Coimbatore will be directed to proceed. *Major of Brigade Bannerman to Lieutenant Chambers. 13th February* 1791.

army

army by the Guzzlehatty paſs, induced Mr. Chambers to recall Captain La Combe with his party (3).

EARLY on the 13th of this month fifty horſemen reconnoitered Coimbatore, and the pettah all around. Immediately after, a laſcar who had been made priſoner, but found meansto eſcape, came in and gave correct information of the enemy's ſtrength. It conſiſted of two cuſhoons, each about one thouſand men, with eight pieces of cannon, the heavieſt of which was an eighteen pounder; there was one fourteen, one twelve, and five four pounders, a number of the inhabitants with ginjal pieces, one thouſand horſe, two elephants, four camels loaded with rockets, and a multitude of polygars, all under the command of Meer Buckſhee Shadavadelly Cawn.

ABOUT 10 o'clock in the morning of the 16th, a party of infantry, ſupported by upwards of two hundred horſe, charged the guard at the pettah, and put them to the rout. The exertions of Captain La Combe, however, reſtored order, but it required no ſmall degree of perſuaſion to prevail on this people to enter the fort. Several amongſt them, preferring a chance of eſcape to Paligautcherry, betook to the hills; the reſt were prevented following with the utmoſt difficulty; indeed a total want of ſubordination and diſcipline has, on almoſt every occaſion, ſubjected the Travancorean troops to defeat from an inferior force, unleſs when headed by European officers. After pitching his encampment to the northweſt of the pettah on this day, the Myſorean leader ſummoned the fort verbally; he demanded immediate

(3) From the repreſentations of Trimulrow, the late Amuldar, I have reaſon to think he would fall a ſacrifice, ſhould you be unfortunate enough to be obliged to ſurrender to a ſuperior force. I have from motives of humanity allowed him to proceed with his effects to Paligautcherry; I requeſt you will order a truſty guard to accompany him, who are to prevent the poſſibility of his eſcape, by their vigilance.—*Vincentia Corbet to Lieutenant Chambers.* 12*th June* 1791.

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poſſeſſion of the place, on pain of death, without exception of women or children. His threats were diſregarded, and a determined refuſal was ſent for anſwer.

A DISCHARGE of muſquetry opened from both ſides on the 17th, and as it continued for the whole of the enſuing day, Mr. Chambers found it neceſſary to withdraw ſome ſwivels which fired en barbette. Whilſt his people ſtood to theſe ſwivels, ſeveral were wounded by ginjal pieces, from the tops of houſes in the pettah; another ſummons on the 19th had a refuſal ſimilar to the firſt; but as the next day cleared up, a battery which had been nearly finiſhed in the courſe of the night, was obſerved within four hundred yards of the walls. A party was immediately ordered to be in readineſs to ſtorm this work; but before it advanced, a third ſummons made its appearance, with offer of terms highly favourable. The refuſal of this, although conveyed in a milder ſtrain, was equally determined as on either of the former occaſions. Hoſtilities inſtantly re-commenced. After firing ſeveral ſhots at the battery, the party ſallied, but galled on their approach by muſquetry from the tops of houſes, they were obliged to return without accompliſhing their intention.

A DESERTER completely equipped, who formerly ſerved the Company, but had been taken with Colonel Braithwaite, now came in, and informed the garriſon that the batteries would open upon them in the courſe of the evening. Accordingly, about duſk, a French twelve pounder and two long ſixes began and fired inceſſantly until near eleven o'clock; they commenced again at four next morning, and continued until ſix in the evening. Upwards of two hundred ſhots entered the works; ſeveral of theſe ſtruck the magazine: it became,

therefore, neceſſary to fill up the intervals of the incloſures. In addition to this labour, the troops found much employment during the night, in repairing what damage had been done to the cavaliers and baſtions.

EARLY on the 22d another battery for three guns was in readineſs. Here, eight ſcaling ladders, capable of allowing four men to mount abreaſt, were diſtinctly ſeen. A ſmart cannonade continued from the firſt battery all the forenoon, with much more effect than hitherto; ſeveral rockets were thrown into the fort; yet as all the ſtraw roofs and other combuſtible erections had been pulled down, little damage enſued. When the following day broke, the new battery opened, but ceaſed to fire towards nine o'clock, as one of their guns had by that time been diſmounted; the other battery, however, continued throughout the day. The garriſon employed the night in repairing the damage done to the works, and the beſiegers continued to impede them with ſhowers of rockets.

A THIRD battery of two embraſures was nearly completed by daylight on the 24th, within two hundred yards of the baſtion on the north-weſt angle. The whole fire of the garriſon was pointed in this direction; but as there were no guns of a calibre ſufficient to receive ſhot of a greater weight than four pounds, and as the powder was in quality miſerably bad, the damage was trifling through the day. The continuance of our fire, however, prevented their ſtrengthening the battery in the dark. A diſcharge of cannon, muſquetry, and rockets, was kept up all the next day and night without intermiſſion. At this

period

period of the ſiege ſeveral caſks full of combuſtibles were planted on the ramparts, in order to annoy the enemy, in the event of their attempting an eſcalade.

As a fourth battery within one hundred and fifty yards of the half moon threatened the beſieged on the 26th, three mines were opened in that direction. Here the enemy did not preſs on in advance. They contented themſelves, on this and the two enſuing days, in opening approaches to their batteries, and making them communicate with each other. The fire of the beſiegers ſlackened a little; but the garriſon, conceiving that this indicated an intention to lull them into ſecurity, continued indefatigable in their exertions. The mines were loaded, the gates were blocked up with earth and ſtones, and as ſhot run ſhort, although there was abundance of powder, the hammermen were ſet to making iron ſlugs, to ſupply the deficiency of balls.

UNDER an increaſe of fire, from cannon, ginjals, and ſmall arms, the Myſoreans advanced their works on the 29th and 30th, whilſt the garriſon redoubling their induſtry, oppoſed them with ſhowers of grenades from the guns. By means of ſwivels mounted on arrack carts the fire increaſed from within alſo; and the beſieged, grubbing the weeds from the ditch, bound them into faſcines for repairing the breaches. On the 31ſt a reſolute party of the enemy that advanced in order to capture ſome bullocks whilſt they watered at the tank, occaſioned an alarm in the garriſon; but as it brought on a ſmart fire, the enemy ſuffered a repulſe, accompanied with the loſs of a few daring men. By the beginning of Auguſt the batteries of the beſiegers were all completed. Beſides other miſchief, they diſmounted a gun which ſtood in one of the cavaliers; and as their fire had been

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deſtructive as well as conſtant, the caſualties within increaſed faſt. The garriſon now mounted a Malabar gun, from which they managed to throw ſeveral grenades. On the 3d, however, this new ſource of defence burſt, and wounded ſeveral men; on the 4th and 5th the beſiegers advanced their approaches to within fifty yards of the ditch; their fire increaſed in fury; and as the garriſon had information of large reinforcements to the enemy, from the diſtrict of Sattimungulum and Denaguncottah, a general attack was hourly expected.

The cannonade from the north-weſt was ſo heavy on the 6th, that large pieces of the parapet and revetment of the curtain came down. An active ſerjeant of topaſſes, with ſeveral of the people, were wounded on this day. The beſiegers ſuffered in their turn. The nearneſs of their batteries enabled the garriſon to take ſuch certain aim, that every ſhot entered their embraſures, and obliged them to draw their guns under cover of the merlons, to re-load. The neceſſities of the beſieged thickened; their ammunition was nearly exhauſted; their wounded were numerous, and without medical aſſiſtance; almoſt all the table and other linen within the works were cut up for cartridges; and, to add to the wretchedneſs of the proſpect, the Travancoreans grew clamorous for ſurrender.

The beſiegers ſlackened in working at night, about this period; but their guns opened at break of day on the 7th, and battered inceſſantly, until twelve o'clock. In two hours afterwards they re-commenced, and continued to play without intermiſſion until ſun-ſet, when about twenty yards of the parapet gave way. A fourth ſum-

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mons now made its appearance. The Cawn condeſcended to reaſon with his antagoniſt, on the impropriety of holding out any longer, againſt ſuch ſuperiority of force. He argued, that regard for the families which he knew were in the place ought to induce Lieutenant Chambers to capitulate; but if the garriſon ſtill perſiſted, he proteſted that no living creature ſhould find mercy. To this it was anſwered, that the ladders had been diſtinctly ſeen, and that the beſieged were determined to ſtand the aſſault. A letter received on this day, from Major Cuppage, promiſing relief, confirmed the reſolute, encouraged the timid, and ſtrengthened the confidence of the ſteady.

THE cannonade opened with the light on the 8th, and continued throughout that and the two enſuing days, until ſunſet. The beſiegers now working inceſſantly in the dark, advanced their approaches to within twenty yards of the ditch. Emboldened from a want of flints amongſt their antagoniſts, the bad quality of their powder, and a conſumption of bullets which the ſmiths were unequal to ſupply, they threatened to ſtorm without delay. The garriſon, however, having repaired ſome ſwivels, planted them on poſts ſunk into the ground, ſo as to enfilade the breach, and uſed every means that could favour a reſolute reſiſtance. Beſides the caſks loaded with combuſtibles, as already mentioned, they covered the ramparts with large ſtones and miſſile weapons of various kinds. In ſhort, nothing was neglected, to render the defence deſperate.

A GENERAL aſſault, which took place about four o'clock on the morning of the 11th, was announced by an univerſal roar of cannon, muſquetry and rockets from the trenches and all around. The garri-

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ſon, flying to their ſtations in an inſtant, returned the fire with much briſkneſs. Regardleſs of danger, the ditch was immediately crowded with the enemy; they planted their ladders with compoſure, and mounted the parapet on the eaſt and ſouth faces at five diſtinct points. La Combe was in charge of this quarter, with his ſepoys. He was nearly overpowered by numbers; but ſtrengthened by a party of topaſſes from Lieutenant Chambers, he redoubled his exertions. His activity and valour encouraged the defendants to wonderful feats; and the people, following his example, cloſed with the aſſailants all around. At this critical juncture a ſubadar ſet off one of the combuſtible caſks. This new inſtrument of deſtruction terrified the Myſoreans on all hands; they put about; the defendants, following their advantage, threw ſhowers of ſtones on the enemy; one and all of them retired from the ramparts; they abandoned their ladders, and took ſhelter in the ditch, and under a wall on the creſt of the glacis. To the northward, and from the weſtward, however, they ſtill advanced with much ſpirit. Driving in the troops that defended the half moon, they carefully avoided the mines. Numbers of them preſſed to the gate; but their principal force in this quarter, planting their ladders againſt the curtain, cloſe to the ſouth-weſt baſtion, ſeveral got to the top. Here they were manfully oppoſed by Mr. Chambers, with his topaſſes. As that officer, fighting amidſt crowds, ſtrained every nerve, his people gave ample ſupport. Fortunately, too, the curtain was flanked with ſome ſwivels, that played with good effect; and, as fire balls and rockets expoſed the movements of the aſſailants to full view, they were compelled to retire with conſiderable ſlaughter.

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THE day now clearing up, the diſcomfiture of the enemy was ſoon compleated. Towards ſix o'clock they abandoned the attempt all around. With the utmoſt ſpeed they ran from the works in every direction; ſtill, all of them aſſiſted in carrying off their wounded and ſlain. Notwithſtanding theſe efforts, ſuch was the carnage, that upwards of two hundred bodies were found on the glacis and in the ditch. The loſs ſuſtained by the garriſon bore no proportion to that of the aſſailants; only ſix men were ſlain, and the wounded ſcarcely doubled that number. Twenty-five ladders, with a number of ſwords, and pieces of armour of different deſcriptions, lay ſtrewed about the works; but the defeat was rendered more complete by the fortunate appearance of Major Cuppage, who, on being apprized of the enemy's deſigns, moved to raiſe the ſiege. His approach was the ſignal for the garriſon to ſally. The inſtant the *Myſoreans* beat to arms, La Combe, with eighty topaſſes and ſepoys, entered their trenches. Although under a heavy fire of muſquetry and rockets, he took poſſeſſion of their batteries, put their guards to the rout, and as one eighteen and one twelve pounder had been already limbered, they were dragged into the fort. The overthrow of the beſiegers was rendered ſtill more perfect.

NEWS of the enemy's deſcent into Coimbatore having been conveyed to the Travancorean miniſter, who then reſided at Calicut, he immediately detached Captain De Crock with a battalion of the Ram Rajah's troops, to Paligautcherry. On the ſame occaſion the ſpirited exertions of Mr. Macleod, the then collector of Madura, brought forward about three hundred and fifty polygars and revenue

troops.

troops. Quitting the enjoyment of domeſtick happineſs, in its beſt ſhape, this patriot, in defiance of hardſhips, headed the fighting men of his diſtrict in perſon. So ſoon as information of theſe aids had been received, Major Cuppage detached Captain B. Vigors, with a battalion of Coaſt ſepoys, to Chatram, in order to favour a communication with the beſieged; and in a few days afterwards, the people under Macleod and De Crock formed a junction with the Madras troops.

THIS force, which in all amounted to about one thouſand fighting men, advanced with four iron four pounders, and two braſs fixes, towards Coimbatore. Approaching the enemy juſt as they had ſuffered the repulſe from Lieutenant Chambers, Major Cuppage continued to heighten their diſtreſſes. The two flank companies of the 16th battalion, ſupporting the party already deſcribed under La Combe, drove the enemy from all their poſts in the pettah. As uſual, however, their horſe drew up on a riſing ground, evidently with a view to cover the retreat of their infantry; but a few ſhot from the ſix pounders, made them alſo fall back. The rapidity with which the Cawn moved off, the extreme fatigue which the bullocks had undergone, the approach of night, and the neceſſity of attending to the garriſon, rendered purſuit ineffectual.

IT was ten o'clock next morning before the neceſſary arrangements for purſuit took place at Coimbatore. About that hour Captain La Combe having joined Major Cuppage, with as many men as the garriſon could ſpare, the whole advanced after the enemy, and by a rapid movement, obtained Vellady, a diſtance of twenty-one miles, without a halt; and as ſeveral wounded men, and ſome camp equipage,

were

were taken in the courſe of this march, it is highly probable, that if circumſtances had admitted an immediate purſuit, the whole corps muſt have been diſperſed. The victors proceeded to the banks of the Bevani; but as the river was nowhere fordable, and as the enemy had already ſecured the boats on the oppoſite ſide, they began to take heart; and, after croſſing the river, they took poſt at Demiacottah.

THE principal object of the detachment being thus effected, the Major pitched his tents on the ſouthern bank. The Myſoreans, ſkreened from view by thick woods, brought two four-pounders to play on the encampment, before their approach was obſerved. The party conſequently changed ground: they fell back from the Bevani, proceeded by eaſy marches to Coimbatore, and having put that poſt in as good a ſtate of defence as circumſtances would admit, the corps diſperſed to their ſeveral ſtations. Mr. Macleod returned with his polygars to his occupations at Madura. De Crock remained with Major Cuppage at Paligautcherry; whilſt La Combe continued to aſſiſt Lieutenant Chalmers at Coimbatore.

PRESSED as the Sultaun had been on all hands, at this ſtage of the war, he could not brook the failure of an expedition, to the ſucceſs of which he looked forward with the utmoſt confidence. Without loſs of time, he detached a much larger body of troops, under Cummer ul dien Cawn, towards Coimbatore. The approach of this force, about the latter end of September, left but a ſhort interval for Mr. Chalmers to refreſh his garriſon, and to repair the breaches which had been made during the former ſiege. Different reinforcements had, however, increaſed his ſtrength to ſeven hundred fighting men; he had alſo the two pieces of cannon which were captured from the

enemy at their late failure; and as he was now ſupported by upwards of forty regular ſepoys, under Lieutenant Naſh, of the Madras eſtabliſhment, he was if poſſible more determined than ever on reſiſtance.

THE Cawn, having under his command ſix regular cuſhoons, each about one thouſand ſtrong; upwards of five hundred ſtable horſe, in low condition; twelve ſix pounders; two eighteen pounders; four mortars; twenty camels loaded with rockets, and a number of irregular troops, ſat down to the north weſt of Coimbatore, on the 6th of October, and took poſſeſſion of the pettah without oppoſition. They changed ground to the ſouthward on the following day, and on the 8th, they attempted to drive in a ſmall party which occupied the bank of a tank cloſe to the poſt. Lieutenant Naſh, with his own ſepoys, a party of topaſſes, and a company of Travancoreans with a gun, were ſent out in order to prevent their getting poſſeſſion of this bank. A ſmart action, in which the enemy were repeatedly repulſed, took place; but as ſeveral reinforcements increaſed their number to upwards of eight hundred ſtrong, it was thought prudent to withdraw the whole of the garriſon within the works.

ON the 12th a battery of two embraſures, which opened from the bank, nearly oppoſite to the center baſtion on the ſouth face, was ſilenced by the fire of a fourteen pounder from that baſtion, and from an eighteen pounder on the cavalier. Two eighteen pounders, which opened from freſh embraſures cut in the ſame bank, to the eaſtward of the others, on the 14th, were diſabled by guns which the garriſon brought to bear on that quarter. A third battery of three embraſures opened on the 15th, a little to the right of the firſt, and ſoon afterwards two guns from a fourth played on the ſouth eaſt angle

angle baſtion. The fire of theſe batteries brought down the wall very faſt; but as ſome embraſures on the eaſt face bore in their direction, two guns which opene from thence attracted the fire from the point where it had moſt effect, and enabled the garriſon to counteract the enemy's deſigns, by erecting a ſubſtantial battery for the heavy guns, on the ſouth curtain.

FROM this period until the 23d, the beſiegers continued to advance by ſap, under a conſtant diſcharge, either of cannon, rockets, or muſquetry; whilſt the defendants, from the bad quality of their powder, were unable to prevent their working. To oppoſe ſix pieces of cannon with which they covered the approaches, none but the ſhot from the two largeſt guns in the garriſon, could reach their batteries; and as twelve pound balls were the largeſt in the place, the aim of theſe guns, from the diſproportion of the ſhot to their calibres, could not be taken with any degree of certainty. About the middle of the month a letter from Major Cuppage, promiſing relief, found its way into the garriſon. Although much harraſſed with conſtant work and duty, this communication threw the whole of the defendants into the higheſt ſpirits; the gates, which had been blocked up with large ſtones from the beginning, were now cleared away, and every preparation was made for co-operating with the troops expected in the field.

A SECOND letter, received on the 23d, informed the garriſon, that two battalions of Madras ſepoys, one from Bombay, and two of Travancorean troops, with ſix field pieces, advanced under Major Cuppage, in order to compel the enemy to raiſe the ſiege. On the arrival of this force, at Madaghery, Cummer ul dien Cawn, leaving part of his troops

troops in the trenches, approached Major Cuppage, with intention to determine in battle whether he ſhould be left to proſecute his original plan without moleſtation, or be forced to abandon the deſign. So ſoon as the Myſoreans were diſcovered in motion, the detachment ſtruck its encampment and prepared to fight. In order to alarm Major Cuppage for his poſt at Paligautchery, and ſtill more for a large convoy of bullocks which was then on its way to General Abercromby, the Cawn made a movement to the right of the detachment, which threatened to have poſſeſſion of the paſs for its object. By this manœuvre, it was left for Major Cuppage to chuſe whether he ſhould abandon the idea of relieving Coimbatore, or riſk the equipment of our weſtern army; and as the latter object was conſidered by far the moſt important, it was immediately determined to fall back; a meaſure upon which opinions have been various.

On the firſt movement of Major Cuppage, the polygars and rocket men of the enemy began the attack on his right flank, whilſt the ſtable horſe advanced to charge his rear in ſolid columns. The flank companies were entruſted with this ſtation. Their valour and diſcipline were put to a ſevere teſt. When hard preſſed, the battalions flew to their aſſiſtance. In repeated attempts the horſe found they could make no impreſſion; and as the Cawn ſaw that all his endeavours could not occaſion the ſmalleſt confuſion, he determined to abandon the purſuit, and to proſecute his operations at the ſiege. The loſs on this occaſion was conſiderable on both ſides. Of the detachment three officers and about fifty ſepoys were wounded. Amongſt the ſlain, which amounted to about half that number, there was no man of rank. What the enemy ſuffered has never been exactly aſcertained; but, from the number that were ſeen to fall, their loſs muſt have been very conſiderable, eſpecially in horſes.

THE firſt communication which the garriſon had with Major Cuppage after this action, left no further room for Mr. Chalmers to expect any relief. The enemy returned to the ſiege, and carried on their approaches with redoubled exertions. All the ammunition in the fort, which had been originally bad, was now nearly expended; a wide breach was rendered eaſy of aſſault from the nearneſs of the trenches; Lieutenants Chalmers and Naſh, with the ſtore ſerjeant and ſeveral privates, increaſed the wounded on one and the ſame day; and as the people in general had their families in the place, all of them intreated their commandant to propoſe a capitulation. Mr. Chalmers conſented, and terms ſimilar to thoſe which had been granted at the ſurrender of Daraporam and Permacoil being readily agreed to, the Cawn was put in poſſeſſion of Coimbatore on the 3d of November.

UNDER a pretence that it was neceſſary for the Sultaun to ratify the treaty, the priſoners, inſtead of being ſent to Paligautchery, according to agreement, were, after a confinement of thirteen days, forced away to Seringapatam. Before he would conſent to move, Mr. Chalmers ventured to remonſtrate; he refuſed to march in any other direction than that which was ſpecified by the terms of agreement; and as he had been already deceived, in order to have an explanation of this ſtrange conduct, he requeſted an audience of the Cawn in perſon.

WHILST on his way to that officer, he was ſurrounded by freſh guards, and cloſely confined by himſelf in a ſmall hovel: from thence after a farther detention of two days, he was compelled to march towards Seringapatam. On his arrival at this capital, he was confined

for

two months in a bullock ſtable, which reſiſted neither wind nor water, and on the wretched allowance of one meaſure of rice, with ten caſh per day, to maintain himſelf and family. An infant ſon ſoon fell a victim to this barbarous treatment. Lieutenant Naſh, with the reſt of the garriſon, underwent indignities and cruelties nearly ſimilar to thoſe which Mr. Chalmers was compelled to endure; nor is there the leaſt room to doubt, that all of them owe their lives to the diſcomfiture which the Sultaun ſuffered at his capital in the following February, and to the ſpirited remonſtrances of Earl Cornwallis reſpecting their treatment. Theſe facts, however unimportant, in the grand ſcale of this war, are related with more than common minuteneſs, in order to ſhew what the exertions of individuals may effect in the worſt of ſituations.

At the time that Lieutenant Colonel Floyd proceeded to recruit the cavalry in the Carnatic, Captain Oram, with his own battalion, moved in advance towards Vinkitaghery. A few days afterwards the ſeventh Bengal and twenty-third Coaſt battalions marched in the ſame direction, under the command of Captain Rattray, with all the carriage cattle that could be ſpared from the army. The two laſt mentioned corps returning with about five thouſand bullock loads of grain, paſſed towards Ouſſore on the 10th of Auguſt; and on the 13th Captain Williamſon, with the 28th Bengal battalion, and two volunteer companies that protected one hundred and fourteen elephants from their firſt ſetting out at Lucknow and Cawnpore, eſcorted thoſe animals, which had been loaded with treaſure at Madras, into camp. Upwards of ſix thouſand bullocks carrying rice and other proviſion, above one hundred carts, with ſwarms of coolies, accompanied Captain Williamſon's detachment. This immenſe

menſe ſupply advanced through the Barahmahl valley, and entering the Myſore country by the paſs at Pallicode, approached the army unmoleſted, under cover of the forts which had been lately acquired in that direction.

ON the 16th of the month Captain Williamſon's detachment reconducted all the elephants and ſpare cattle towards Ambore, along a route, which winding amongſt hills and jungles, leads by Ryacottah to Kiſtnaghery. This paſſage into the Barahmahl, although it had been widened by our pioneers, was found much more difficult of acceſs than that by Pallicode. Thence it was never afterwards attempted with cattle, throughout the war. Captain Oram, with his own and part of the fifteenth battalion, was poſted at this period, in the neighbourhood of Kiſtnaghery, to watch the movements of that gariſon. Theſe two diviſions formed a junction; they proceeded to Ambore, and after being joined by the firſt battalion of Coaſt ſepoys, the whole eſcorted a ſecond convoy, conſiſting of ſome camp equipage, proviſion, and ſtores, to Bangalore, about the middle of September. This diviſion was accompanied by the heavy guns from Ouſſore, under the particular direction of Captain Glaſs of the Bengal artillery.

A VAKEEL ſent by the Sultaun to treat for peace arrived at one of the outpoſts about the middle of Auguſt. This negociator was ſo particular about the mode of his reception, as to create ſuſpicions reſpecting the intention of his miſſion, and the ſincerity of his maſter's propoſals; particularly as his credentials were addreſſed to Earl Cornwallis only. His name was Appajee Row: he was of the Hindoo religion, and by birth a Maratta, but ſo little reſpected by his coun-

countrymen, that it became neceſſary to protect his perſon with a guard. The twenty-ſixth Bengal battalion was ſent on this duty. Suſpected of intrigues, he was diſmiſſed without a hearing on the 23d, when the battalion returned to its ſtation in the line.

THE communication with Bangalore, having, in conſequence of our movements (1), been conſidered open, ſeveral gentlemen viſited their friends in that garriſon. On one of theſe occaſions Mr. Hume, ſurgeon of the 36th regiment, was unfortunately captured by looties on the 24th, as he was returning from thence to camp; nor has any certain account of his fate been as yet obtained. Another unlucky circumſtance happened about this time. A body of horſe, about one thouſand in number, and headed by a deſcendant of the former proprietor of Nundydroog, having ſeparated from the confederates, in order to keep the ancient poſſeſſions of his family in quietneſs, a detachment under Cummer ul dien Cawn ſurprized their encampment, and put moſt of them to death, in the neighbourhood of Chinapalaboram. The few that eſcaped fled for ſhelter to the walls of Bangalore; yet, notwithſtanding their irregular mode of warfare, this was the only ſerious blow which they ſuſtained whilſt acting in concert with the reſt of the allies. The Marattas, although not ſo rude as the people of Nizam Ally, had ſeveral quarrels with our troops. In one of theſe a ſepoy of the ſeventh Bengal battalion was put to death; at another time a private of the thirty-ſixth had his hand cut off by the blow of a ſword: but the culprits were conſtantly delivered up for puniſhment to the leaders in whoſe diviſions they ſerved.

			Miles	Fur
(1)	July 22	Neelgherry,	8	—
	29	Shettapelly,	7	—
	31	Moodoogampelly,	5	—
	Aug. 7	Colkacondapelly,	3	—
	12	Near Ouſſore,	6	—
	11	Agatapelly,	6	4
	23	Beyoor,	10	—

As

As the equipments for a ſecond attempt on the Sultaun's capital were now in great forwardneſs, it was judged adviſeable by Earl Cornwallis to lay open our communication with the diſtricts of Nizam Ally. Beſides the interruption which our ſupplies from the dominions of that prince might ſuffer whilſt Nundydroog and a whole chain of hill forts continued in the hands of the enemy, no material advantage could be derived from the northern brinjaries, or from the herds of polygars by whom theſe romantic wilds are inhabited. Gowdie's brigade, ſtrengthened by a detachment of artillery, with four iron twelve pounders and two mortars under Major Montagu, marched on this ſervice on the 13th of September. On the 15th they were joined by the fourth and part of the third and fifteenth battalions of Coaſt ſepoys under Captain Alexander Read. This laſt reinforcement had been for a length of time moſt advantageouſly employed in the collection of grain.

RAYMANGHUR, a hill fort of conſiderable ſtrength, was ſummoned on the 17th, but the killedar refuſed to ſurrender. Batteries erected with uncommon rapidity were then in conſiderable forwardneſs: their effect was therefore tried towards evening. A well directed fire ſoon made impreſſion upon the wall; and as ſome ſhells thrown into the place with much judgment contributed to heighten their conſternation, the garriſon ſubmitted at diſcretion (2). Am-

(2) *Major Gowdie to Major Cloſe*,—Laſt night and this day we have been employed in conſtructing the batteries.—Lieutenant Mackenzie of the engineers, by my advice, took advantage of the bank of a deep ravine to bring the twelve pounder to an evelation to bear on the work, diſtance eight hundred yards. Major Montagu, with indefatigable exertion and labour, got four ſix pounders and the two mortars on the top of a rock that completely flanked the works I propoſed to attack. At one o'clock two men from the killedar waited on me, propoſing terms that I could not comply with on account of time; I ſent them back at three, to acquaint the killedar that if he did not accept of terms in courſe of that afternoon, I ſhould open ſuch batteries on him as I had conſtructed. No meſſage arriving from the fort within the limited time, I accordingly fired with great effect. After a few rounds I diſcovered people deſcending from the rock, and immediately gave orders to ceaſe firing. Captain Read at this time requeſting to advance with a company, to meet the party coming down, I agreed, and as ſoon as it was poſſible for him to gain the ſummit, I had the pleaſure to be informed he had full poſſeſſion of Rahmanghur. It is not poſſible for me at this late hour to aſcertain what is upon the hill. Captain Read, with his detachment, marches to morrow morning, to ſummon Ambagydroog and Chillumcottah; the latter known by the name of Moorigam Ally.

bagydirgum and Chillumcottah, two neighbouring hill forts, opened their gates to a party detached under Captain Alexander Read, on the firſt ſummons (1). After the two diviſions had again formed a junction, the whole detachment proceeded without loſs of time to Nundydroog; and on the 22d, towards noon, the grenadiers carried the pettah, and a conſiderable portion of the hill by aſſault (2). Reports, however, of the approach of Cummer ul dien Cawn to ſupport the northern hill forts, induced Major Gowdie to move off from Nundydroog, and to take poſt at Chinapalaboram on the 24th. Four days afterwards the detachment again ſat down before the hill, with every preparation for the ſiege, and on the 29th Captain Norman Macleod of the Bengal eſtabliſhment, with his own and the tenth Coaſt battalion, eſcorted to Major Gowdie two additional battering guns, four mortars, with a quantity of grain and ſtores.

(1) *Major Gowdie to Major Cloſe*, 21ſt September, 1791. You will be pleaſed to acquaint his Lordſhip, that I made a march of nine miles to this place. After coming to my ground, I received a letter from Captain Andrew Read, of Gurrumcondah, expreſſing his apprehenſions of the approach of Cummer ul dien Cawn. From this information, and other reaſons, I have determined to alter my plan, and proceed no further weſtward. From very good authority, I underſtand they have in Nundydroog between two and three thouſand fighting men. To attack it, thus circumſtanced, would be madneſs; independent of this, Major Montagu is of opinion, that the twelve-pounders cannot breach the walls. Captain Read and his detachment has again joined me. The two hill forts of Ambagydroog and Chillumcottah ſurrendered to him yeſterday without oppoſition. He informs me, that my preſent ſtation will cover five thouſand brinjarries proceeding to the grand army. The killedar of Rahmangur is a venerable old man; he requeſted permiſſion to proceed to the Cuddapah country, which I have granted him. He was ſo wretchedly poor, that I was obliged to give him two bullocks, one to ride on, the other to carry his little baggage; and I furniſhed him with fifty rupees, to pay his expences on the road.

Anſwer in Cypher.—Major Cloſe to Major Gowdie.

I am directed by Lord Cornwallis to inform you, that Captain Macleod, with his battalion, and a Coaſt battalion, will march tomorrow morning from Bangalore, to join you, with the ordnance and ſtores Major Montagu has applied for. Under his eſcort two hundred bullock loads of rice, and a ſupply of arrack and ſalt, will alſo proceed. This detachment, goes from hence with rice for their own conſumption to the 10th of October inclufive.—23d *September*, 1791.

(2) *Major Gowdie to Major Cloſe*, 22*d September*, 1792—You will acquaint his Lordſhip, that I marched with the flank companies of the detachment, at ten laſt night, for the pettah of Nundydroog, and completely ſurprized it at day break this morning. Zeal for the ſervice, in this inſtance carried me farther than I intended. Captain Read and Lieutenant Mackenzie, of the engineers, with aſtoniſhing reſolution mounted the hill, and made a lodgement within one hundred and fifty yards of the firſt gate; but the place is of ſuch wonderful ſtrength, there being three walls, one above the other, that I have given up the idea of keeping poſſeſſion of the poſt, and ſhall withdraw the troops immediately after dark; with a full conviction, that this part, the north face of the hill, is not to be taken. I have had a very heavy cannonade and muſquetry on me the whole day. On leaving the pettah an hour ſince, my loſs was only one European and three ſepoys wounded. I ſhall halt tomorrow, and the next day move round to the ſouth ſide of the fort, to reconnoitre it. My people behaved with great humanity, having many of the inhabitants in their power, whom they ſpared. A few lives, however, were loſt.

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THUS ſtrengthened, the works went on with much ſpirit; abundance of materials for pickets, faſcines and gabions, were eaſily procured from jungles all around; and a battery conſtructed for ſix guns, in the face of the hill, by Lieutenant Mackenzie, of the Madras engineers, was compleated on the 2d of October. With unparallelled labour and exertion the guns were got up this ſteep hill in the courſe of the two enſuing nights(3). By means of tackles fixed to poſts ſunk into the ground, and to ropes fixed around rocks and trees, this fatiguing ſervice was carried on in the dark, under the direction of Major Montagu; but ſituated as the battery lay, it is highly probable that no degree of exertion in the troops, or of ſkill in the director, could have overcome the difficulties that intervened, but for the aſſiſtance of elephants, the wonderful ſagacity of which animal is highly conſpicuous in his performance of the moſt ſevere taſk in perfect ſilence, when noiſe would expoſe him to danger. A mortar battery which had been laid out on the pettah ſide, to the weſtward of Nundydroog, was in readineſs about the ſame time with the other. The latter opened on the 4th without effect, from the height of the hill, and the former on the following day was found unequal to breach the wall, as the ſtones, which were all of an oblong form, and had been laid lengthwiſe, from their hardneſs not only reſiſted the ſhot, but frequently broke them to pieces.

THE progreſs of our operations at Nundydroog having been daily reported to Earl Cornwallis, it was left to his Lordſhip either to abandon the deſign, or to advance up the face of the hill by regular ap-

(3) *Major Gowdie to Major Cloſe, 3d October.*—With aſtoniſhing labour and exertion Major Montagu did in the courſe of laſt night get the two twenty-pounders only into the battery, and I believe no man has more reſources within himſelf. I have not a doubt but I ſhall be able to open the battery tomorrow, as ſoon as the clouds diſperſe from the hills, which generally happens about ten o'clock. I propoſe opening the mortar and gun batteries at the ſame time. By Major Montagu's advice I have thought it neceſſary to order the eighteen pounders on, likewiſe the elephant, as mine had work enough laſt night. It is my intention to erect a two gun battery at a gateway leading to the pettah, directly under the mortars, to play on the gateway of the fort, and to take the large baſtion in flank.

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proaches. The latter alternative was immediately adopted. Orders were ſent to proſecute the ſiege with the utmoſt vigour; Captain Kyd, of the Bengal engineers, was directed to join Major Gowdie's detachment; and a trench which had been dug for the foundation of another wall, forming a ſafe cover to the beſiegers, it was occupied in the firſt inſtance. This advanced poſt lay parallel to the enemy's outer wall, at the diſtance of about one hundred yards. Here Captain Read and Lieutenant Minden were both wounded.

WITH the moſt unremitting perſeverance in exceſſive labour, a battery for eight guns was compleated much higher up in the hill than the firſt, on the 11th; but from the ſteepneſs of the road by which the guns muſt have been conveyed into it, each required two elephants and four drag ropes crowded with men to bring them forward. After ſummoning the fort (1), it opened on the enſuing day with excellent effect, and ſoon ſilenced all the guns which bore in its direction, excepting one that fired in flank from the ſouth eaſt angle, and did much damage (2). Againſt this annoyance a traverſe was thrown up at

(1) *Sultaun Cawn Sheriff Bahauder, killedar of Nundydroog.*—Major Gowdie now addreſſes him, to let him know, that he has orders from the Right Honourable Earl Cornwallis to take Nundydroog. If Sultaun Cawn Sheriff is determined to hold out, Major Gowdie recommends to him, for the ſake of humanity, that he will ſend down from the fort all women, children, bramins, and ryuts, that they may be eſcorted to any place of ſafety he may point out. After this intimation the killedar may depend on it, that if he obliges Major Gowdie to open his batteries of guns and mortars, that no flag will be attended to. Major Gowdie thinks it neceſſary to acquaint Sultaun Cawn Sheriff of the fall of Chittledroog to Purſeram Bhow; alſo of the Marattas having poſſeſſion of Perybalaporam, and of their having ſpread themſelves over the country. Added to this, the grand army is within ten miles; ſo that all ſuccour is entirely cut off from Nundydroog. Major Gowdie hears that Sultaun Cawn Sheriff is a good ſoldier: he therefore muſt be a good man, and one who would ſave the blood of his fellow creatures. He therefore recommends to him to take one day's conſideration of the conſequence that muſt enſue, ſhould he oblige him to ſtorm the fort with the forces he has the honour to command. If the killedar is diſpoſed to treat on honourable terms, Major Gowdie will negociate matters, by Sultaun Cawn ſending proper people down before the batteries are opened. The bearer of this, Huſſain Cawn Jemadar, is the confidential man of Major Gowdie; he therefore expects that he will be treated with reſpect, in ſuch a manner as Major Gowdie would treat a man from Sultaun Cawn. An anſwer is expected to this letter, ſuch as one ſoldier would ſend to another.

Major Gowdie to Major Cloſe.—I ſent a jemadar and flag to ſummon the fort. The killedar refuſed having any thing to ſay to him, and fired both cannon and muſquetry at him.

(2) *Major Gowdie to Major Cloſe, 13th October, 1791.* Since writing you yeſterday, I have had eight or ten people killed and wounded, but as I have not had a return of them, I cannot be particular. The firing to-day has made a conſiderable hole in the wall, which is of much greater ſtrength than I could have formed any

night, and a work was conſtructed for two ſix pounders ſtill farther in advance. A twelve pounder being alſo conveyed into this battery, with infinite labour, the angle gave way to a few ſhots well aimed by Major Montagu; and the gun which had all along done ſo much miſchief, came tumbling down the rock. As the beſiegers fell ſhort of ammunition about this period, the fire from the batteries ſlackened; but a ſupply having arrived on the 16th, from Bangalore, it re-commenced with much briſkneſs.

THE flank companies of His Majeſty's thirty-ſixth, and ſeventy-firſt regiments, formed a junction with the beſiegers on the 17th; and immediately advanced to occupy the laſt parallel. In order to intimidate the beſieged, Earl Cornwallis moved with his whole army within a few miles of Nundydroog (3) on the following day; and after cloſely reconnoitering the breach, his Lordſhip gave directions for an aſſault with the firſt light of the moon. About duſk, Major General Medows, with Majors Gowdie and Montagu, joined the troops in the advanced parallel. The ſtorm was attended with all the ſuc-

any idea of. The people in the fort are ſtockading both ſides of the breach. Faſcines and earth was laid behind the wall laſt night, which we are now bringing down. Captain Kyd writes to Colonel Roſs. He will give a farther deſcription of the breach; for my part, I think it will take two days more to effect a practicable one. As the wounded men are now very numerous, and many of them bad caſes, the ſurgeons are deſirous of removing them to an hoſpital, and have requeſted of me to write to his Lordſhip for twenty or thirty doolies to be ſent from the grand army.

			Miles	Fur.
(3) Auguſt	28	Malloorpelly,	10	—
	30	Agaram,	7	—
Septr.	10	Beyoor,	4	—
	19	Baſantaporam,	6	—
	26	Gebbahly,	10	4
	27	Elevanca,	7	4
	29	Singanipelly,	3	4
Oct.	18	Aroonapelly,	11	—

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ceſs that could be expected from the moſt judicious diſpoſition (1). Two guns, fired at the riſe of the moon towards midnight, gave the ſignal to advance. Under Captain Robertſon, of the 71ſt regiment, the grenadiers, accompanied by Major General Medows, puſhed on for the firſt breach which had been laid open, whilſt the light infantry under Captain Hart, of the thirty-ſixth regiment, accompanied by Major Gowdie, aſſailed the other in the outworks; parties from the fourth Madras regiment, under Captains Gibbons and Cameron, with all the pioneers carrying-tools and ſcaling ladders, accompanied theſe diviſions: Major Montagu ſent an officer with ſome artillery men and a mortar, which he intended to make uſe of as a petard, to blow

Regulations for the aſſault of Nundydroog, agreed on between Major Gowdie, commanding the detachment, and Captain Robertſon, of his Majeſty's ſeventy-firſt regiment, who commanded the ſtorming party, 17th October.

(1) The fort to be aſſaulted by two different attacks; the firſt to be led by a ſerjeant, corporal, and twelve grenadiers, ſupported by a Lieutenant and twenty men, who are to be followed by the grenadiers under Captain Burn, who are to make a lodgment in the breach in the curtain: the ſubaltern who leads this attack, will the moment he carries the breach take poſſeſſion of the cavalier in the rear of the breach, from whence he will keep up a heavy fire on the round baſtions to the right and left, ſo as to cover the men advancing out of the parrellel. The ſecond attack, the light infantry under Captain Hart, with the ſame forlorn and ſtorming party as the grenadiers, are to move out in the ſame order, and to attack the breach in the enemy's advanced work to the left, in which they will make a lodgement, and there wait for orders. Both theſe attacks are to carry ſix ladders each, two with the ſerjeant, two with the ſubaltern, and two with each captain; the men for this duty to be warned before we march off, and poſted at the head of the reſpective attacks; the greateſt ſilence to be obſerved, and the men to be warned againſt chearing, or making any noiſe whatever.

Inſtructions for Captain Macleod.

When the ſepoy grenadiers are paraded near the grenadiers poſt, which will be by two o'clock this evening, you are to move up as cloſe as poſſible after the European working party, ſo as to get as near the parallel as you can, keeping your men under the beſt poſſible cover. The inſtant the ſtorming party moves out of the parallel, you are to march into it, ſending two companies to ſupport the light infantry, who are to attack the left breach; you will likewiſe ſupport the grenadiers, who are to attack the right breach, to the beſt of your judgment, as circumſtances may occur.

Inſtructions for Captain Gibbings.

You are to move from your lines with the battalion companies of your corps ſo as to be at the firſt ſtation on the gun road beyond the engineers poſt before two o'clock this evening; you are to form your men on the right of the ſepoy grenadiers, who are to parade at the above place. When the whole are formed, you will be pleaſed to move off in ſuch a manner as to prevent your men from being expoſed as little as poſſible; you will then wait on Captain Robertſon in the parallel, and know from him the number of your men he will require for carrying the ſcaling ladders for the attack; the remainder of your own men to be employed as Lieutenant Makenzie, ſenior engineer, may direct.

Inſtructions for Lieutenant Mackenzie.

The attack is to be put off till the riſing of the moon. Captain Gibbings and Lieutenant Dowſe, with the men under them, have inſtructions to obey your orders. I have no intention of making any lodgment but in the breach in front of the cavalier, and on the cavalier; if it ſhould afterwards be found practicable to get poſſeſſion of the baſtions to the right and to the left of the breach, their gorges muſt be pulled up. An additional working party of one hundred ſepoys is ordered to join you for any ſervice you may chuſe to employ them on. It will be neceſſary that you ſhould be in the parallel early. General Medows and I will be there before dark. My reaſon for wiſhing you to be there early, is to ſee the materials ready to put into the people's hands.

Inſtructions

blow open the gate of the inner wall; and the whole was ſupported by all the grenadier ſepoys of the detachment under Captain Macleod. As if they expected an aſſault, the enemy were more than uſually alert; their fire from ginjals and ſmall arms inflicted ſome ſevere wounds, and a blue light diſcovering the aſſailants to the garriſon juſt as they left the parallel, a heavy diſcharge of muſquetry and rockets opened; ſtones of immenſe weight, too, rolling down from the works at the ſummit of the hill, with aſtoniſhing velocity, were ſtill more formidable to our troops than all the other defences.

Inſtructions for Lieutenant Dowſe, commanding the Pioneers.

You will have your men ready to move up to the parallel by two o'clock this evening, and you will be pleaſed to comply with every requiſition from Lieutenant Mackenzie, ſenior engineer.

General Orders, by Earl Cornwallis.

Lord Cornwallis having been witneſs of the extraordinary obſtacles, both of nature and art, which were oppoſed to the detachment of the army that attacked Nundydroog, he cannot too highly applaud the firmneſs and exertions which were manifeſted by all ranks, in carrying on the operations of the ſiege, or the valour and diſcipline which was diſplayed by the flank companies of his Majeſty's thirty ſixth and ſeventy-firſt regiments; thoſe of the Madras fourth European battalion; the thirteenth Bengal battalion of native infantry; and of the third, fourth, tenth, fifteenth, and twenty ſeventh battalions of Madras native infantry, that were employed in the aſſault of laſt night, and which, by overcoming all difficulties, effected the reduction of that important fort.

His Lordſhip is highly ſenſible of the zealous and meritorious conduct of Major Gowdie in the command of that detachment, both at the attacks of Raymanghur, and in carrying on the arduous operation of the ſiege of Nundydroog, for which the Major will be pleaſed to accept his beſt acknowledgments. The whole of the officers and ſoldiers who compoſed that detachment appear likewiſe to be juſtly entitled to the ſtrongeſt expreſſions of his approbation; and he particularly deſires that his warmeſt thanks may be preſented to Major Montagu, for his ſucceſsful efforts in bringing the artillery into the batteries, and for the ability with which it was afterwards ſerved.

To Captain Robertſon, of the ſeventy firſt regiment, who commanded the European flank companies that led the aſſault, and to Captain Macleod, who ſupported the Europeans with the flank companies of the native regiment, for the gallantry and judgement with which they diſcharged the duties of their reſpective ſituations. To Captain Read, for his almoſt unexampled perſeverance in carrying on an approach, and eſtabliſhing a parallel near to the enemy's work on the aſcent of the hill, which was calculated to facilitate the ſucceſs of the aſſault.

To Captain Kyd, his Lordſhip's aid-de-camp, for the zealous and able profeſſional aſſiſtance which he gave as engineer; and to Lieutenant Mackenzie the ſenior engineer upon duty, for the ſkill and indefatigable induſtry which he uniformly exerted, both at Raymanghur, and during the whole of this ſiege. Although the ſervices of pioneers are leſs brilliant than thoſe of the troops, they are of peculiar value in all ſuch operations, and his Lordſhip thinks himſelf called upon, in juſtice to Lieutenant Dowſe, and all the non-commiſſioned officers and men of the pioneer corps; as well as to Enſign Stokoe of the engineers, who aſſiſted with ſo much ability in directing their labours, to declare that their behaviour on this occaſion has deſerved his higheſt commendation.

Lord Cornwallis cannot ſufficiently expreſs the ſenſe of his obligation to General Medows; but he requeſts that he will be aſſured, that he conſiders the handſome manner in which the General undertook the temporary command of a detachment ſo inadequate to his rank, and the conduct of the aſſault, both as a mark of perſonal friendſhip to himſelf, and as an additional proof of his earneſt deſire to promote the honour and intereſt of his country.

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THE enemy made but a feeble reſiſtance. Notwithſtanding the many diſadvantages which our ſoldiery had to ſurmount, they ſoon got poſſeſſion of the breaches; after one diſcharge of muſquetry they preſſed forward, and cloſely purſuing the runaways, they prevented their barricading the inner gate, and entered the upper works without the loſs of one man. The fears of the defenders led them to ſeek ſafety in various alternatives. From the nearneſs of our encampment on the preceding day, numbers became clamorous for ſurrender; the active and young in a mutinous mood deſcending the rock by means of ladders made of ropes, eſcaped through the jungles; and ſeveral abandoning their poſts, fled for ſhelter to the principal pagoda, where they were ſoon followed by the killedar and buckſhee. On gaining poſſeſſion of the place, mercy and mildneſs rendered the ſituation of the priſoners as comfortable as circumſtances could poſſibly admit; but the dejected killedar could not be diverted from the lowneſs of ſpirits into which he had been thrown by the fall of his poſt. He was a Muſſulman of high truſt, about forty years of age. Naturally of a penſive and melancholy turn, he could not be perſuaded from muſing on the ſudden loſs of a fortreſs which had been conſidered impregnable, and which, whilſt in a very imperfect ſtate, and with a feeble garriſon, withſtood all the efforts of Hyder for three ſucceſſive years, and yielded at laſt to famine only. The buckſhee, of the ſame religion, but ſomewhat farther advanced in life, was one of thoſe who a few years ago was employed on an embaſſy to Conſtantinople.

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THE victors obſerving by day light the difficulties which they overcame in the night, were ſtruck with aſtoniſhment at their wonderful ſucceſs and good fortune. Independent of the works, from the natural advantages of the hill, a few reſolute men might have made this acquiſition worthy of the high confidence which the Sultaun repoſed in its ſtrength. Neither pains nor expence had been ſpared in rendering the rock impregnable. It is inacceſſible all around, except by one ſteep and rugged paſſage, which is fortified with two ſtrong walls and a number of towers. The labour in raiſing theſe high walls and outworks with hewn ſtones of much hardneſs, in ſuch a ſituation, muſt have been exceſſive, tedious, and expenſive; and as the foundation of a third wall had been laid out, it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that Nundydroog was fixed on as the pillar to which the Sultaun's chain for ſupporting his ambitious projects againſt the north, muſt have been faſtened.

To the ſouthward and weſtward of this ſtrong hold, the country is fertile, well cultivated, and full of villages. Although the inhabitants had abandoned their houſes, as they had not hitherto ſuffered any material diſturbance, conſiderable concealments of grain were diſcovered by the followers in theſe directions; and as nothing could ſurpaſs the confidence of the enemy in the ſtrength of the place, contrary to their wonted cuſtom, not only the towns, but even large quantities of forage, eſcaped the ravages of fire. Cormalghur, or Calarumcunda, another hill fort at the diſtance of three miles from Nundydroog, ſurrendered on the firſt ſummons. Taking advantage

of theſe circumſtances, our allies remained in this plentiful neighbourhood for a while. Major Gowdie, after leaving Captain Read, with his own detachment, in charge of Nundydroog, forwarded three heavy guns, under an eſcort of a ſepoy company, for the uſe of the Nizam's army, then beſieging Gurrumcondah, and proceeded with the reſt of the troops in the direction of Bangalore.

On a retroſpective view of the ſeveral important ſervices performed by the diviſion under Major Gowdie, during a period of little more than three months that it acted by itſelf, they cannot be deemed unworthy of a very conſiderable ſhare of the applauſe ſo juſtly beſtowed on detachments from the army. The ſurrender of Ouſſore, the ſtorming the pettah, and center fort of Ryacottah, the fall of that ſtrong hold, the capture of Raymanghur, the yielding of Ambagydirgum and Chillumcottah at diſcretion, the reduction of Nundydroog, and the conſequent ſubmiſſion of Cormal Ghur, in conjunction with the other poſts, completing a chain of ſtrong fortifications acroſs the country, gave entire protection to the brinjarries and northern polygars in their movements to the ſouthward as far as Bangalore; and excluſive of other ſervices, whilſt with the main force, muſt ever entitle that body of troops to a moſt reſpectable mention from all candid writers. The fall of Nundydroog opened our communication with the poſſeſſions of Nizam Ally, without much riſk of interruption; and diſheartening the garriſon, it ſtrengthened the confidence of the troops that beſieged Gurrumcondah.

Whilst

WHILST the grand army was thus occupied in covering the operations againſt the hill forts which ſtretched from Bangalore towards the dominions of Nizam Ally, a detachment that ſeparated from the force under Cummer ul dien Cawn, as he deſcended into Coimbatore at Guzlehatty, croſſed the Cauvery at the foot of the mountains. This diviſion, headed by Bunker Sahib, ſon to Budder ul Zemeen Cawn, the late killedar of Darwar, advancing to the northward with addreſs and rapidity, entered the Barahmahl valley by the Tapoor paſs, and occaſioning conſiderable alarm amongſt our parties in theſe diſtricts, after throwing a killedar of great truſt, and an additional force into Kiſtnaghery, they threatened the convoys which approached Amboor from Fort St. George. On receiving intelligence of Bunker Sahib's approach, in order to protect a ſupply of cattle which grazed in the vicinity of Vaniambaddy, Captain Oram found it neceſſary to withdraw his battalion from Tripatore, a poſt at which he had been ſtationed, with a view to keep open our communication with the Pallicode paſs.

THIS enemy, which the fears of the inhabitants had greatly exaggerated, together with ſome plunderers who appeared in the diſtricts to the ſouthward of Ouſſore, induced Earl Cornwallis to detach Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, with His Majeſty's ſeventy-fourth regiment, the ſeventh Bengal and firſt Coaſt battalion, towards the Barahmahl vally. Tripatore, with all the principal villages in this quarter, had been already plundered. Irritated by the ill treatment which his father experienced from another branch of the confederacy, the Myſorean leader commanded, that cattle of whatſoever deſcip-

deſcription ſhould be driven away in the direction of Seringapatam; and that the whole produce of the ſoil ſhould be ſwept off towards Penagra, a mud fort which ſtands near the ſouth end of the Barahmahl valley, and at no conſiderable diſtance from the entrance at Tappoor.

THITHER Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell directed his courſe. The place was demanded by a regular ſummons, but the garriſon, not contented with a refuſal, aggravated their obſtinacy by firing on the flag. As the fort was of no ſtrength, the inſult met with a juſt and inſtantaneous puniſhment. It was immediately attacked all around, and carried by eſcalade, without the loſs of one man; indeed there were but very few wounded; the enemy ſuffered conſiderably before a ſtop could be put to the carnage. Enraged at their violation of the rules practiſed amongſt civilized nations, the aſſailants made free uſe of the bayonet; nor was it poſſible to ſtop the effuſion of blood, until nearly two hundred lives had been expended. The place was diſmantled of its defences, and the detachment proceeded towards Kiſtnaghery.

HERE they met with a very different reception. On the 7th of November, towards eleven at night, two diſtinct diviſions, compoſed of Europeans and ſepoys, advanced by ſeparate routes to attack Kiſtnaghery. One was commanded by Captain Wallace, of the ſeventy-fourth regiment; the other by Captain Rattray of the ſeventh Bengal battalion. Thoſe two parties ſtormed the pettah, and were ſucceſsful at the ſame period of time. The enemy fled to the upper works, and the aſſailants, conceiving that they might enter with the fugitives,

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proceeded up the rock with the utmoſt expedition. Although thus cloſely purſued, the defenders contrived to ſhut up their gates. Alarmed by the noiſe of the attack below, all of them flew to the ramparts. Every attempt at eſcalade was fruſtrated by an immenſe quantity of ſtones, which inceſſantly pouring down the rock, ſwept away the ladders and thoſe by whom they were carried. As one party was driven off, another returned to the walls; ſtraining every nerve, they repeatedly renewed their efforts; but as a bright moon diſcovered every movement, the activity of the defenders made conſiderable ſlaughter, and pointed to the propriety of withdrawing the troops. Thus abandoning the enterprize, the retreat was effected with compoſure, and after deſtroying the pettah, the whole returned to their encampment before day-light. The loſs was conſiderable on both ſides, but the aſſailants had to lament the fall of ſome valuable officers (1). This repulſe, together with the ſucceſs at Coimbatore, afforded the Sultaun a temporary gleam of comfort; but it was ſoon overcaſt by the ſhocks that he was compelled to endure in other quarters. After driving the invaders out of the Barahmahl and neighbouring diſtricts, Colonel Maxwell returned with his detachment to the grand army (2).

(1) *Return of killed and wounded in the attempt on Kiſtnaghery.* Seventy-fourth, killed, Lieutenants Forbes and Lamont; wounded, Captain Wallace, Lieutenants Mackenzie and Ayton,—Bengal Eſtabliſhment, wounded, Lieutenant Bird, ſeventh battalion:—Coaſt Eſtabliſhment, wounded Captain Agnew, aid de camp to Colonel Maxwell.

(2) Lord Cornwallis returns his beſt thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, for the zealous and able manner in which he has executed his general inſtructions, to diſlodge and drive out the detachments that the enemy had ſent into the Barahmahl, and the diſtrict of Ouſſore. The good conduct and gallantry which was manifeſted at the aſſaults of Pinagra, reflects great credit upon Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, and the corps under his command; but his Lordſhip conſiders the ſpirited and judicious attempt which, after ſurprizing and carrying the pettah and lower fort, was made upon the upper fort of Kiſtnaghery, as highly honourable to all the officers and ſoldiers who were employed on that occaſion, and juſtly deſerving his warmeſt applauſe.

DURING

DURING this period, Earl Cornwallis occupied a poſition in the neighbourhood of Ouſcotta (3), which was judiciouſly calculated for covering at once the ſtores with the heavy guns that approached the army from the Carnatic, and the immenſe quantities of grain which the brinjaries brought towards Bangalore from the northward. In a ſituation ſo centrical, his Lordſhip could alſo ſuccour his detachments in the Barahmahl, ſhould the movements of the enemy have rendered that meaſure neceſſary; and as the intention of conveying the train by the Pallicode paſs had not been laid aſide, a ſafe communication with Colonel Maxwell was of ſtill greater importance. But as Captain Andrew Read, Captain Richard Scot, and Lieutenant Colonel Giels, agreed that the Padnaigdirgum paſs could with ſome little difficulty be rendered practicable for heavy guns, that road was adopted in preference to the former, which beſides being liable to interruption from the enemy, and in itſelf circuitous, had now the additional diſadvantage of having the valley leading to it flooded by the rains.

ON the 21ſt of September a company from the twenty-ſixth Bengal battalion, under Lieutenant Bradford, eſcorted Captain Howley with from two to three hundred laſcars, towards Amboor, in order to forward the tranſport of the heavy guns; about a fortnight afterwards Captain Scot, with the remainder of that battalion, conducting the priſoners of war, and the remains of the late Lieutenant Colo-

		Miles	Fur.
(1) October 20	Boodikery,	14	2
21	Nalloorpelly,	14	6
23	Ooſſeur,	3	4

nel

nel Moorhouſe to the ſame place, had inſtructions to return with the firſt convoy. Through the zeal of the Honourable Charles Stuart, and other members of the Supreme Government in Bengal, ſeconded by the able exertions of the Madras preſidency, immenſe ſupplies had by this time been collected at Amboor.

Besides large ſums of money, great quantities of military ſtores, with about eight hundred drafts and recruits for the King's and Company's ſervice, all arrived from Europe on the ſhips of that ſeaſon, were in readineſs to join; recovered men for the native corps of the Bengal and Madras eſtabliſhments, amounting nearly to the ſame number, here awaited orders; and about three hundred volunteers from the Bombay Government advanced thus far on their way to the army. Theſe diviſions, when added to his own battalion, augmented the convoy under Captain Scot to about two thouſand five hundred fighting men. There was alſo a detachment of two troops from the native cavalry, under the command of the Honourable Lieutenant St. Leger.

As the ſtores were of more eaſy conveyance than the heavy guns, under this eſcort about twelve thouſand loaded bullocks were ſent on in advance. Juſt as they paſſed Colar, a body of five thouſand horſe, ſent by Tookajee Bounſla, Rajah of Berar, to join the army, having been miſtaken for the enemy, occaſioned an alarm in the neighbouring diſtricts, which was conveyed to Captain Scot by meſſengers, who from their fears accumulated the proſpects of danger to the higheſt pitch. From this intelligence many judged it adviſeable to

make

make a forced march at night; but as the ſafety of the ſupplies was of more importance to the ultimate object of the war than that of the corps itſelf, the commanding officer judiciouſly determined not to endanger the former by a movement in the dark, for the riſk to which the latter would be liable. He continued to advance by regular marches; and, as it was ſoon aſcertained that the intelligence was erroneous, the reſult juſtified the propriety of his conduct. After lodging the ſtores in Bangalore, Captain Scot received orders to join the diviſion employed under Major Gowdie; and the horſe of Tookajee Bounſla formed a junction with the Maratta army in three days afterwards.

The train followed this important convoy without loſs of time, in two ſeparate diviſions. The firſt under charge of Captain Howley, aſſiſted by Captain Glaſs with his own company of artillery, was eſcorted by the fourteenth battalion of Bengal ſepoys, commanded by Captain Archdeacon, and arrived at Bangalore on the 22d of November; the other under Lieutenant Colonel Giels, accompanied by Major Stevenſon, whoſe regiment of cavalry had now been completely recruited, reached that depot on the laſt day of the ſame month. But as the principal diviſion of the cavalry, together with a conſiderable part of the equipment, remained ſtill in the Carnatic, Earl Cornwallis determined to attempt the reduction of Savandroog and the other hill forts that threatened his operations againſt Seringapatam, during the period which muſt have elapſed in drawing forward

ward his laſt convoy. Whilſt theſe ſtrong holds continued in poſſeſſion of the enemy, no dependance could be placed on the engagements of our brinjaries, who in the event of their fall, were willing to contract for the tranſport of ample ſupplies.

ALTHOUGH the judicious poſition of our main force (4) prevented theſe convoys from ſuffering any material interruption, the enemy ſtill hovering on the ſkirts of our encampment, contrived occaſionally to do ſome miſchief. Juſt as the firſt diviſion of the train approached Bangalore, ſome of their horſe found means to carry off twelve elephants from a party that were ſent to forage from the left of the line; but as they were cloſely purſued by a diviſion of Marattas, three were re-taken. A few days afterwards about two hundred and fifty of that people, who had ventured too far in the direction of Magree, were cut off to a man, by a party of the enemy's horſe. But thoſe trifling advantages were ſcarcely felt, when compared with the ſucceſs that attended our operations in other directions. Independent of his ſufferings from the confederates in Myſore, our ſquadron, at this period, contributed much to cripple the enemy by their exertions on the Malabar coaſt.

A SMALL iſland which ſtands within one mile of land, in the latitude of Onore, had been fortified by the Sultaun with much care. Intended principally as a magazine of naval ſtores, every article neceſſary for conſtructing or fittn out of ſhips, were lodged in this

				Miles	Fur.
(4) November,	7	Baſantiperam,	— — — — — —	11	4
	22	Near Kingery,	— — — — — —	5	4
	23	Kingery,	— — — — — —	2	—

fortreſs in great abundance. His Majeſty's ſhip the Minerva, accompanied by the Thames and Veſtal frigates, commanded by Captains Sutton, Truebridge, and Oſborn, ſailed on an expedition againſt this ſtrong hold, and anchoring cloſe to the works, the killedar was ſummoned to ſurrender on the 11th of October. The garriſon refuſed to ſubmit. Beſides having many advantages from nature and art, it was ſtrengthened by about forty pieces of cannon; but the dextrous management of ſome marines who landed to attack the place, together with the appearance of our ſhips, intimidating the enemy, they conſented to lay down their arms. A circumſtance which took place about ſix weeks after this period, threatened for ſome time to involve Great Britain in a war with France. As the Reſolu, a frigate of thirty-ſix guns, convoyed two French merchantmen towards the port of Mangalore, Commodore Cornwallis ordered Captain Sir Richard Strachan, with the Phœnix and Perſeverance frigates, to examine the trading ſhips. Whilſt the boats were employed in this ſervice, the commander of the Reſolu, ſheering along ſide, fired one round of all her guns into the Phœnix without any previous communication. This ſudden attack was repelled with promptitude. Sir Richard raked the Frenchman fore and aft, and continuing his advantage, the Reſolu, after fighting for about one hour, ſtruck, but not until the Perſeverance had joined in the engagement. Upwards of fifty men were killed and wounded on each ſide; Amongſt the latter, the captain of the French frigate was for a time diſabled; but the wounds of Lieutenant Finlay, of our marines, proved mortal. The frigate was delivered over to the commandant of Mahé, and the trading

ſhips

ſhips containing no warlike ſtores, they were permitted to proceed on their voyage without moleſtation. However, as ſeveral veſſels had ſailed from French ports with ſupplies for the Sultaun, it was highly neceſſary to check the interference of that country in the firſt inſtance; nor does it appear that any attempt to land ſuccours took place after this period. It is ſaid that the French commodore, Monſieur St. Felix, although inclined to reſent the indignity which in his idea had been offered to his nation, could not prevail on his people to run the riſk of involving their country in a war with England.

As the reduction of Savandroog had been conſidered an object of the firſt importance, the third and thirteenth Bengal, with the ſixth Coaſt battalion, accompanied by a troop of cavalry, eſcorted the chief engineer on the 30th of November, whilſt he again endeavoured to form an acquaintance with this inhoſpitable fortreſs. The place, after being cloſely reconnoitred, was deemed practicable on the north face, and the beſt judges having reported to that purpoſe, his Lordſhip determined on the attack without loſs of time. This immenſe rock, which riſes upwards of half a mile in perpendicular height, out of a country every where broken by deep ravines into rugged precipices, is embraced by walls and fortifications all around. Towards the top it is ſeparated by a frightful chaſm into two huge maſſes, each of which is ſtrengthened by diſtinct works. Thick belts of bamboo and thorny buſhes encircle its baſe, which meaſures full eight miles in circumference; and, as if intended by nature to ſtrengthen the whole, one impenetrable jungle, extending from thence in every direction, forms a barrier nowhere ſhort of five miles in depth.

THE

THE party ſent to eſcort the chief engineer, encamping at Thoonakery, within ſix miles of Savandroog, they were joined by the twenty-ſixth Bengal battalion on the 4th of December. At this time Lieutenant Colonel Cockerell took charge of the detachment. The army, after a junction of the diviſions which had been detached under Colonel Maxwell, Major Gowdie, and others, advanced to within four miles of Thoonakery (1). Eſcorted by a battalion of ſepoys, Earl Cornwallis reconnoitred the country, and in particular the diſtricts to the northward and weſtward. His Lordſhip directed that Lieutenant Colonel Cockerell, with the third and thirteenth battalions, ſhould take poſt at Sandycoop, a ſmall mud fort on the north road, at the diſtance of about ſix miles. The twenty-eighth Bengal, with the ninth and twenty-firſt Coaſt battalions under Captain Welſh, in order to cover the other flank, were ſent in the oppoſite direction, as far as the centre road; and the only route, beſides theſe, by which the enemy could paſs the wilds which ſeparate Seringapatam from Bangalore being that to the ſouthward, it was left to be watched by Captain Alexander Read with his own detachment. The immediate proſecution of the ſiege was entruſted to Lieutenant Colonel Stuart, who had under his command His Majeſty's fifty ſecond and ſeventy-ſecond regiments, the fourteenth and twenty-ſixth Bengal, and the ſixth Coaſt battalion. In addition to this force, Major Montagu, conducted four twelves and the ſame number of eighteen pounders, all of iron, together with two howitzers, and a proportion of artillery men.

(1) December 7. Kanelly, — — — — — — — — — Miles 5
12. Thoonakery, — — — — — — — — — 6

PRE-

PREVIOUS to any attack on Savandroog, it became neceſſary to cut a road through the thickets, ſo as to admit of tranſporting the guns to the foot of the hill. From the cloſe texture of the jungle, and the broken ſurface of the country, this ſervice appeared at firſt ſight almoſt inſurmountable; but the ſame ſkill and perſeverance that overcame the difficulties at Nundydroog, removed every obſtacle in this quarter. The piquets of the detachment clambering up the mountain, occupied an immenſe precipice attached to Savandroog on the 10th of the month; and in courſe of the night, a few companies of Europeans, with the twenty-ſixth battalion of ſepoys, formed a lodgement within two hundred and fifty yards of the firſt wall, in a ſituation which was fixed on for the upper batteries. The enemy, in not defending this poſition, clearly diſcovered that they truſted for ſafety to the natural ſtrength of the place, and not to their own exertions.

FROM the extreme fatigue of making roads, and erecting works in the face of the hill, notwithſtanding that the garriſon offered little or no oppoſition, it took the hard labour of ſeven days before any of the heavy guns were in readineſs to open. However, about noon on the 17th, one battery of three eighteen pounders commenced, at the diſtance of eight hundred yards from the wall, at an elevation of twenty-three degrees; another, erected nearer by one hundred yards, played about the ſame time from three twelves and two eighteen pounders; but as theſe guns required a greater degree of elevation than the others, and as the wall was built of large hard ſtones, faſtened to the rock by ſtrong iron bolts, the effect of the

the cannonade from the twelve-pounders did not at the beginning anſwer expectation. From two two-gun batteries which had now been conſtructed within two hundred and fifty yards of the wall, the fire ſoon promiſed a practicable breach; and as the twelve-pounders were replaced with eighteens from the army, a conſtant diſcharge on the upper wall opened an entrance there alſo. Lieutenant Macpherſon, of the ſeventy-ſixth regiment, who on this and ſimilar ſervices at former periods, commanded the European pioneers, advanced to the outer breach in broad day-light, and meaſured the height of the wall. Major Montagu, conceiving from his report, that it had not been made ſufficiently practicable, kept up an inceſſant and well directed fire from all the batteries, and with ſuch ſucceſs, that before dark the firſt wall was ſhattered to the very foundation. The fire of the 20th widened the breaches, and commanded the whole of the rock in this direction. The flank companies of the ſeventy-firſt and ſeventy-ſixth regiments were directed to join Colonel Stuart's detachment; and as all the defences, except ſuch as nature offered, had given way to the ſkill of our artillery and engineers, every preparation was made for the aſſault. On the ſuggeſtion of Colonel Neſbit, who as ſecond in command had all along diſcovered the utmoſt activity, the Commander in Chief gave orders to ſtorm. From a confidence in his abilities, and a thorough acquaintance with his ſpirit and zeal, his Lordſhip entruſted that officer with the direction of this momentous undertaking.

Close and noxious fogs regularly deſcend on Savandroog at night; and as their departure towards the ſummit of the rock, with the riſe of the ſun, daily expoſed the breaches to the beſiegers, whilſt the atmoſ-

moſphere growing ſtill more denſe around the enemy darkened their view, that period of the 21ſt was fixed for the aſſault. But as the inſtructions iſſued by Colonel Neſbit at his tent on the evening before the ſtorm, in preſence of all the officers who were to command attacks, or lead diviſions, muſt convey the moſt correct idea of this enterprize, they are here ſubmitted in the Colonel's own words.

" IT is intended to aſſault Savandroog tomorrow morning; the " attacks will be compoſed as follows;—The light company of the " ſeventy-ſixth, with the grenadier companies of the fifty-ſecond and " ſeventy-ſixth, under Captain Gage, will take as early as poſſible to " the left, by the path leading in that direction through a ſmall gate- " way in an upper wall, or by any other path or way by which they " can aſcend the hill. Arriving there, Captain Gage will form and " remain to cover the aſcent of the main body. This diviſon will be " accompanied by ten European pioneers, with four ſcaling ladders " and a proportion of tools, to follow in the rear of the leading com- " pany.

" THE light company of the fifty-ſecond, aſcending the firſt wall " as faſt as poſſible, and as much to the right, will proceed along " the inſide of the wall, to a ſmall gateway, or beyond it if practi- " cable, to amuſe the enemy in that quarter, and to ſecure the right " flank of the attack. If Captain Monſon ſhould ſee occaſion to " puſh forward, he will be inſtantly ſupported. This diviſion will " be accompanied by twenty pioneers, with their tools.

" THE light companies of the ſeventy-firſt and ſeventy-ſecond " regiments, under Captain Robertſon, will move as much to the " right of the breach as ſhall be poſſible, and make along the wall " a ſhort diſtance, to ſome huts, paſs them, and aſcend the hill by a

path

" a path which will be found in the receſs of the rock; a guide, " however, will attend, to ſhew this path. Captain Robertſon will " uſe the utmoſt expedition in getting to the top of the hill, where " he will join Captain Gage, and remain with him to cover the " aſcent of the main body. Ten European pioneers, with four ſcal- " ing ladders, and a proportion of tools, will accompany this at- " tack in the rear of the ſeventy-firſt company.

" THE main body, under the direction of Major Fraſer, aſſiſted by " Captain Hunter, and led by the Honourable Captain Lindſay, will " conſiſt of the ſeventyfirſt and ſeventy-ſecond grenadiers, four bat- " talion companies from the two regiments in camp, and four com- " panies of native grenadiers, to move under cover of the parties to the " right and left up the rock, oppoſite the European poſt, deliberately " and ſlowly, and keeping as collected and compact as poſſible, and " are to have no other object in view than that of gaining the hill.

" THE men are not to fire, or otherwiſe to interrupt their progreſs. " This attack to be ſupported by the ſixth battalion Coaſt infantry, " under Captain Macpherſon, who will aſcend the hill, and then " form, according to ſituation and circumſtances; being ready at " every inſtant, whether in his progreſs, or on his arrival, to aſſiſt or " ſupport where occaſion may require. This attack to be accom- " panied by twenty European pioneers, ten in the rear of the ſeventy " firſt grenadiers, with four ſcaling ladders; ten more, with four lad- " ders, in the rear of the firſt battalion company; and thirty native " pioneers, with an officer, to attend the ſepoy grenadiers; and a pro- " portion to be attached to the ſixth battalion.

" EACH

" EACH attack and diviſion of it, to commence at the ſame in-
" ſtant of time. The officers will be informed to-morrow morning
" of the ſignal agreed on. An attack is to be made on the N. E.
" pettah, and a conſiderable corps will be ſent to ſhew themſelves
" on the other ſide of the hill."

As the fogs around Savandroog, had been ſtill more cloſe than uſual on the morning of the 21ſt, our batteries fired but little till towards ten o'clock; about that hour, however, the day began to clear up, and the enemy having been ſeen deſcending, in order to defend the breach, all the heavy guns opened upon them with grape, a well directed and deadly fire. Our troops at that inſtant advancing in the order deſcribed, the defendants were ſtruck with a panick, from which the rapidity and fierceneſs of the aſſault left them no room to recover. Such were their fears that, with little or no reſiſtance, except what offered from the natural ſteepneſs and ruggedneſs of the rock, the diviſions under Captains Gage and Monſon, entered the two walls promiſcuouſly; unmoleſted by the fugitives, they took poſſeſſion of their cannon, and penetrated to the ſummits of both rocks, without the loſs of one man; indeed, on the whole of this memorable enterprize two only were wounded (1). Of the enemy about two

(1) " Lord Cornwallis thinks himſelf fortunate, almoſt beyond example, in having acquired, by aſſault, a " fortreſs of ſo much ſtrength and reputation, and of ſuch ineſtimable value to the public intereſts, as Savandroog, " without having to regret the loſs of a ſingle ſoldier on the occaſion. He can only attribute the puſillanimity " of the enemy, yeſterday, to their aſtoniſhment, at ſeeing the good order, and determined countenance, with " which the troops who were employed in the aſſault entered the breaches, and aſcended precipices that have hitherto " been conſidered, in the country, as inacceſſible. But although the reſiſtance was ſo contemptible, he is not the " leſs ſenſible, that the behaviour of the grenadiers and light infantry of the 52d, 71ſt, 72d, and 76th regiments, " who led the aſſault, and who muſt have made ſuch deciſive impreſſion upon the minds of the enemy, reflected " the moſt diſtinguiſhed honour upon their diſcipline and valour. The vigour and alacrity which was ſhewn by " the officers and men of Lieutenant Colonel Stuart's detatchment, in ſupporting the labours and fatigues of the " ſiege

hundred were ſlain, and numbers in endeavouring to eſcape the bayonet, loſt their lives from the height of the precipices over which they attempted to deſcend. The fall of Savandroog in ſo ſhort a time, and with loſs ſo very inconſiderable, impreſſed the allies with a moſt favourable opinion of our proweſs and ſkill; eſpecially as the whole Maratta force, had on a former occaſion, beſieged the ſame fortreſs without ſucceſs for a period of at leaſt three years. Yet notwithſtanding what they had ſeen, ſo high were their opinions of the Sultaun's ſtrength and reſources, that ſeveral amongſt them ſtill doubted of ſucceſs againſt his capital.

RAMGHUR and Sheriaghery, ſtruck with the ſudden fall of Savandroog, and intimidated further by a ſpirited aſſault on the former, under Captain Welſh, they both yielded to his detachment, which had advanced for their reduction. Although of conſiderable ſtrength, as the intrepidity of the aſſailants had made them maſters of the pettah and centre fort of Ramghur, the killedar was induced to ſurrender on a promiſe of good treatment, and the example was ſoon followed by the other. Quantities of proviſions and ſtores were captured in theſe hill forts, all of which having been ſecured the detachment returned to camp.

THE diviſion of Lieutenant Colonel Stuart again advancing in order to reduce Outradroog, Earl Cornwallis moved with the reſt

" ſiege, entitle them to the higheſt commendation; and his Lordſhip deſires that Lieutenant Colonel Stuart will " accept of his warmeſt acknowledgements, for the zeal and judgement which he manifeſted, both in directing " the efforts of the troops under his command during the ſiege, and in making arrangements for the aſſault. " His Lordſhip alſo returns his beſt thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Roſs, Chief Engineer, for the judicious choice " which he made in ſelecting proper ſituations for the batteries, and for the great attention which he paid to the " other duties of his ſtation; and to Lieut. Colonel N. Pitt, for the able and officer-like manner in which he " conducted the trooops to the aſſault; and the greateſt praiſe is due to Major Montagu, for his laborious and ſuc- " ceſsful exertion to overcome the infinite difficulties that occurred in placing the guns in the batteries, and for " his profeſſional ſkill in directing their fire."

of

of his army to the pagodas, at Magree. At this time, as on a former occaſion, the killedar of Outradroog, treated a ſummons ſent by Lieutenant Colonel Stuart with contempt, and threatened to fire on the flag, if it did not retire. About 10 o'clock, a detachment conſiſting of the 26th battalion of Bengal ſepoys; four battalion companies from the 52d and 72d regiments, with two field pieces and a proportion of artillery-men and pioneers, advanced to ſtorm the pettah, under Captain Richard Scott; whilſt Major Stephenſon's cavalry, with a company from the 52d regiment, made a circuit to the northward of the hill, in order to cut off the garriſon in the event of their attempting a retreat.

At the hour of eleven, and within one mile of the pettah, the attack was planned with much judgement. In the event of meeting with but feeble reſiſtance, Captain Scott fortunately determined to follow up any advantage which the fears of the garriſon or other fortuitous circumſtance might throw in his way. However, as the killedar requeſted a ceſſation of hoſtilities for two hours, it was granted on his promiſing that he would bring the garriſon to ſubmit. Treachery was ſoon ſuſpected; the people on withdrawing their property from the pettah, were ſeen to range along the fortifications, pointing their guns and making every preparation for reſiſtance; and as the place, independant of its natural advantages, was defended by ſeven ſtrong walls at the only point where it was acceſſible, delay became highly dangerous.

Towards one o'clock, ſome ſhots being fired from the garriſon, with excellent aim at the head of our column, the ſuſpicions of treachery were confirmed beyond a poſſibility of doubt; Lieut. Shipton, of the Bengal Artillery, in return, opened his guns on the lower works with the beſt effect; Capt. Scott gave the order to ſtorm at the ſame time, and as the troops advanced from the left, the 72d companies under Lieut. Macinnes, eſcaladed the pettah in an inſtant. The companies of the 52d headed by Captain Zouch entered ſomewhat to the right, and the ſepoys mounted the walls directly in front. The whole again aſſembling, formed a junction on the oppoſite ſide of the pettah. Four walls conſtructed on the face of the hill, were ſucceſſively carried by the help of ladders. The gates of the ſecond and third walls, were burſt open by main ſtrength; but thoſe of the firſt and fourth, could only be opened from within. A ſource of defence hitherto unpracticed in the war, was for the firſt time attempted between the upper of theſe walls. A number of wild bullocks let looſe by the runaways, in order to cover their retreat, played their part with wonderful adroitneſs, and overturned upwards of thirty men. Several Europeans and ſepoys, toſſed in the air to a conſiderable height, received ſevere contuſions; but the ſteady diſcipline of the troops, overcame every impediment. After ſurmounting theſe obſtacles, lofty precipices and ſtrong walls, ſtill ſtood in the way; the paſſage which had till now been ſingle branched from here to the right and left; the latter road, defended by too lofty walls, led by ſingle ſteps, cut in ſolid rock, over the brow of a frightful precipice; the other

other, paſſing through a natural arch of this rock, like that already deſcribed at Hooliahdroog, could not have been forced if guarded by a few reſolute men, as it was not of width ſufficient to admit troops by files. Through this latter paſſage, however, the aſſailants continued to advance; the road through the arch, was but feebly defended, and the troops entered the upper works without having one man ſlain; two only were wounded by muſket ſhot, but ſeveral were for a time diſabled by the bullocks, and amongſt them Captain Zoueh, was much bruiſed from a ſevere heave. The killedar was taken priſoner; about forty men were put to the bayonet; but as ladders had been previouſly planted at two different points in order to ſecure a retreat, the principal part of the garriſon made their eſcape into the jungles (1).

On the works of Outradroog which were in good repair, we found about twenty pieces of cannon. The entrances at the ſeveral gateways were flanked by turrets and baſtions. In the upper fort there were ſome magazines conſtructed in chaſms of the rock; there were alſo, ſeveral hoards of grain, a number of chains and handcuffs, with a quantity of ſheet-copper. In one immenſe chaſm there was an inexhauſtible reſervoir of excellent water. From theſe, and

(1) "Lord Cornwallis has received, with the higheſt ſatisfaction, a report from Lieutenant Colonel Stuart, that "the ſtrong and important rock of Outradroog was carried yeſterday forenoon, by aſſault, by a detachment conſiſting "of two companies of the 52d, and two companies of the 72d regiments, and the 26th Bengal battalion, without "the loſs of a man on our ſide. The judgement with which Lieutenant Colonel Stuart made the general diſpoſition "for the aſſault, reflects the higheſt credit on him as an officer; and his Lordſhip deſires that Captain Scott, of the "Bengal infantry, who commanded the aſſault, will accept his warmeſt acknowledgements, for the ſpirit and good "conduct which he manifeſted in availing himſelf of the conſternation of the enemy, according to the inſtructions "given him by Lieutenant Colonel Stuart. His Lordſhip likewiſe deſires that his thanks may be communicated, in "general, to the other officers and ſoldiers who compoſed the detachment, for their gallantry and ſteadineſs on that "occaſion; and that it may be particularly ſignified to Lieutenant Macinnes, of the 72d regiment, who led the Euro-"pean company, and to Lieuts. Macpherſon and Dowſe, who conducted the European and native pioneers that were "employed in carrying the ſcaling ladders to break open the gates, that from Lieutenant Colonel Stuart's report, he "conſiders their behaviour highly meritorious."—G. O. 25th December, 1791.

other favourable circumſtances Earl Cornwallis was induced to occupy Outradroog as an hoſpital, whilſt the operations againſt Seringapatam were going forward. Beſides other advantages, poſſeſſion of this ſtronghold together with Savandroog gave ample protection to the Binjaries, who advanced towards the army; and as none of the other hill-forts which riſe between Seringapatam and Bangalore were of any material importance, as they are ſituated at ſuch a diſtance to the ſouthward of this road, the army reſted in the vicinity of Outradroog, without attempting any further exploits for a time.

A

SKETCH

OF THE WAR WITH

TIPPOO SULTAUN.

CHAPTER THE FIFTH.

WHILST Earl Cornwallis was thus employed in the reduction of the ſeveral fortreſſes, that anywiſe threatened to impede the operations carrying on againſt Seringapatam, the cavalry corps under Lieutenant Colonel Floyd, ſtrengthened by drafts and recruits were augmented in men nearly to their original force. Reſt from fatigue, abundance of forage, and the unremitted attention of their officers, enabled Stephenſon's regiment to take the field before the ſetting in of the monſoon in the Carnatic; the diſintereſted zeal of their leader, having, with uncommon liberality, kept pace with our diſtreſſes, in the worſt of times, the recovery of this corps was ſoon effected; conſequently accompanying Lieutenant Colonel Giels, with the heavy guns, they formed a junction with the grand army, whilſt encamped in the vicinity of Savandroog.

BUT

BUT the horſes of the other corps, although their recovery was in conſiderable forwardneſs, were by no means equal to undergo the fatigues of another campaign; it was therefore determined that all his Majeſty's dragoons ſhould be mounted from the beſt horſes of the native regiments, and that ſuch, beſides theſe, as were in a ſerviceable condition, ſhould be made over to Major Orr, in order to enable his regiment alſo to take the field. Yet, after the utmoſt ſtretch of exertion in re-equipment, the whole cavalry of Earl Cornwallis, including the two body guards under Lieutenants Turner and Grant, did not at any enſuing period exceed twelve hundred ſwords.

ALTHOUGH the monſoon of this ſeaſon was very uncommonly ſevere, parties of horſe detached from the diviſion of Bunker Sahib, carried their ravages into the heart of the Carnatic, and rendered it neceſſary to cover each convoy that approached Amboor with a body of troops. Towards the beginning of January, one of theſe diviſions penetrating nearly to the gates of Fort St. George, burnt ſeveral of the adjacent villages, robbed and diſabled the inhabitants, and carried off great quantities of plunder. Fortunately, however, none of the European families that dwelt without protection on Choultry Plain, fell into their hands. Alarmed by ſome ryots who fled on the wings of fear, one and all of the Europeans retired to the fort, or took ſhelter under cover of a ſmall detachment of artillery, which was ſtationed at the Mount; but the plunderers having ſucceeded, probably beyond all expectation, drove away their booty,

and

and diſappeared with a ſuddenneſs nearly ſimilar to the rapidity of their advance. A ſum equal to the injury which the Carnatic revenues ſuſtained by theſe and ſimilarly deſpicable bodies of irregular horſe would maintain a corps of reſpectable cavalry, capable of defending that country, againſt ſuch an enemy, to the end of time. Yet the zealous exertions of Captain Alexander Read, in collecting ſupplies at Amboor, were ſo completely followed up by Captain Cuppage his ſucceſſor, that the whole of our equipments were in motion through the Padnaigdirgum paſs towards the middle of December, and before the 20th of that month they advanced to the encampment of Captain Oram, who, with his own battalion, ſtrengthened by a ſmall reinforcement, awaited their arrival in the vicinity of Venkitaghery.

After being joined by Major Scot, and a detachment of Royal Artillery which arrived on the ſhips of this ſeaſon, under his command, together with a reinforcement of about three hundred men from St. Helena, Lieut. Colonel Floyd, covering the convoy in rear, aſcended the Padnaigdirgum paſs on the 23d of December. The road had been improved with much care and ſkill; but although the rains had ſubſided the Palaar river was of conſiderable depth. Various ſtreams that in a manner ſeparate the hills unite near the bottom of this paſs, from whence that river meanders as far as the eye can reach, through a beautiful valley towards Amboor, where it is joined by another ſtream from the Barahmahl. Theſe rich valleys watered abundantly from mountains that of a ſudden riſe with majeſtic grandeur were in thorough cultivation, and contraſted with the jungly ſurface of the rugged ranges by which

they are nearly encloſed appeared to wonderful advantage. Indeed the country throughout, in conſequence of the rain, had undergone a change of appearance greatly for the better.

On the junction of Colonel Floyd with Captain Oram every precaution was taken for the ſecurity of the convoy, which in loaded bullocks only amounted to about fifteen thouſand. The movement of Hyder Sahib againſt Gurrumconda, as already detailed in the 2d Chapter, occaſioning conſiderable alarm, the utmoſt care was beſtowed on keeping the cattle compact, and Captain Alexander Read with his own battalion and two ſquadrons from Stevenſon's Regiment under Lieutenant St. Leger having ſtrengthened the convoy on the 29th of the month, the whole encamped to the weſtward of Bangalore on the 7th of January.

So ſoon as the grain had been lodged in this depot, the cavalry followed by twenty pieces of battering cannon, with ſome mortars and howitzers, under the direction of Colonel Duff, proceeded to the Weſtward, and joined the Grand Army by the 12th of the month. Theſe, with the addition of eight heavy guns, which had been already advanced as far as Outradroog, compleated the train intended for the ſiege of Seringapatam. Bodies of ſepoys encamped in battalions or detachments, whoſe piquets communicated with each other, ſtretching along the road from Bangalore to the encampment, formed one continued chain, every link of which contributing to the ſecurity of the reſt, the whole beſpoke the workmanſhip of an able maſter. As regularity and order pervaded every department, for a diſtance of thirty miles, notwithſtanding the nearneſs to the enemy's capital,

capital, protection was complete; and followers of all deſcriptions might be ſeen moving to and fro with no more concern than in times of perfect peace. But theſe threatenings were rendered ſtill leſs bearable by a ſevere blow which the Sultaun ſuffered from another quarter.

THE forces of Purſeram Bhow, ſupported, as heretofore, by Captain Little's detachment, on quitting the Grand Army, proceeded in a north-weſt direction acroſs the Sera diſtrict. After reconnoitering Chittledroog, and endeavouring to bribe the killedar without ſucceſs, it was judged adviſeable, from the ſtrength of the place, not to attempt an attack. Againſt the hill fort of Kincoopy, the Bhow had better ſucceſs. He beſieged and carried the place, but his enterpriſing ſpirit now led him to undertake atchievements of a nature by far more ſerious.

THE rich diſtrict of Bedanore had hitherto remained in perfect peace. Notwithſtanding the hazard to which the meaſures concerted with Lord Cornwallis would be expoſed by ſuch a movement, thither the Bhow determined to proceed. Regardleſs of his promiſe to form a junction with General Abercromby about this period, he could not withſtand the temptation of aggrandiſing himſelf amongſt the neighbouring Princes, by a conqueſt of ſuch high importance; but as Hoolyonore, Bankipore, Simoga, Cumpſy, Ananpore, with ſeveral other ſtrong holds, guarded the beſt paſſage towards Bedanore, their reduction became neceſſary, as well to enſure ſucceſs, as to ſecure a communication with the reſt of the Confederates,

when

when advanced to the ſiege of Seringapatam. Simoga, the principal of theſe ſtations, ſtands on the Northweſt bank of the river Budra; however, as it was judged adviſeable to occupy one of the adjacent inferior poſts in the firſt inſtance, Hoolyonore, a fort conſtructed near the confluence of that river and the Tum, was beſieged by Captain Little about the middle of December. The wall was ſoon breached, and the place was carried by a night aſſault, on the 19th of that month.

The garriſon of Bankipore terrified by the early fall of Hoolyonore, ſurrendered at diſcretion in three days afterwards, but the troops in Simoga encouraged by the preſence of an army nearly three thouſand ſtrong under the Nabob Reſa Sahib, was not of a diſpoſition to ſubmit. In order, that the operations againſt this ſtronghold might be carried on without diſturbance, the Bhow determined to attack the covering army in the firſt inſtance. Reſa Sahib had already taken poſt amongſt the jungles, to the ſouthweſt of Simoga, in a ſituation where his right was covered by the Budra, his left by impenetrable jungles, and his front by a deep ravine.

Towards noon on the 29th of December, Capt. Little with about one thouſand Bombay ſepoys, ſupported by Appa Sahib, with nearly the ſame number of infantry, and about three thouſand horſe, advanced on the enemy. The conteſt was ſevere and bloody. For a time victory ſtood on the balance. Partial charges of daring parties from both ſides were repeatedly oppoſed by obſtacles which the enemy had thrown in the way, or by the ſteady diſcipline of our ſepoys. Captain Little was to be ſeen encouraging

encouraging his people whereſoever the battle raged the moſt ſevere. In ſhort, after a well fought action of two full hours, the enemy gave way to a cloſe fire, which was directed againſt their left wing, and as the impreſſion was followed up, the route ſoon became general.

THE victors collecting as they advanced, continued the purſuit for fifteen miles, they captured ten guns, upwards of three hundred horſes, with double that number of bullocks, and large quantities of ſtores; but his country had on this occaſion to regret the loſs of a valuable officer in the fall of Lieut. Roſs, who acted as Brigade Major to the Bombay troops. Here, as at Darwar where he was alſo wounded, this officer's exertions were highly conſpicuous. The killed and wounded of Captain Little's detachment amounted to ſixty in number, amongſt the latter, Lieutenants Bethune, Doolan, and Moore, were for a time diſabled.

THE overthrow of Reza Sahib was ſoon followed by the capture of Simoga. Captain Little had effected a breach in this fort on the 2d of January; and, on his promiſe of ſecurity to private property, the garriſon ſubmitted. The barefaced breach of capitulation at Darwar, having deſtroyed all confidence in Maratta faith, the Killedar of Simoga exacted this promiſe from the Engliſh leader. Cumpſy and Ananpore ſurrendering on the approach of Purſeram Bhow, his forces threatened Bedanore towards the latter end of January; but the Sultaun, determined not to permit the ſubjection of this favorite diſtrict without a ſtruggle, detached Cummer-ul-dien Cawn with a choſen body of troops in that direction; and, although no engagement took place

the meaſure anſwered his intention, as the Bhow deſiſting from the deſign returned towards Seringapatam.

Whatſoever advantages might have been derived from theſe ſucceſſes the general intereſt of the confederate powers was very materially endangered by ſuch uncommon deviation from the concerted plan. Except in the diſtricts intruſted to the Bhow, the ſtorm which for a time hung over the Myſorean dominions collecting from every direction, again threatened to burſt on the Sultaun's capital at an early period. In addition to the multitudes that advanced from the Eaſtward, our army on the Malabar Coaſt, quitting their cantonments, had already reaſſembled in the neighbourhood of Cananore. Reſt from fatigue, new equipments, freſh ſupplies of ſtores and neceſſaries of every kind, added to the exertions of their leader in procuring conveyance, enabled theſe corps to take the field about the beginning of December.

THE army of General Abercromby, conſiſting of his Majeſty's 73d, 75th, and 77th Regiments; the firſt European Regiment of Bombay; the 2d, 4th, 6th, 10th and 12th Bombay battalions, one battalion of grenadiers, and the 14th battalion of Coaſt ſepoys were divided into three brigades and a reſerve. The train conſiſted of ten eighteen-pounders, four twelve-pounders, twenty field pieces, and two mortars, attended by upwards of ſeven hundred men; and two battalions of ſepoys, with a body of irregular horſe from the Rajah of Travancore, augmented this force, in all, to nearly ten thouſand ſtrong. A ſupply of draft

draft and carriage cattle, procured by General Abercromby partly from Bombay, and partly from the Maratta country through the exertions of Sir Charles Ware Mallet, together with eight thouſand bullocks, ſent from the Madras Government, by the way of Palligautcherry; beſides furniſhing the proportion required for the train and ſtores, enabled them to march with forty days proviſions for the whole.

THE acceſs from Cananore to Seringapatam had been conſiderably facilitated by the operations of our former invaſion, yet the weight of the rains had ſo broke up the roads, as to render their repair a taſk of much labour and fatigue. However, perſeverance overcame every difficulty, and the whole equipment obtained the top of the paſs by the 18th of January. Here a friendly intercourſe with the Coorga Rajah immediately recommenced; with his aſſiſtance granaries and depots were loaded in the direction of the enemy's capital; the guns which had been buried as already mentioned were now dug from their concealments; the entrance of the paſs was fortifyed with well conſtructed batteries; and as the train with the confederates was conſidered ſufficient for the reduction of Seringapatam, all the Bombay heavy guns, with a detachment of about four hundred men were left with Colonel Peche on the top of the Poodicherrim Ghaut, whilſt the reſt of the troops proceeded to Sedaſier, where they had inſtructions to await orders from the Commander in Chief.

MEANWHILE the armies of Earl Cornwallis, Secunder Jaw, and Hury Punt formed one extenſive encampment, ſeparated by

by the jungles, which ſpread over the diſtricts in the vicinity of Outradroog into three immenſe diviſions (1). After a meeting of the Leaders on the 25th of January, 1792, and previous to their movement againſt the enemy's capital, the Britiſh troops were drawn out in review before the Chiefs of the Poona and Hyderabad forces on the laſt day of the month.

EARLY on the enſuing morning, the Britiſh army, leaving Hooliah-droog cloſe upon the right, quitted the jungles, and after croſſing the Madoor, encamped near Tagelly: the other branches of the Confederacy, advancing as it ſuited their convenience, remained on the oppoſite bank of the river. Hooliadroog, on being ſummoned by Colonel Maxwell, previous to this march, again ſurrendered to our arms without having done any injury. What reſiſtance it offered was, as on a former occaſion, intended ſolely to obtain a promiſe of ſecurity in their effects to the people that it protected. The poſt had undergone a complete repair, and being left in charge of a ſmall party of ſepoys under Lieutenant Macleod; it formed the firſt link in a chain which Earl Cornwallis determined to eſtabliſh, from his hoſpital at Outradroog to Seringapatam.

The mud fort of Tagelly, garriſoned with two companies from the 26th and 28th battalions of Bengal ſepoys, and given

(1) Whilſt the allies lay encamped amongſt the Droogs ſeveral papers calculated to promote deſertion were dropt within the Sentries of our piquets at night. All of them were left about the ſame time, written in the ſame hand, and with the ſame inaccuracies. A literal copy is ſubjoined——"The King is very ſorry to underſtand that ſome reports have been made in your camp, that when any European comes to the Badchaws camp at Seringapatam that he puts them to death, but there is no ſuch thing, when they arrive here the king gives them a preſent of 30 or 40 Rupees per man and gives them every encouragement. For we have nothing to do here, only eat, drink, and ſleep, nobody to ſay any thing to us or moleſt us. If the one half of you only know'd how we live at Seringapatam, you would not ſtay long in the Engliſh camp; the leaſt pay we receive here, is thirty Rupees, from that to forty, fifty, from this to ninety rupees per month and upwards, to any good man that comes to ſerve the Badchaw, you may come with the greateſt ſafety there is nothing here to fear."

in

in charge to Lieutenant A. Charron, formed the ſecond link of communication from Outradroog. Beſides protection to the Brinjaries, this chain became neceſſary to cover the approach of a party who were then on their way from Bangalore, with entrenching tools (1).

As the army proceeded, Caricode, another mud-fort, at the next ground of encampment, was put in a ſtate of good repair, and guarded by two companies from the 9th battalion of Coaſt ſepoys; it was entruſted to Lieutenant Bradſhaw (2). The confederates ſtill continued to advance, and Captain Croaker, with the remainder of the 9th battalion, having been poſted at Hooralloo, he had inſtructions to ſtrengthen the other ſtations according to the beſt of his judgment,

(1) *Adjutant General, to Lieutenant Charron, 1ſt February, 1792.*

"Captain Mandeville, of the Coaſt Artillery, having left Bangalore, on the 31ſt of laſt month, with twenty-nine bullocks loaded with entrenching tools, and the eſcort of a Jemidar's guard from Captain Williamſon's battalion, it is expected he will arrive at Hooliadroog, on the morning of the 2d of this month, from whence he may probably have his eſcort ſtrengthened by one of the companies ſtationed there, under Lieutenant Macleod; Lord Cornwallis has in conſequence directed a detachment of two companies of ſepoys, one of which is ordered from the 3d brigade, and one from the 4th, to be left in the fort, named Tagely, cloſe to the line, until Captain Mandeville's arrival there. The company from the 3d brigade, being commanded by Enſign Jackſon, you, as the ſenior officer, will conſequently take the command of the detachment left in Tagely;—and as Lieutenant Morris, Commiſſary of Stores, is inſtructed to give over to your charge this evening a ſufficient number of bullocks, to relieve thoſe employed in carrying the entrenching tools from Bangalore; Lord Cornwallis deſires, that you will take them under the charge of your own company, on their being ſent by Lieutenant Morris, and that you will move to the fort in the morning with your detachment, and the bullocks, and there wait the arrival of Captain Mandeville, under whoſe orders you are to march to join the army; intimation to the above effect having been ſignified to that Officer. Captain Mandeville, is alſo directed to join the army on the next ground on the 3d of this month, if poſſible, and is inſtructed to ſend back as ſoon as he joins you, the eſcort and cattle from Bangalore, with whatever addition of the eſcort he may receive from Hooliadroog; (the cattle being private property,) and as there are about eight hundred Brinjaries coming up with him, who may not chooſe to march ſo quickly as he will have the opportunity of doing, by means of the freſh detachment and freſh cattle left with you, he is authorized to leave a few ſepoys from your detachment to protect theſe Brinjaries if they ſhall deſire it. I have been directed to ſignify the laſt paragraph that you may conſider the orders therein ſtated, to have been ſent to Captain Mandeville, as your guide in the event of any accident happening to him; and, of the eſcort, with the bullocks, entrenching tools, and the Brinjaries joining you without him. I have only further to add his Lordſhip's orders, that you are to loſe no time in reporting to Head Quarters, in caſe Captain Mandeville, contrary to expectation, ſhall not join you by two o'clock P. M. on the 3d of this month, that the neceſſary orders may be forwarded to you in conſequence. The Company from the 3d brigade, is ordered to join you after general beating to-morrow."

(2) As the army approached Caricode through ſome miſtake of the guide, the park did not arrive at its ground until four in the evening, although the troops were in their tents about one. So deep were the ſloughs that each battering gun required all the exertions of one hundred men, with two elephants to get forward, and in many places, quantities of draft and carriage ſtores ſtuck faſt, and could not be brought on at all. As this might have been avoided, the General diſcovered a degree of diſſatisfaction which produced ſuch attention as to prevent a repetition of the complaint. A party of looties miſerably mounted, found means, during the march to mingle with the Nizam's horſe. They paſſed for Marattas; converſed freely on various ſubjects, and, on a preconcerted ſignal, at the firſt halt when ſuch of the confederates as were mounted had alighted, each looty ſprung on a valuable horſe, made free uſe of the ſpur, and leaving the unſuſpicious throng in amazement, they inſtantly flew off at full gallop.

and to keep a watchful eye over the ſecurity of the whole chain. Repeated attempts at plunder by looties, were as often defeated by the vigilance of the ſeveral parties in theſe ſtations, and their activity was rewarded by particular marks of the Commander in Chief's approbation (1).

FROM the time of our quitting the jungles at Hooliadroog, the enemy's horſe made their appearance daily in ſmall parties, but they now aſſembled in ſuch force, that it became neceſſary to ſtrengthen the advance with the leading brigade. Towards 9 o'clock, the troops in front opened a view, grand beyond all deſcription. In one direction, the enemy's capital, deſcribing a quadrangle of great extent, with two ſides ſtretching acroſs the iſland of Seringapatam, appeared, from the buſtle of ſwarms within, as if in motion. The beſt affections of multitudes who continued true to their truſt from the beginning, by keeping all alive about their works, ſtill diſcovered that the Sultaun's mode of carrying on the war gave ſatisfaction, and that however moderate his proſpects, his conduct was in high favour.

IN addition to double walls and ditches, this capital was ſtrengthened on more than two-thirds its circumference by the river Cauvery, which ſeparating into two branches at the weſtern extremity, waſhed the ſkirts of the glacis on either ſide. In the centre of the

(1) I have laid before Lord Cornwallis your letters dated at noon and 2 P. M. this day, and his Lordſhip directs me to expreſs his approbation of the active and zealous part you have taken for the public ſervice. I am further directed to ſignify to you, that you are to remain at your preſent poſt until Captain Mandeville's arrival, agreeable to your former orders, and that as two companies of the 9th Coaſt battalion, under Lieutenant Bradſhaw are to be left here (the fort of Caricode) when the army marches in the morning, a party from them will be detached if bullocks can be procured to bring up the ſhot, &c. which you have collected.—Adjutant General, to Lieutenant Charron, 3d February, 1792.

iſland,

iſland, at the diſtance of about a thouſand yards from the fort there ſtood a pettah conſtructed with much regularity, and ſurrounded by a lofty mud-wall; and, towards the eaſtern extremity where the branches of the river re-unite, a rich garden, decorated with lanes of cypreſs interſecting each other at right angles, added ſplendour to a ſuperb palace, which was further adorned by ſeveral adjacent buildings, conſtructed on a ſcale of great magnificence.

On the northern bank of the river, an encampment, ſecured by a chain of ſix well conſtructed redoubts was defended on the right, by works thrown up on the Carigat hills. On the iſland, batteries, ſtrengthened with baſtions and fletches ranging along the river, formed a ſecond line of protection wondrous in ſtrength; and a bound hedge, with a deep nulla, run all along in front of the whole. Beſides theſe defences, ſoft paddy-fields and deep ravines gave additional ſecurity to the poſition in which the Sultaun determined to defend his capital. His judgment, in this inſtance, had alſo the advantage of being ſupported on that principle of blind adherence, which Mahomedans in general pay to the diſcernment of their predeceſſors. It was on this ground that Hyder, not only diſunited a ſimilar confederacy in 1767, but turned their arms againſt each other, and advancing from his works, over-run the Carnatic, until his threatenings procured a peace creditable to himſelf alone. The event of our laſt campaign, tended alſo to juſtify the meaſure.

When the eye turned in another direction, a moving world ſeemed to threaten whatſoever preſumed to obſtruct its career. Every

attempt

attempt to convey juſt ideas of the ſeveral bodies that compoſed this huge maſs, muſt fall miſerably ſhort of the original. Regular columns of infantry ready to act on the appearance of an enemy, extended along the front and left flank, whereſoever danger was to be apprehended. The train and heavy carriages of whatſoever deſcription moved on better ground to the right of the infantry, in general, at the diſtance of about one-hundred yards. Stores, ſuttling, and private carriages of various kinds, advanced on a third road to the right of the other two; and elephants, camels, buffaloes, bullocks, tattoos, aſſes, with myriads of followers, that defy deſcription, kept pace with theſe lines on the baggage flank. In the rear, and to the right large bodies of horſe from the army of Nizam Ally, connected with powerful diviſions from Hurry Punt. Theſe in their turn co-operating with the cavalry of Colonel Floyd, extended to the infantry in front; in ſhort one immenſe chain of cavalry and infantry, embracing the whole maſs afforded compleat protection to the ſeveral component parts. From this moving world, ſwarms of irregular horſe branched out in every direction as far as the eye could reach.

At one part of the ſurrounded ſpace, whole groups of Brinjaries might be ſeen driving hoards of cattle loaded with grain, whilſt their female companions groaned under the additional burden of infants clinging to their ſides. At another a ſpeculative dubaſh with ſome hundred bullocks, carrying viands the beſt adapted to European palates, poured plentiful abuſe on whomſoever had the misfortune to approach his drove. Here coolies out of number croſs and jolt each

other

other to the great detriment of their employers. There, on an alarm of horſe, occaſioned by their aſſociates in villany, in order to defraud their maſters, whole loads are thrown off and plundered.

In one place bodies of horſe preſs inwards from the ſkirts on ſuch as ſhew an inclination to ſcatter; in another the crack of the baggage-maſter's whip forbids followers of all denominations to approach the publick ſtores. Yonder a ſlough threatens to ſtop carriages of every deſcription, notwithſtanding the utmoſt efforts of the willing team, until the ſagacious elephant lends the aid of his powerful ſhoulder to the wheels, or raiſes the ſunken load with his proboſcis. Now bullocks tired of their burthens and determined to carry them no longer, bound, twiſt and fling, until by breaking the cords, they are extricated from their loads. Others with ſimilar intentions lie flat on the ground; torture of various kinds is applied without effect; their tails are wound up, and almoſt bitten off with teeth white as alabaſter; but no degree of pain will move them, until cords tightly twiſted round their muzzles effectually ſtop their breath, and compel obedience. Yet with all this buſtle, ſuch was the earneſtneſs of every department to get on, that the whole kept pace with the heavy guns, and performed a march of ten or twelve miles on each day without injury or inſult from the enemy (1).

As the confederates advanced over the plains, it was reaſonable to ſuppoſe that the Sultaun would not ſuffer ſuch an immenſe armament

(1) Except on the laſt march, during the advance of the confederates from the jungles at Hooliadroog until their arrival before Seringapatam, the baggage moved on the left flank, ſkirted by the cavalry. The line marched from the left, and Colonel Baird, as he commanded the leading brigade, was daily in charge of the advance. But on the 5th, the day we got ſight of the capital, the line marched by the right, in conſequence of which change, Colonel Cockerel was from the ſame cauſe, entruſted with the advance. The baggage was thrown on the right flank, and the cavalry moved to the right of the whole.

to approach his capital, without ſome deſperate effort for its relief. He could not be ignorant, that to protect ſuch an enormous quantity of ſtores required abilities of a very different kind, yet nothing inferior to thoſe by which they had been collected. He well knew that neither the army under General Abercromby, nor that of Purſeram Bhow, had as yet formed a junction with Earl Cornwallis; and he was certain that Seringapatam with its environs, contained upwards of fifty thouſand fighting men, independant of looties; conſequently, that thirty thouſand regular infantry and five thouſand diſciplined horſe might have oppoſed the allies, in whatever ſituation he judged moſt adviſable, without endangering the garriſon. The ſyſtem that the Sultaun adopted on this occaſion, differed widely from general expectation. Solely bent on fortifying a camp under the guns of his capital, he made no attempt whatever towards ſtopping the progreſs of the allies, from the day they left the jungles near Hoöliadroog, until they ſat down before Seringapatam; indeed the whole of his conduct indicated indifference of their approach. Secure in the ſtrength of his fortifications, and confident from the number and valour of his troops, he dared the joint efforts of his enemies, and furniſhed a conſpicuous inſtance in confirmation of the well received opinion, that no poſt whatever is tenable before a well appointed and well diſciplined force, under the direction of a judicious commander.

About noon, the whole army took a ſweep to the right, around the baſe of a hill not ſix miles diſtant from the iſland, and completely

in

in ſight of Seringapatam. The enemy's horſe now appeared ſomewhat more formidable than for ſeveral preceding days; however, they ſtill continued to diſcover an averſion to action on equal terms. The cavalry in advance, led by Major Orr, repeatedly attempted to engage, but thoſe of the Sultaun as often gave way, contenting themſelves with a diſcharge of rockets from the many ravines by which the country is interſected. The army after a fatiguing march, encamped in a ſtrong poſition judiciouſly choſen at the foot of the Cappillair hills (1), diſtant from the iſland about eight miles.

FROM the laſt movement of the Britiſh General, from the ſpace and nature of the ground that lay between his camp and the iſland, and from the long marches that he had lately performed, the Myſorean Prince was induced to believe, that nothing ſerious would be attempted until a junction with General Abercromby had been effected. Nor was the Sultaun ſingular in this opinion; the latter part of the laſt march from its direction, certainly indicated nothing of an immediate attack. But when a manœuvering army is at hand, when an active enemy is within one ſhort march, little dependance ought to be placed on appearances.

BOTH armies remained quiet on the 6th, during which day the enemy's works to the northward and eaſtward of the fort, were com-

			Miles.	*Furlongs.*
(1)	Dec. 15.	Coodul,	6	0
	24.	Maggree,	11	4
	Jan. 5.	Aagalawte,	6	2
	26.	Dowaboodikery,	6	6
	27.	Hooliadroog,	3	4
	Feb. 1.	Tagelly,	8	4
	2.	Caricode,	9	0
	4.	Hooralloo,	8	2
	5.	French Rocks,	10	4

pletely

pletely reconnoitered, and their ſituation and ſtrength were thoroughly comprehended by the Commander in Chief. In proof of this aſſertion, nothing can be ſtronger, than the following inſtructions, which were delivered to commandants of wings, about duſk, juſt as his Lordſhip had received the reports of the officers whom he ſent to examine the Sultaun's poſition.

" ORDERS to be communicated by officers commanding wings, " to officers commanding brigades and corps only, with the neceſ- " ſary information to the field officers on picquet.

" THE army marches in three diviſions at ſeven this evening, to " attack the enemy's camp and lines; picquets to join; field pieces, " quarter and rear guards, and camp-guards, to ſtand faſt.

" Right Diviſion, Major General Medows.

" 36th
" 76th } Regiments, - - Lieutenant Colonel Nesbit.

" 3d Brigade, - - - - Lieutenant Colonel Cockerell.

" 22d Native Battalion, - Captain Oram.

" Lieutenant Lennon's Pioneers.

" A detail of officers from the engineer corps, and a proportion " of ſcaling ladders.

" Centre, - Lord Cornwallis.
Lieutenant Colonel Stuart.

" 52d
" 71ſt
" 74th } Regiments, - Lieutenant Colonel Knox.

" 4th

4th. brigade, — — — Major Ruſſel,

2d — } Native Battalions, — Major Langley,
21ſt }

Lieutenant Dowſe's Pioneers,

A detail of officers from the Engineer corps, and a proportion of of ſcaling ladders.

Left diviſion, Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell,

72d regiment, } Lieutenant Colonel Baird,
5th brigade, }

Enſign Stokoe's Pioneers,

A detail of officers from the engineer corps, and a proportion of ſcaling ladders.

Order of march for the right diviſion.

One battalion company from the 36th regiment,
Pioneers,
Four European flank companies, with ſcaling ladders,
36th regiment,
Two Bengal battalions,
} Lieutenant Colonel Neſbitt.

General Medows,
Lieutenant Colonel Cockerell,
Engineers.
76th regiment,
Two Bengal battalions,
22d native Coaſt battalion.

Order of march for the centre.

One battalion company from the 52d regiment,
Pioneers,
Six European flank companies, with ſcaling ladders,
52d regiment,
One Bengal battalion,
Lieutenant Colonel Knox,

Lord Cornwallis,
Lieutenant Colonel Stuart,
Engineers,
71ſt regiment,
Two Bengal battalions,
74th regiment,
2d
21ſt Coaſt battalions,
Major Langley,

Order

Order of march for the left,

One flank company of the 72d regiment,
One ditto, with ſcaling ladders,
Pioners,
One battalion from the fifth brigade,
} Lieutenant Colonel Baird.

Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell,

72d regiment.

Two battalions of the fifth brigade.

"If the right attack is made to the weſtward of Somarpett, "the troops of that attack, ſhould, after entering the enemy's lines, "turn to the left. But, if the attack is made to the eaſtward of "Somarpett, the troops ſhould turn to the right, to diſlodge the ene- "my from all the poſts on the left of their poſition.

"The troops of the centre attack, after entering the enemy's "lines, ſhould turn to the left; the front diviſions, however, of both "the right and center attacks, ſhould, after entering, advance nearly "to the extent of the depth of the enemy's camp before they turn "to either ſide, in order to make room for thoſe that follow; and "ſuch parts of both diviſions, as well as of the left diviſion, as the "commanding officers ſhall not think it neceſſary to keep in a com- "pact body, will endeavour to mix with the fugitives, and paſs "over into the iſland with them.

"The reſerve, leaving quarter and rear guards, will form in front "of the lines at nine this night; and Colonel Duff will receive the

Commander

" Commander in Chief's orders concerning the heavy park, the en-
" campment, and the reſerve.

" YOUNG ſoldiers to be put on the quarter and rear guards at gun
" firing, and the piquets to join when the troops march off.

" A careful officer from each corps to be left in charge of the
" camp and regimental baggage.

" COLONEL Duff to ſend immediately three diviſions of gun laſ-
" cars, of fifty men in each, to the chief engineer, to carry the ſcaling
" ladders; and the chief engineer is to ſend them to the diviſions, re-
" ſpectively along with the officers of this corps.

" THE officers of engineers and pioneers to be reſponſible that the
" ladders, after having been made uſe of by the ſoldiers, are not left
" careleſsly in the enemy's works.

" SURGEONS and doolies to attend the troops, and arrack and
" biſcuit to be held in readineſs for the Europeans.

" The diviſions to form as follows, after dark.

" The right in front of the left of the right wing,

" The centre in front of the right of the left wing.

" The left in front of the left of the left wing."

PREVIOUS to aſſembling theſe diviſions, Colonel Duff received inſtructions from Earl Cornwallis in perſon, concerning the ſafety of the encampment, and made his arrangements accordingly. On the advance of the columns the reſerve was drawn up in front of the encampment; and remained there for the night. The artillery was commanded to range by their guns, and the quarter and rear guards to ſtand to their arms until day-light. The Colonel was further inſtructed to ſend with the columns a detachment of artillery, conſiſting of two captains, ſix ſubalterns,

ſubalterns, one hundred European artillery, with three hundred and fifty laſcars, under orders ot Major Montagu. The diviſion of Earl Cornwallis was accompanied by Major Montagu, Captain Roſs, two ſubalterns, fifty European artillery men, and one hundred and fifty laſcars. The diviſion of General Medows by Captain Howell, two ſubalterns, fifty European artillery men, and one hundred and fifty laſcars; and the diviſion of Colonel Maxwell by two ſubalterns, thirty artillery men, and fifty laſcars; the allies, ready to mount, waited for day in ſilent anxiety, and the whole felt conſcious that the fate of the war hinged on the ſucceſs of this enterprize.

Towards eight o'clock the three columns were in motion, agreeable to theſe orders. The riſe of a full moon aſſiſted to direct their courſe, and nought to diſturb the ſtilneſs of a ſerene night preceded the impending convulſion. The troops, unencumbered by cannon, truſted ſolely to the ladder and bayonet. Well did they act their part. But as the nature of the ſervice frequently ſeparated officers from their corps, and as much of the ſucceſs of the night was due to the perſonal exertions of ſome gallant individuals thus ſituated, it is intended to be as circumſtantial as poſſible in the deſcription of this momentous and concluſive attack; an attack, which amongſt other ſalutary conſequences, juſtly claims the preſervation of many lives, as it ultimately proved deciſive of the war.

As the ground could not have eſcaped the recollection of the corps, and in particular of the ſeventy-ſecond regiment, from their acquaintance with it on the 15th of May, 1791, Colonel Maxwell's column required no guides to direct its progreſs. Favoured alſo by an approach

proach ſhorter in diſtance, and eaſier of acceſs than either of the other diviſons, a ſpirited attack which was made on the Carigat hill opened the engagement towards eleven o'clock, and warned the Sultaun of his danger. Beſides the ſteepneſs of the aſcent, theſe works, in themſelves, were of great ſtrength. A well-conſtructed redoubt was protected by a double row of breaſt works; but the firmneſs of the aſſailants overcoming every obſtacle, they drove the enemy from the poſt, and after ſecuring poſſeſſion, followed them towards the iſland. The column, in deſcending from the Carigat pagoda, ſuffered ſevere loſs, as it was entirely expoſed, not only to the right of the enemy's line, but to a body of troops poſted under cover of a mound which ſupported a canal on the face of the hill, yet proceeding unchecked by theſe obſtacles, Colonel Maxwell croſſed the Lockany river, and entering the right of the Sultaun's encampment, formed a junction with the diviſion of Earl Cornwallis.

Just as the attack of the Carigat hill commenced, a truſty ſquadron of horſe, with a number of rocket boys, that the enemy had poſted in advance, diſcovered the centre diviſion moving towards the iſland with awful ſilence. They rightly judged, that to oppoſe the approach of the column was certain death without any poſſible advantage to the Sultaun; that to alarm his camp was the principal if not the only ſervice he could now reaſonably expect, or at leaſt that they could render; conſequently, they let fly a plentiful diſcharge of rockets amongſt the aſſailants. They fell back with regularity and compoſure: nor did they attempt to enter their lines until the danger was completely proclaimed in every quarter.

STILL preſerving the ſame ſolemn ſilence, the column twice croſſed the Lockany, a river that covered great part of the enemy's right wing in front. Whilſt wading the ſecond time, it was ſeverely galled by heavy diſcharges of muſquetry poured from a hedge, behind which the Saltaun's firſt line had been poſted. So cloſe and frequent were the flaſhes, that the atmoſphere was for a while in one continual blaze. Peſeverance, however, ſoon procured the oppoſite bank. The front diviſion approached the hedge, gave one volley, and with a tremendous ſhout the whole column ruſhed to the bayonet. The ardour of the troops rendered the daring exertions of the pioneers of no avail. Some preſſed through; ſome crept under; whilſt others bounded over. All mingled with the enemy. In vain did the Myſoreans defend; in vain ſeek protection from flight. Eternity ſtood open in every direction. Each individual cloſed on his antagoniſt, put oppoſition at defiance, and plunging amidſt unheard-of dangers, performed feats, of which no poſſible deſc iption can convey ideas tolerably juſt, or at all adequate to the occaſion. Under theſe circumſtances, the ſeveral corps could no longer act by the direction of any one individual leader. The Commander-in-chief, therefore, made choice of a poſition from which he could obſerve to advantage the effect of the ſtorm, and directed that Captain Vigors ſhould remain there with his battalion.

SEVEN companies that originally headed the column, paſſed the north branch of the Cauvery, at a ford cloſe to the foot of the glacis. Various other diviſions croſſed ſomewhat lower down. Whilſt in the river, the ſeveral corps were ſurrounded by, and interſperſed a-

amongſt

mongſt, immenſe bodies of the enemy. The ſtream was rapid, it was frequently waiſt deep, and almoſt every where the bottom was both ſlippery and uneven. In this ſituation the ſuperior bodily ſtrength of the aſſailants availed them more than their acknowledged diſcipline and valour. A blow from the butt of the muſquet, or ſoldier's fiſt, was equally fatal to the Myſorean fugitive, as the thruſt of the bayonet, or deadly bullet: Whenever he came down he was hurled away by the current, without a poſſibility of recovery; and if any probable conjecture can be formed from the appearance of the bed of the river on the enſuing days, more lives were loſt by water than by all other means put together.

NOTWITHSTANDING the confuſion of a night attack, and the various unavoidable obſtacles to action in concert, inſtinct, diſcipline, or ſome other providential cauſe, inclined five of theſe companies not to ſeparate; nor can a doubt be entertained of their having been the firſt Britiſh troops that ever held a firm footing on the iſland of Seringapatam. On reaching the bank, a ſoldier-like ſenſe of danger induced the officers to halt and form their men; ſeniority gave the command to the Honourable Captain Monſon; and, with the utmoſt regularity, this body advanced briſkly acroſs the island, until it reached the oppoſite branch of the river. Its rout was along the principal ſtreet of the enemy's bazar, which lay on the edge of the glacis, near to the eaſtern face of the fort, and immediately in front of the pettah. Through a wide paſſage, which opened into the chelah gate from this ſtreet, ſwarms of the flying enemy crowded to take ſhelter in the covert way, and under the ramparts; and as the aſſailants, in paſſing along, gave a diſcharge obliquely by diviſions

amongſt

amongſt this maſs, the ſlaughter muſt have been dreadful. The ramparts, the covert way, the glacis, the bazar, and the pettah, were crowded with men in arms; yet, as if petrified with fear, the only ſerious oppoſition made to this handful of troops, was, by a ſmall redoubt at the end of the ſtreet, from the gorge of which two guns played on the aſſailants under cover of muſquetry. The free uſe of the bayonet not only cleared the ſtreet, but obtained poſſeſſion of the redoubt alſo.

The enemy now diſcovered that the Britiſh held poſts all over the island; conſequently, they abandoned it in crowds; the only ford to which they had acceſs was over the ſouth branch of the river, and was commanded by the guns of this redoubt; they were neceſſitated, therefore, either to eſcape through ſhowers of grape; to ſwim; or to crave quarter from a victorious and injured enemy. The corps, now much fatigued, reſted for ſeveral hours. Repeated chears, the grenadier's march, with various other means, had been reſorted to in courſe of the morning, in order to diſcover any part of the Britiſh army, but without effect. It was therefore, at a conſultation of the captains, judged neceſſary to abandon the redoubt; and having ſpiked the guns, this gallant corps retired towards the pettah, which was then occupied by a body of troops under the Colonels Stuart, Maxwell, Knox, and Baird.

It was the original intention of Earl Cornwallis, that the ſeven leading companies of this column, with the fifty-ſecond regiment and fourteenth battalion of ſepoys, ſhould have formed a diviſion under the immediate direction of the Honourable Colonel Knox, during this enterprize; but on approaching the iſland a heavy body of the enemy

preſſed through the diviſion, and ſeparated the Colonel, together with the ſeventy-firſt and ſeventy-fourth light infantry, from the other five companies. Captain Ruſſel, too, with about ſeventy men, chiefly of the fifty-ſecond regiment, had been borne away in a ſimilar manner. Theſe fortunately united; ſtill they ſcarcely amounted to two hundred men. The Colonel, however, true to the deſign of his General, determined to occupy ſome poſt on the iſland, and having a French priſoner for a guide, he inclined to the left; paſſed the Dowlat Baug, and entering the pettah from its eaſtern face, was foremoſt in the attack of that important poſt. Here he experienced much oppoſition. Repeated charges in different ſtreets only ſerved to diſcover that the enemy was not to be diſlodged with a force ſo inconſiderable. Heavy ſquadrons of the Sultaun's cavalry, charging at full gallop, were no ſooner beat back by ſhowers of bullets, than ſolid columns of infantry preſented a firm front. As theſe gave way before the Britiſh bayonet, the cavalry renewed the fight. Againſt ſuch ſuperiority of numbers, alternately ſupporting each other, the Colonel thought proper not to perſiſt; and as a deſtructive diſcharge of cannon and muſquetry, from the lines on the iſland, was directed againſt the corps that were then croſſing the river, he judiciouſly directed Capains Ruſſel, Robertſon, and Wood, with three parties, to attack theſe batteries from their rear, whilſt himſelf took poſt at the neareſt gate. The ſucceſs that attended the ready execution of this order contributed in a high degree to the ſecurity of the troops that were then wading; as

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at this place the river was ſcarcely fordable, even had there been daylight and no oppoſition.

THE fire from the batteries ceaſed at once. An attack from the rear was ſo unexpected by thoſe in charge of the lines, that all of them ſought for ſafety in flight. Some eſcaped to Seringapatam; others, deſirous of abandoning the iſland, puſhed for the ford over the ſouthern branch of the river, whilſt ſeveral, ignorant of our having a poſt in the pettah, were captured by the party under Colonel Knox. From this latter claſs it was learnt, that a number of Europeans were confined in an adjacent hovel. A party for their releaſe was immediately detached; and twenty-ſeven men, chiefly reduced by ill treatment to a ſtate the moſt miſerable and debaſing in nature, were thus liberated from heavy irons. After diſlodging the enemy, the parties returned to the gate of the pettah, from whence they had been detached, and continued with Colonel Knox for the remainder of the night.

ABOUT three hundred yards to the eaſtward of the fort, and immediately between the glacis and the pettah, the fifty-ſecond regiment, under Captain Hunter, together with three companies of the fourteenth battalion of Bengal ſepoys under Lieutenant White, and ſome pioneers, entered the iſland, taking poſſeſſion of the Dowlat Baug, a ſpacious palace, in the centre of a beautiful garden, around which was a high though ſlender brick wall. The palace made ſtout reſiſtance; indeed every inch of ground that this body paſſed over was warmly diſputed. The garden was perfectly-expoſed to one whole face of the garriſon; and as the enemy was ob

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ſerved in motion, with elephants to puſh down the wall, and with guns on the oppoſite bank, the palace, after ſeveral hours poſſeſſion, was fortunately abandoned. This corps now retired from the iſland, towards Sibbald's redoubt: what ammunition it had not expended was rendered unſerviceable from the depth of the river; and there was ſcarce time to repleniſh, before it was called to aſſiſt againſt a large body of the enemy that advanced towards a plain on which the Earl had aſſembled ſome troops.

The force that His Lordſhip had collected bore no proportion to the number by which he was attacked. It conſiſted of ſeven companies of the ſeventy- fourth regiment, under Captain Dougald Campbell, with the ſecond and twenty-firſt Coaſt battalions under Captains Vigors and Montgomery. This handful of men withſtood the furious and deſperate onſet of many thouſands for ſome time. Three companies of Madras ſepoys that had been detached under Lieutenants Kenny and Roberts, to within fifty yards of the enemy, fired by platoons, with a regularity and ſteadineſs that would ſtamp credit on the beſt troops in Europe; and on being moſt ſeaſonably reinforced by Captain Hunter's diviſion, the whole body came to the bayonet, and after repeated charges proved ſucceſsful.

The Myſoreans, however, on this occaſion diſcovered no want either of diſcipline or valour. The reinforcement which fell ſuddenly on their right flank inſtantly received a heavy and well-directed fire from a corps that changed front for that purpoſe. Nor did this body attempt to give way until they felt the points of the bayonets from different directions. The ſucceſs that attended the aſſault of the iſland;

iſland; the approach of day; and the riſk of continuing an action under the guns of the fort, contributed to induce Earl Cornwallis to deſiſt from purſuit, and to retire towards the pagoda hill.

WHILST the troops in front of the centre column were thus engaged, the ſeventy-firſt regiment, after penetrating the bound hedge, was drawn up by Major Dalrymple acroſs the enemy's line of encampment, with a regularity that would not diſcredit the parade of Dublin. Notwithſtanding the diſadvantages of a night attack, all of this ſteady corps ſtood firm by one another until day-light; and, ſupported by the ſeventh and twenty-eighth Bengal battalions, ſcoured the plains towards the right of the Sultaun's poſition. Here heavy columns of Myſoreau horſe, ſeparated by the weight of our fire into ſquadrons, were ſoon driven to the retreating infantry. Whilſt preſſing onwards, a redoubt that protected the right of the enemy's poſition was attacked by two companies, whoſe progreſs it obſtructed, without breaking the order of the regiment; and as the garriſon, abandoning their truſt, joined the runaways, this poſt became an eaſy acquiſition; one of theſe, ſtrengthened with two companies from the twenty-eighth Bengal battalion, commanded by Lieutenants Morgan and Weguelin, and a detachment of artillery, were left in charge of the place under Captain Sibbald; and the corps, proceeding as before, continued to diſperſe the enemy's right wing until they formed a junction with the diviſion of Colonel Maxwell, who, after croſſing the Lockany, now preſſed towards Earl Cornwallis.

HERE

HERE, as they were hemmed in beween the centre and left columns, the defendants had no chance for eſcape, unleſs by attempting to gain the iſland. They all, therefore, crowded tumultuouſly towards the river, which was nowhere fordable in this direction, for a ſpace of two miles; yet, in order to avoid the bayonet, thouſands plunging into the water, endeavoured to get acroſs. The intrepidity of the aſſailants led them to underrate the obſtacles which lay in the way, and to encounter whatſoever danger the deſperate ſituation of the runaways drove them to attempt. At one part of the river horſes fully capariſoned dragged riders, who held faſt by their manes, acroſs the ſtream; at another, men in complete armour, plunging into the water, truſted for ſafety to their dexterity in ſwimming. In many places the unuſual cloſeneſs of the rocks at their ſurface enabled ſome to eſcape by bounding from one to another; but the depth and rapidity of the currents in the chaſms below, conſtantly hurled to eternity ſuch as chanced to ſlip a foot. Frequently the width of a crevice compelled the runaway to encounter his purſuer, as the preferable alternative; ſometimes a horſe or bullock jammed between the rocks, afforded him a footing, that promiſed a probability of eſcape. To theſe diſadvantages in croſſing, a heavy fire from the lines added a deadly hindrance.

WHILST thus ſituated a call that loudly forbade all attempts to get acroſs, was repeatedly heard from the rear: but in front, the voice of Colonel Baird, preſſing to perſiſt, gained the attention of the ſoldiery all round. Himſelf foremoſt to ſhew the example, men were not wanting to follow; and having, with the aſſiſtance of Major Petrie,

Lieutenant

Lieutenant Sutherland and others, ſecured a footing on the iſland, ſeveral of the column got over by degrees. At a ford which was diſcovered about one mile to the left, the main body croſſed under Colonels Stuart, and Maxwell; and, as the lines on the iſland had been by this time cleared of the enemy by Colonel Knox, the ſeveral diviſions advanced to the pettah without further moleſtation, where they continued for the remainder of the night.

WHILST theſe things were going on, under the immediate eye of Earl Cornwallis, our right hand column advancing ſilently with a firm pace, directed its courſe ſomewhat to the weſtward of Somarpett, and engaged in a warm attack on the Edga redoubt, a ſtrong work which protected the left of the enemy's poſition. Twelve pieces of cannon, loaded to the muzzles with grape, pointed from this redoubt; a deep nulla winded in front and on either flank; a thick hedge all around ſtrengthened the other defences; there was alſo a double ditch, a ſtrong parapet; and on this occaſion, within and around, upwards of fifteen hundred fighting men ſtood ready for reſiſtance.

FROM the frequency of its bendings it became neceſſary to wade the nulla repeatedly before the enemy's encampment could be approached in this direction; ſtill the defendants made no reſiſtance at croſſing: the bound hedge was alſo penetrated without oppoſition: but immediately afterwards a heavy diſcharge of cannon and muſquetry opened on the head of the column. This was not a time to heſitate. Warned of their danger by the noiſe of the other engagements, the enemy fired with much briſkneſs. The five companies

panies in front, however, led by Colonel Neſbitt, and ſupported by the thirty-ſixth regiment, made a ſudden wheel to the right, and commenced the attack with deſperate reſolution.

A CONSIDERABLE corps of Europeans, under Monſieur Vigie, drawn up to ſtrengthen the redoubt on the left, were driven off by a party from the thirty-ſixth, whilſt the remainder of that regiment cloſely followed the flank companies, who now puſhed for the body of the work. From the depth of the ditches, and ſome delay occaſioned by the ſlaughter amongſt thoſe who brought on the ladders, the leading companies were for a while unable to aſcend the work: but the ſeventy-ſixth grenadiers fortunately diſcovered an entrance which promiſed ſome hopes of ſucceſs. Towards the fort a traverſe incapable of admitting two men abreaſt, led acroſs the ditches to a narrow winding paſſage, at the far end of which a gate well barred ſecured the only acceſs into the redoubt. To ſtrengthen this paſſage a triangular work had been erected on the right, and another on the left, with much judgement. Both were attached to the work. Both were crowded with troops. The traverſe, the paſſage, and the gate, were completely expoſed to the fire of theſe triangles. A piece of ordnance in each, with one that ſtood in the body of the work, were ready to pour grape on the aſſailants; and the whole garriſon, by facing inwards, could point their fire at the gate and gorge as rays converge towards a focus. Beſides theſe advantages, Lally's corps of Europeans, which had been drawn up on the left of the aſſailants, as already mentioned, added greatly to the ſtrength of the poſt, and to the confidence of its garriſon. Another diviſion oppoſed Captain Oram,

who

who had been previouſly directed to advance with his battalion along the great road in front, with intention to attract the enemy's notice from the principal object of attack. In ſhort, every appearance of the redoubt, every diſpoſition of the troops around, beſpoke bloody and determined reſiſtance. Before a furious charge made by the diviſion ſent from the 36th regiment, Vigie gave way, and was purſued, whilſt the redoubt, with ſome diſtance around, appeared one complete ſheet of fire.

MAJOR DIROM, Deputy Adjutant General, had been directed by Major General Medows to attend the ſtorm and report the iſſue. The Major, Captains Wight, Gage and Markham, Brigade Major Nightingall, Lieutenants Barton and James Robertſon, Enſign Maccoll, with a number of ſubaltern officers well ſupported, paſſing the ditches by the traverſes already deſcribed, entered the winding paſſage, and ſtruggled to break down the gate. The firſt diſcharge of grape from the cannon, with a heavy fire of muſketry from every direction, in an inſtant levelled ſix officers, and a proportion of men along the paſſage. The natural effect of ſo ſevere a ſhock, was ſomewhat of a preſſure backwards, but no one thought of retreat. The three Captains already mentioned, fortunately eſcaped this volley. All at the ſame inſtant ſeeing the importance of the triangles, they ſoon became maſters of them on either ſide; and a briſk fire from theſe ſtations prevented the enemy from ſecuring advantages, which the effect of ſo favourable an impreſſion might otherwiſe have rendered permanent.

Such of the officers as had not been diſabled by the firſt volley, renewed the ſtruggle at the gate with an addition of force, before the garriſon had time to reload their guns. There was no reſiſting this ſecond attack. Some of the bars ſhattered by the grape, giving way to the ſtruggle, and before the preſſure of the onſet, an opening was ſoon widened at the gate; and as ladders had by this time been planted from the ditch, the aſſailants aſcending the ramparts, entered the redoubt from every direction. As there was no way to retreat, a terrible carnage enſued. Each of the defendants determined to ſell his life at the higheſt poſſible price. In ſhort, within a circle whoſe diameter did not exceed twenty yards, beſides the fall of an important poſt, Tippoo Sultaun had to mourn the loſs of about four hundred choſen men, amongſt whom was Sahid Hummed, an officer of high renown, and commandant of his left wing. Nor had we to boaſt a victory without regret; the ſite of this horrid ſcene, was ſtrewed with the prime of our ſoldiery, and officers of the greateſt promiſe, attacked by numbers, reſigned life juſt as they overpowered their immediate antagoniſts. But there followed what was ſtill more grievous to the Commander in Chief; the column, as if ſickened of blood at the firſt outſet, continued inactive for the reſt of the night. In place of attacking another redoubt, which began to oppoſe their progreſs, ſoon after they were put in motion towards Earl Cornwallis, an unhappy council of war, in order to avoid delay, after ſome little deliberation, determined to make a circuit to the left. The encampment of this wing conſequently remained without fur-

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ther moleſtation during the action. The column repaſſed the bound-hedge, again forded the nulla at different bends, and proceeding towards the Carigat Pagoda, got bewildered amongſt paddy-fields for the better part of the night. Before day, however, the whole diviſion with the exception of the garriſon, left under Captain Auſtin, in the Edga redoubt, was drawn up, at the foot of the hill (1).

NOTWITHSTANDING the unhappy reſult of the council in General Medows's diviſion, the advantages of the enterprize were numerous and important. What part of the enemy's right wing eſcaped the bayonet, was totally diſperſed, and although his left had been but partially beaten, they could not poſſibly maintain their ground by day whilſt we held poſſeſſion of the Edga redoubt. The poſition of the troops in the iſland, although occupied in the dark, was ſuch as the beſt of Generals could have wiſhed for the night. Under Lieutenant Colonel Stuart, about two thouſand men were ſtationed within the Pettah, on the center of the iſland, whilſt the diviſions of Captains Hunter and Monſon held poſts a conſiderable way in advance on either flank. The approach of day however pointed to the propriety of ſeveral alterations.

ABOUT ſun-riſe the 76th regiment, and 3d battalion of Bengal ſepoys augmented the troops on the iſland, in all to about the ſtrength

(1) In the early ſtages of this action, the Commander in Chief was accompanied by Colonel Martin, by Lieutenant Colonels Patrick Roſs, Alexander Roſs, Malcolm, and Richardſon; by Majors Skelly, Haldane, and Smart; by Captains Madan, Kyd, and Apſly; and by Mr. Kingſcot, Doctor Laird, Mr. Cherry, and Lieutenant Turner, with his Lordſhip's body guard. Major General Medows was accompanied by Colonel Harris; by Majors Hart, Dirom, and Cloſe; by Captains Macauley and Bordes, and by Lieutenant Grant with his body guard. Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell was accompanied by Captain Agnew, and by Lieutenants Wallace and Capper; Captain Beatſon, of the Madras eſtabliſhment, was poſted with the right column; Captain Allen and Lieutenant Macleod led that of Earl Cornwallis, but the column of Colonel Maxwell required no guide.

of

of eight complete corps. Thus reinforced, Colonel Stuart was enabled to occupy the Pettah from whence he withdrew in courſe of the night. The enemy attempted to regain the iſland ſoon after day-break, but deſiſting as their opponents increaſed in ſtrength, the whole retired towards Seringapatam. Another ſtruggle which had the recovery of Tippoo Sultaun's redoubt, for its object, although maintained with greater perſeverance, was rendered ineffectual from the deſperate valor of the troops, to whom it was intruſted. Three different attacks on this poſt were as often repulſed.

UNDER cover of ſome rocks from whence two field pieces fired within piſtol ſhot of the work, and encouraged by a heavy cannonade from the garriſon, a large body of infantry attempted to ſtorm about the hour of ten, but they were beat off with conſiderable loſs. The ſecond attack was by a reſolute party of diſmounted horſe, who towards one o'clock threatened to enter ſword in hand; theſe, however, were alſo beat back. Still the Sultaun did not relinquiſh the deſign. Without a doubt of ſucceſs, he commanded the whole of his Europeans under Monſieur Vigie, to recover the work; yet this attempt was attended with no better effect, than either of the former ones; but as it proved to Tippoo Sultaun, that the garriſon to a man, was determined to reſign the poſt, with life only, he deſiſted. The ſlaughter within and around, was truly ſhocking; the wounded deprived of all acceſs to water, and medical aſſiſtance, piteouſly implored help; but the multitude of the enemy that were ſtill ſcattered about the encamp-

ment

ment prevented the poſſibility of affording them any relief until late in the evening (1).

HAVING carried away what remained of their camp-equipage, the Myſoreans now ſet about abandoning the north ſide of the river entirely. Every redoubt was evacuated. Beſides poſſeſſion of his encampment and two thirds of the iſland, eighty pieces of cannon, with immenſe quantities of arms, ſtandards and trophies of various deſcriptions, graced the victory; and, but for the ill-judged determination of our council to the right, the courage of the conquerors was ſo completely inflamed, and the ſpirits of the enemy ſo miſerably ſpent, that all his ſtanding force muſt have been diſperſed if not totally annihilated (2).

ALTHOUGH our troops in other quarters remained in quietneſs whilſt the attack on Sibbald's redoubt laſted, the Sultaun immediately afterwards endeavoured to retrieve part of his loſs, by an attempt to recover the iſland. Upwards of three thouſand

(1) Perhaps the wonderful degree of reſolution diſcovered in the defence of this redoubt, was due, not more to the acknowledged gallantry of its firſt garriſon, than to the exertions of ſeveral officers, who from wounds or other cauſes had, during the night, taken ſhelter within the place; among theſe we find Major Skelly, Captains Hunter, Maitland, and Montgomery; Lieutenants Irvin and Madden. Another fortuitous circumſtance which tended alſo to the ſafety of Sibbald's redoubt, was that Quarter Maſter Serjeant Howard, of the 28th Bengal battalion, while in queſt of that corps, in the dark, fell in with Lieutenant White, who after taking a ſupply of ammunition, for the three companies which he headed, directed the Serjeant, with the remainder, towards that redoubt.

(2) However inclined to render juſtice to the memory of many gallant individuals, whoſe exertions contributed in a very conſpicuous degree to the ſucceſs of this enterprize; however deſirous to enlarge on the numerous inſtances of zeal, courage, ability, and perſeverance that ſhone forth with brighteſt luſtre, throughout the engagement, the ableſt writer, after the moſt minute reſearch and careful attention, will find his labours fall far ſhort of his wiſhes to delineate the reſpective merits of the ſeveral actors. It is to a want of competency to the taſk, and not to neglect or dearth of information on the ſubject, that every failure of this nature in the preſent inſtance muſt be attributed. At a particular ſtage of this action, it was, perhaps, to the able maneuvres of Captain Dugald Campbell that his country is indebted for the preſervation not only of Earl Cornwallis, but of his whole ſuite. The tactical ſkill of Lieutenant Buchan, with the intrepidity of Sibbald, Skelly, Hunter and other officers, gave a degree of confidence to the troops that compoſed the garriſon of Sibbald's redoubt, which ſaved the whole from deſtruction. At the Edga redoubt, perhaps the ſtrength and intrepidity of Enſign Maccoll was not of leſs importance in enſuring ſucceſs, than the collected conduct of Colonel Neſbitt, or the determined valour of Captains Wight and Gage. In ſhort, to particularize every individual who diſtinguiſhed himſelf on this occaſion, can only be done by giving a liſt of the whole that were engaged.

men ſweeping from river to river, advanced through the Pettah, and drove the followers who plundered there, in crouds upon the lines of Colonel Stuart. The firſt battalion of Madras ſepoys was puſhed on in advance, and being ſoon followed by the 71ſt regiment, a ſmart action took place. The enemy yielded to the ſuperior diſcipline of their antagoniſts, and reluctantly retiring towards the fort, they left Colonel Stuart in quiet poſſeſſion of the Pettah. The troops in the redoubts taken from the enemy, had been by this time relieved; the encampment of the army had moved ſomewhat nearer to the fort; and, after ſtrengthening our poſition in the iſland with four additional field pieces, Major Gowdie's brigade was commanded to lie on their arms for the night, at the foot of the Carigat hills, in order to throw ſuccour to any direction at which the Sultaun might point an attack in the dark. But contrary to expectation, all remained in quietneſs till day-light (1).

It was not until now that the enemy fully acknowledged his defeat; repeated ſtruggles in different directions, hitherto diſcoverd that the Sultaun entertained ſome hopes of recovering part of what he had lately loſt; but now that he everywhere gave up the battle, it was evident that want of ſucceſs in all directions had thrown a damp on the ſpirits of his people, which neither affection for their prince,

(1) "The conduct and valor of the officers and ſoldiers of this army, have often merited Lord Cornwallis's encomiums; but the zeal and gallantry which were ſo ſucceſsfully diſplayed laſt night, in the attack of the enemy's whole army, in a poſition that had coſt him ſo much time and labor to fortify, can never be ſufficiently praiſed; and his ſatisfaction on an occaſion, which promiſes to be attended with the moſt ſubſtantial advantages, has been greatly heightened by learning from the commanding officers, that this meritorious behaviour was univerſal, through all ranks to a degree that has rarely been equalled. LordCornwallis therefore requeſts that the army in general will accept of his moſt cordial thanks, for the noble and gallant manner in which they executed the plan of the attack. It covers themſelves with honor, and will ever command his warmeſt ſentiments of admiration." G. O. 7th Feb. 1792.

love

love of their country, enthuſiaſm in religion, nor a tenacious adherence to the tranſmiſſions of anceſtors, could remove (1).

THE Pettah of Shehar Ganjam, is perhaps the moſt regular in India; it is ſurrounded by a mud-wall, which although of no greater thickneſs than thoſe generally raiſed for the protection of gardens, is upwards of twelve feet in height. Within this encloſure ten wide ſtreets interſect each other, at right angles; between theſe, ſeveral leſſer ones are directed by the fancy of the builder. The principal entrances are at either end of the centre ſtreets which lead to Seringapatam, and towards the Laulbaug; but there is a ſmaller gateway at the next ſtreets, to the right and left of the former, in the ſame direction. All the houſes are built nearly on one principle, thoſe in the main ſtreet are on a larger ſcale, and more commodious than the reſt; but the whole are white-waſhed and covered with tiles. A regular row of trees, ſhaded the people from the ſun along the principal ſtreets on either ſide. At the northweſt outlet on each hand, a range of barracks ſtretched from the Pettah towards Seringapatam; here the Chela battalions were quartered, in times of peace. Theſe buildings from without appeared perfectly regular, but on the inſide they were parted into a number of ſmall diviſions, as the whim of each individual occupant ſuggeſted. Beſides the advantages of being

(1) In this action, Earl Cornwallis, whilſt expoſed to the utmoſt danger, received a ſlight hurt on the right hand; beſides the Commander in Chief, the following names were amongſt the ſufferers:—Wounded, Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm, Major Frazer.—Killed, Captains Archdeacon, Mackenzie, Sibbald.—Wounded, Captains Hunter, Roſs, Browne, Maidland, Markham, Zouch.—Killed, Lieutenants Stewart, Bain, Hutchiſon, Jones, Robertſon, Buchan.—Wounded, Lieutenants Macpherſon, Robertſon, Brownrigg, Irvin, Madden, Rowan, Hemming, Martin, Philpot, Ward, Robert Campbell, Shawe, John Campbell, Farquhar, Niccoll.—Killed, Enſign Smith.—Wounded, Enſign Hamilton, and Surgeon's Mate Paley.—Europeans killed, wounded and miſſing, including officers, 303.—Natives ditto, 232.

diſciplined

diſciplined under his own immediate eye, the poſition of theſe troops in the centre of his dominions, prevented their eſcape from ſlavery; they ſerved alſo as a conſtant watch on the inhabitants of Shehar Ganjam, of whom, as they had been forcibly conveyed away by Hyder, during his ſeveral incurſions in the Carnatic, ſome jealouſy had ſtill been entertained. All of them were manufacturers of cotton, and being conſequently an acquiſiton of the firſt importance to this political prince, although he kept a ſtrict watch over their movements, he endeavoured by mild treatment to reconcile them to a change of country. Between the Pettah and Seringapatam, to the right, and in the centre of a garden, there ſtood a palace, called the Dowlat Baug, which was intercepted from the view by clumps of cypreſs. Within this building, an hiſtorical repreſentation of Colonel Ballie's defeat, decorated the walls; the exploſion of the tumbrils, as the leading cauſe of that diſaſter, was the moſt conſpicuous part of the painting; and a ſmall tomb which adjoined, was ſaid to contain the remains of that gallant but unfortunate officer. From the walls of the Pettah to the river on either ſide, and indeed over the greater part of the iſland, the deſtruction of innumerable huts appeared ſo freſh as to confirm the belief, that a large city had been laid in ruins ſince the commencement of the war, or perhaps from the time our armies entered Myſore. This ſcene of devaſtation, extended in an eaſterly direction, cloſe to a thick bamboo hedge that ſurrounded the Laul Baug, a beautiful garden, which covered the eaſt end of the iſland.

A MAGNIFICENT palace conſtructed on a ſimilar principle, and nearly of the ſame dimenſions, with that already deſcribed at Bangalore, ſtood towards the center of this garden. It was built principally of wood, with ornaments, which were lacquered and varniſhed as the former; but although the whole was finiſhed, in appearance, from without, the decorations had not been compleated. From the palace, through a beautiful avenue of cypreſs trees, the tomb of Hyder, a neat ſquare building, with a dome riſing from it's center, cloſed the view. At the entrance into this mauſoleum, there was a neat piazza, with its roof ſupported by pillars of granate, which from the exquiſiteneſs of the poliſh, and nicety in ſtaining, were invariably miſtaken for black marble. This ſpacious area, formed by four double arcades furniſhed a pleaſant retreat for prieſts and pilgrims of every deſcription. From the ſquare building at each of the corners around the dome, there roſe minarets of the beſt workmanſhip; numerous appartments for the religious of the Mahomedan order, encircled the ſacred ground; and, an extenſive terrace on which the building ſtood, was here and there vaulted and ſet apart for ſuch of Hyder's relatives as had been killed in battle ſince the tomb had been erected. Avenues of cypreſs interſecting each other in every direction, beſides furniſhing abundance of ſhade, divided the garden into plots of different ſhapes, which were planted throughout with fruit trees and ſhrubberries of various deſcriptions.

THE Laul Baug appeared a princely nurſery for the produce of Myſore; trees bearing apples, oranges, guavas, grapes, plantains, cocoanuts,

coanuts, beetlenuts; as alſo ſandal-wood, ſugar-cane, with cotton and indigo plants, roſe from out the ſeveral incloſures; and paddy, raggy, choulum, chewaree, nachine, coultie, with various other ſpecies of peaſe, grains and pulſes, might be ſeen in different directions. Plants of mulberry too, from the extraordinary attention with which they were treated, diſcovered that the Sultaun had ſet his mind on the manufacture of ſilk. At the eaſtern extremity of the garden, there is a neat bungalow, that commands a view of the river for a conſiderable diſtance, after the re-union of the two branches. From this building a deep nulla that watered the garden, formed a breaſt-work along the ſouth bank of the iſland, which was further ſtrengthened with ſeveral redoubts; but the principal defence on this ſide lay in the difficulty of croſſing the water; for, bad as the bottom was on the oppoſite branch, it was ſtill better than on this, where it could ſcarcely be forded at any time from the ruggedneſs of the rocks.

The beſt and indeed the only ford into the iſland, except thoſe on either ſide cloſe to the walls of Seringapatam, was that under the Carigat hills, which was ſtrongly defended with trenches and batteries. In ſhort, if the natural advantages of his poſition, and the ſtrength of the ſeveral defences, are taken into conſideration, it will not be wondered at, that the Sultaun ſhould have thought himſelf ſecure from ſudden attack. In no other manner than that adopted, could the attempt be made without the certainty of great loſs, with conſiderable riſk of failure; and although of ſingular boldneſs, the unanimous opinion of all unprejudiced ſpectators, proclaimed the wiſdom

of

of the meaſure, as to judgement in planing, as well as firmneſs in the leader with reſpect to coolneſs in execution.

ALTHOUGH a conſiderable part of the Sultaun's right wing had been diſperſed during the action, large bodies on his left who had been but little moleſted, continuing to remove their camp-equipage and guns, pitched their encampment on the ſouth ſide of the fort. In every other direction Seringapatam was now ſo cloſely inveſted, that the Sultaun on the 8th, blew up whatever outworks were detached at any diſtance. His loſs in twenty hours was computed at as many thouſand fighting men, of which number about one-fourth were ſlain, ſeveral were made priſoners, but by far the greater part returned to their homes. Immenſe quantities of arms and ſtandards of various deſcriptions, with upwards of eighty pieces of cannon, graced the victory (1).

THE critical ſtage at which his affairs had now arrived, began to produce a temporary appearance of humility in Tippoo Sultaun, that had hitherto been a ſtranger to his overbearing mind; but his neceſſities had not yet humbled him ſufficiently to give over all hopes of converting the conceſſions which his ſituation rendered neceſſary, to purpoſes of pride and ambition. Fearful that his enemies ſhould preſs him ſore, whilſt his troops were ſcattered and diſperſed from their late defeat, he ſtrove by protractive arts to gain time. Another

(1) The loſs of Tippoo Sultaun in forts, guns and troops, during this war, will ſcarcely gain credit amongſt thoſe who have not had an opportunity of witneſſing the ſtrength of his country. Upwards of ſeventy forts are ſaid to have ſurrendered to the allies; eight hundred pieces of cannon taken from the enemy, gave additional ſtrength to the diſtricts that had been conquered; and the deſtruction or diſperſion of above fifty-thouſand fighting men, is a cruſh to his power from which he will find it difficult to recover for many years.

motive

motive for delay, was the deſire of being reinforced by a diviſion of his army, which then watched the movements of Purſeram Bhow, under the command of Cummer ul Dien Cawn, one of his beſt officers. The firſt ſtep which the Sultaun judged neceſſary towards this important object of protraction, was the releaſe of Lieutenants Chalmers and Naſh, who, as already related, had been detained in Seringapatam contrary to capitulation, ever ſince the ſurrender of Coimbatore. After an audience of two hours, accompanied with ſome mean repreſentations and entreaties for their interpoſition to procure a peace, he requeſted Lieutenant Chalmers to deliver two letters to Earl Cornwallis, and to return with an anſwer. This converſation was accompanied with a promiſe of reſtoring all their baggage, horſes, and whatever they poſſeſſed at the ſurrender of Coimbatore, or an equivalent in money; it was the effect of a correſpondence, which paſſed between the Sultaun and Earl Cornwallis on the preceding month (1). A liſt of the whole loſs was ſent with the

(1) *From Tippoo Sultaun. Received January* 13, 1792.—"At this time, with a view to ſtrengthen the friendſhip, and remove the diſagreements between the Ahmudy Sirkar, the Company, his Highneſs the Nawaub Aſoph Jaw, and the Peiſhwa; and to cultivate the ties of intimacy between theſe four Sirkars, a confidential and experienced man belonging to this Sirkar will be deputed to your Lordſhip, in order that by negociation perſonally with every one, the diſpleaſure of the mind may be done away, and a reconciliation with each other (which is for the good and quiet of mankind) may take place. If this meets with your Lordſhip's approbation, be pleaſed to notify it, that the abovementioned perſon may be ſent to a place appointed, and the ancient friendſhip may be renewed."—Dated 12th Jemmadie ul Owel, 1206, Hejira,—or 7th January, 1792.

Anſwer to Tippoo Sultaun.—Written the 16th *January*, 1792, *after recapitulating the letter received the* 13*th of January.*—"It is well known, that after having made every conciliatory propoſition in my power to prevent this war, I was forced by the dictates of honor and good faith, to have recourſe to arms, to ſave one of the Company's allies from deſtruction; and I have ever been deſirous to make peace as ſoon as proper compenſation can be received, for the injuries and loſſes that have been ſuſtained by the Company, and by thoſe allies with whom it is connected in the ſtricteſt bonds of confederacy.—But with what confidence can a negociation be carried on with a man, who not only violates treaties of peace, but alſo diſregards the faith of capitulations, during war. The garriſon at Coimbatore ought by the capitulation, to have been ſet at liberty, upon certain conditions, immediately after its ſurrender; and I have a juſt right to demand, that the agreement ſhould ſtill be executed on the ſpot where it was made; but being unwilling, at this critical time, to occaſion any delay that can be avoided in opening a negociation, I ſhall not inſiſt on a literal performance of the original ſtipulations, on account of the length of time that the execution would require.—Let therefore the garriſon of Coimbatore be ſent to this army, to be ſet at liberty according to the conditions of the capitulation, that were ſettled between Lieutenant Chalmers, and Cummer ul Dien Cawn, and I ſhall then be ready in concert with the allies, to fix upon a place where Vakeels from you may conveniently meet proper perſons that will be deputed, on the part of the three confederate powers, for the purpoſe of endeavouring to arrange the terms on which a general peace can be re-eſtabliſhed."

anſwer

anſwer, yet this promiſe has never been fulfilled. Rejoiced with the proſpect of liberty at any price, theſe gentlemen were liberal of their promiſes in return; however, the melancholy account which they gave of their treatment during captivity, pleaded nothing with our Commander-in-chief in favour of their plighted ſuit.

On the 9th the army changed ground, and took a final poſition for the ſiege. So cloſe to the object of attack was th is encampment, that it became neceſſary to leave the mazagine at a little diſtance in the rear, as ſome of the enemy's heavy guns threw random ſhots through and over our tents. The troops in every direction were now regularly relieved, and working parties of great ſtrength were ordered to prepare faſcines, gabions, and pickets, with materials which were furniſhed in abundance from the pettah and Laul Baug. The whole corps of engineers encamped in the middle of this garden. Aſſiſted by a diviſion of laſcars, and of European and native pioneers, upwards of two thouſand men daily reduced the ſeveral plots of planting, with the rows of cypreſs by which they were encloſed, to mere waſte. The palace, with the buildings around the tomb, formed convenient hoſpitals; and the Sultaun, by felling the trees at the Dawlet Baug, was alike buſied in forwarding means of reſiſtance.

Whilst theſe preparations were going forward, a large body of the enemy's horſe made a daring attack upon our magazine ſoon after day-break on the 11th. They were obſerved on the preceding day in motion to the Eaſtward, on the ſouth ſide of the river, but their deſigns had not been ſuſpected. After fording the Cauvery in the neighbourhood of Arrakery, this enemy made a circuit around the north-eaſt extremity of the Pagoda hill; and as a ſimilarity in appear-

ance prevented them being diſtinguiſhed from the horſe of our allies, had their judgment kept pace with their ſpirit, it is dangerous to hazard a conjecture on the degree of miſchief which might have followed; indeed, as the head quarter line encamped in this direction, many imagined, and with much appearance of truth, that this was a ſecond blow aimed at the life of our Commander-in-chief. His Lordſhip was conſequently perſuaded to admit a Captain's guard of Europeans over his tent during the night, for the remainder of the war.

TOWARDS evening a working and covering party of great ſtrength was ſent out from the ſeveral corps, acroſs the ſouth branch of the river, to erect a redoubt on a riſing ground which commanded the whole of our poſts on the ſouth ſide of the iſland. This work, with three companies from Colonel Stuart's diviſion, was put in charge of Lieutenant Macinnes, who continued in that command until the peace. Swarms of brinjarries that arrived in camp during this and the preceding day, were encouraged in their advance by a ſmall detachment which, under Captain Mandeville, eſcorted a ſupply of entrenching tools, from Bangalore. The enemy kept up a conſtant but ineffectual diſcharge of cannon throughout the day, from the period of our firſt attack on his encampment until the evening of the 13th, when it ceaſed for a time. The cauſe of this temporary lull was the advance of two vakeels, who approached tents pitched for their reception in the vicinity of the moſque, or Edga, redoubt; but at their return about ten o'clock next morning, the fort fired as before. Another cannonade was now heard in a weſterly direction.

THE

THE army of General Abercromby advancing towards Earl Cornwallis, agreeable to the plan concerted, croſſed the Cauvery on the 11th, about twenty-five miles above Caniambaddy. On the 13th and 14th, large bodies of the enemy's horſe attempted to cut off their baggage, and to retard a junction which they felt themſelves unable to prevent; but as the whole of our cavalry, with the exception of one regiment, ſupported by the twenty-ninth battalion of Coaſt infantry, and about four thouſand of the allied horſe, proceeded in that direction under Colonel Floyd on the 12th, an union of the two armies was effected without any material loſs. On this occaſion, however, the tardineſs of our allies, and their inattention to command, furniſhed the enemy another opportunity of diſplaying their ſuperiority in the field; and, but for the protection of Colonel Floyd, their eſcape to either army muſt have been at evident hazard. After leaving at Poodicherrim and Sedaſier a force ſufficient for the protection of both paſſes, General Abercromby on the 15th conducted to Earl Cornwallis upwards of ſix thouſand fighting men, of which number about one third were Europeans. For regularity of conduct and uniformity in diſcipline this corps was not to be ſurpaſſed in any country.

ALTHOUGH the vakeels of Tippoo Sultaun continued to confer daily with thoſe of the allied army, whether the eye turned towards attack or defence, there was no ſlackneſs of preparation on either ſide. The fort had been cloſely reconnoitered all around, except on its ſouth face, where the Sultaun's troops ſtill continued to encamp. Towards the iſland the defences were of wondrous ſtrength. Double walls and ditches of excellent maſonry, were covered in front by works conſtructed with the beſt materials, and on the moſt approv-

ed

ed principle of the preſent time. Drawbridges ſecured the communication over the ditches at every entrance, and heavy guns out of number pointed in all directions from baſtions, cavaliers and outworks. The defences to the northward, notwithſtanding that they were covered by the river, were on a comparative view conſidered of leſs ſtrength than thoſe towards the iſland. The walls in this direction were not of the ſame thickneſs as in the other: the ditches excavated from the ſolid rock, at an enormous expence, were inferior in width and depth: but the natural advantages of the ground were ſtill more favourable to an attack on the north face than all other conſiderations. From a gradual riſe in the country, not only the buildings within, but the walls of the fort, were expoſed to the very foundation; and ſeveral French deſerters, who had lately abandoned the Sultaun, agreed in opinion, with reſpect to the weakneſs of Seringapatam in this direction.

AFTER the General had ſet his mind on the point of attack, he directed ſuch ſubordinate arrangements as in his opinion became neceſſary to enſure ſucceſs. The iſland and Sibbald's redoubt were left in charge of Colonel Stuart. The piquets and out-poſts were, as uſual, intruſted to Colonel Maxwell. The reſt of the works that originally ſecured the enemy's encampment were confided to Captain Brown, of the Madras eſtabliſhment; and under the immediate eye of the Commander-in-chief, Major General Medows was directed to ſuperintend the whole (1). All matters preparatory to breaking ground

G. O. 18*th February*, 1792.—"The following arrangement ordered for conducting the duties of the line, "and the operations of the troops, during the ſiege."

"An engineer's park to be eſtabliſhed immediately near the bound hedge, in the rear of Captain Brown's "redoubt; as the rendezvous of the corps of engineers, for the ſtores, &c. of that department, and for the "corps of European and Native pioneers, who being placed under the orders of the chief engineer, for the "period of the ſiege, are to be conſidered as a diſtinct detail, for working ſervice, and regulated accordingly.

being

being thus adjuſted, on the 17th a brigade was ordered to carry faſcines, gabions, and pickets from the iſland. Towards evening the party was relieved by three corps, who carried theſe materials to Brown's redoubt, a work which, erected about one mile in front, and to the northward of Seringapatam, covered the centre of the Sultaun's fortified encampment. From thence it had been determined to carry on the approaches. Six complete corps, therefore, conveyed materials thither on the 18th; but as the deſign was conſiderably facilitated by a ſucceſsful diverſion from the iſland, it will be neceſſary to detail that meaſure before any deſcription of the opening of our trenches is attempted.

" The entrenching tools lodged with the Commiſſary, to be removed to the engineer's park, in charge of a " conductor of ſtores, who is to remain there, and, under the direction of the chief engineer, regulate the de- " livery of the tools to working parties; and ſee that, when no longer wanted, they are carefully returned into " ſtore. Liſts of artificers in European corps, but particularly carpenters, to be ſent forthwith to the Deputy " Adjutant General. The field officer for the iſland diſcontinued. The picquets (out poſts) from the line, to " report to Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, as uſual. The following corps poſted on the iſland, under the com- " mand of Lieutenant Colonel Stuart, until further orders. The 52d and 72d regiments, the 13th and " 14th Bengal, and 5th and 21ſt Coaſt battalions. Theſe corps to be accommodated with a few tents from " camp: but his Lordſhip recommends, that the number only, indiſpenſibly neceſſary to cover the troops, " may be taken from the lines. The remainder of the troops on the iſland to return to camp in the courſe of " to-morrow morning. A detail, including a field officer, to be relieved daily, will be ordered as a guard for " the trenches, to be furniſhed from camp, or the troops under Major General Abercromby. The field officer " for this duty, to have authority over the advanced redoubts; which Sibbald's excepted, are to be occupied, " until further orders, by the firſt native battalion. The working parties for the trenches will be ordered in like " manner; and, ſo long as numerous details are required for working ſervice, a field officer will be appointed " to command them. He is to regulate, in communication with the engineers on duty, the details required to " work: and frequently viſit the different parties at work; but is not to interfere in the command of the " guard for the trenches; which is to be under the orders of the field officer included in that detail. " Lieutenant Colonel Knox, to meet the chief engineer at four o'clock, at the engineer's park; and make " himſelf acquainted with the ſituation of the out-poſts; and receive from him the Commander in Chief's " directions, regarding the manner in which the troops are to be employed, and diſpoſed of, for the protection " of the working parties during the night. Working parties to march at three this afternoon, to carry faſcines " ropes and pickets, from the depot of materials, near the ford, to the engineers' park, the ſeventh Bengal, " and ſecond Coaſt battalions: after one trip, this party to return to camp. Working party for the trenches " this evening, to be furniſhed by the troops under Major General Abercromby; and to march ſo as to arrive " at the engineers' park by ſun-ſet. Lord Cornwallis is convinced, that the ſame military ardour, which has " been ſo often manifeſted by the officers and ſoldiers of this army, during the courſe of the preſent war, will " call forth the moſt animated exertions of all ranks, upon an occaſion which may eventually bring the conteſt " to a ſpeedy and honorable concluſion: and, he therefore, only thinks it neceſſary to deſire, that both " officers and ſoldiers will recollect, that gallantry under arms, forms but one part of the duty of a ſoldier, " during a ſiege; and, that the ultimate ſucceſs cannot be ſecured, without the moſt vigorous and unremitting " exertions of induſtry and labour. His Lordſhip will enter into all the details of the arrangements for carry- " ing on the ſiege; and he feels a peculiar ſatisfaction, in poſſeſſing the advantage of General Meadows's zeal " and activity, for aſſiſting to ſuperintend them. He requeſts that the General will be pleaſed to viſit the " works as often as he may judge it expedient; and that he will give ſuch orders on the ſpot, as may from " time to time appear to him to be calculated for preſerving our own troops; and for rendering our fire more " effectual againſt the enemy; communicating the nature of ſuch orders to his Lordſhip, as ſoon as may be " convenient for him: and in every reſpect, his Lordſhip relies, with the utmoſt confidence, upon the General, " both for ſuggeſting what may be uſeful for improving any of the arrangements, and for executing with energy, " whatever may be directed, for promoting the ſucceſs of the preſent enterprize.

WHILST

WHILST the materials were conveyed to the depot at Brown's redoubt, ſome works conſtructed for the ſecurity of our poſts on the iſland creating great jealouſy amongſt the beſieged, their whole attention was attracted to this quarter: but an attack which was made on their camp in the night withdrew their anxiety from other objects to that alone. Under Major Dalrymple, His Majeſty's ſeventy-firſt regiment, and the thirteenth battalion of Bengal ſepoys, croſſed the ſouth branch of the Cauvery on the 19th, about nine at night, and in two hours afterwards approached the enemy's encampment unperceived. The main body remaining on their ſkirts, four companies of the ſeventy-firſt, under Captain Robertſon, were puſhed on in front. At the beginning numbers were bayoneted whilſt faſt aſleep, by the party in advance; but as the principal object was to create an alarm in the fort, ſeveral regular vollies were diſcharged. No reſiſtance was offered by the Myſoreans. Ignorant of the force by which they were attacked from this new direction, they thought of nothing but flight: and without having one man hurt, the party returned to the iſland, after having completely effected their deſign. So ſtrongly was the enemy's attention riveted to what was going on to the ſouthward, that not one ſhot was fired on a diviſion who worked inceſſantly throughout the night, within eight hundred yards of the fort on the oppoſite ſide. But as ſoon as day diſcovered our operations in the dark, a furious cannonade opened, and continued for a length of time without intermiſſion.

THESE were not the only advantages gained over Tippoo Sultaun on the night we broke ground. It had been for ſome time determined that the army of General Abercromby ſhould occupy a poſition

to

to the ſouthward of Seringapatam, and it was the original intention of Earl Cornwallis to have beat up the enemy's encampment with the advance of that army; but the ruggedneſs of a ford at which this corps at firſt attempted to get over, rendered it neceſſary either to abandon the deſign, or to put it in execution from the iſland. However, as a better ford had been found out about two miles higher up; under Major Dow, the Bombay grenadier battalion, with the light companies of the ſeventy-third and ſeventy-fifth regiments, croſſed in the dark; and as they got over without being diſcovered by the enemy, they experienced no oppoſition, except ſuch as offered from the rapidity of the ſtream and ruggedneſs of the bottom. The Major, on gaining the oppoſite bank, immediately took poſt on an adjacent height, ſo as to cover the reſt of the troops whilſt croſſing. A conſiderable body of horſe at firſt threatened interruption; but contenting themſelves with watching our motions, they permitted the whole to gain the ſouthern bank, and to take up their ground without oppoſition.

Towards two o'clock a large body of cavalry, ſupported by a line of infantry and ſome guns, advanced ſeemingly with intention to give battle, to a redoubt which was in ſome meaſure covered by the guns of the fort. Their firſt endeavour was to recover a village of which our troops had taken poſſeſſion; they at the ſame time opened a cannonade upon the heights; and, as the Sultaun appeared at the head of his horſe in perſon, it was evident that he watched an opportunity to take advantage of any confuſion which might occur. Although he continued in the field until dark, not chuſing to run that hazard

on

on the approach of night, he drew back towards the fort; and the party left in the redoubt following his example, after a feeble reſiſtance, the place was occupied by a detachment of our troops. Thus our poſition to the ſouthward of Seringapatam was gained without any material loſs; and the abſence of Purſeram Bhow alone prevented the place from being completely inveſted. For ſome days from this period bodies of horſe eſcorted large quantities of baggage, carried chiefly upon elephants and camels, from Seringapatam to Myſore; and, as the wreck of his numerous army could find no place of ſafety to encamp in around the walls of the former, what part of his forces could not be employed in its defence, was directed to occupy the latter.

On the 19th and two following days an inceſſant cannonade was kept up on our trenches; but, from the ſtrength of our cover, the caſualties were not ſo numerous as might have been expected; our lines on the iſland became daily more reſpectable; and as the duties of the trenches were uncommonly ſevere, ſix corps only were left to protect the poſts that were under the direction of Colonel Stuart (1). The time now approached for commencing our operations from the ſouthward. The redoubt which a few days before had been deemed worthy of ſo much contention, was abandoned by our troops ſoon after it was taken, from its having been ſo much expoſed to the guns of Seringapatam; neither was it occupied by the enemy; but from its ſituation at equal diſtances between the encampment and the

(1) His Majeſty's 52d and 72d regiments; the 13th and 14th Bengal battalions, the 6th and 21ſt Coaſt battalions.

garriſon,

garriſon, it was judged adviſeable, towards facilitating an attack from the ſouthward, to re-poſſeſs this ſtation in the firſt inſtance, as alſo to occupy a neighbouring tope.

UNDER Captain Mackenzie of the ſeventy-fifth regiment, a detachment was puſhed on in advance for this purpoſe, on the 21ſt, towards dusk; but on the following morning, as ſoon as the meaſure was diſcovered by the enemy, a large force ſallied out of the fort, and ruſhed with the utmoſt impetuoſity to attack that part of our diviſion which was poſted in the tope, whilſt Captain Mackenzie advanced for their ſupport with the whole of his detachment. The enemy, although greatly ſuperior in number, gave way before the Britiſh bayonet; but the Sultaun, as if diſgraced by their conduct, at that inſtant opened a diſcharge of grape promiſcuouſly upon the whole. Towards noon an immenſe multitude again advanced to attack the tope, which had now been ſtrengthened by four additional companies under Captain Cameron.

WHILST the ammunition of our diviſion laſted, notwithſtanding the great diſproportion of numbers, the ſtruggle was maintained with much obſtinacy; but no longer in a condition for defence, they retired towards the ſhelter of a nulla in the rear. Encouraged by the appearance of retreat, the Myſoreans advanced with rapidity and reſolution; however, from the ſuperiority of our diſcipline, they had nought to boaſt of in the long run; for, our detachment facing about, drove them in their turn, and purſuing with the bayonet, continued the chace until cloſe to the bank of the river. The length of the ac-

tion, and the viciſſitudes of the day, had now attracted the attention of both armies. Alternate retreats raiſed anxieties in every breaſt. General Abercromby's force, although in readineſs to advance, were prevented by the expectation of an attack from the diviſion under Cummer ul dien Cawn. Our troops on the iſland prepared to aſſiſt from that quarter; and the Sultaun, as if determined to gain the day, at length advanced in perſon to the ſupport of the action.

As the diviſion under Captains Mackenzie and Cameron fell back a ſecond time, they were met by the twelfth battalion of ſepoys under Captain Oakes, who detached by General Abercromby to their aſſiſtance, alſo conducted a ſupply of ammunition. On the junction of this reinforcement, the whole immediately advanced, and again took poſt at the tope. The Myſoreans alſo, by this time reinforced, renewed the fight with unabated ardour. Fortunately, however, another ſupply of troops ſtrengthened our diviſion. The ſecond battalion of ſepoys, with the remaining companies of the Bombay European regiment now advancing, the engagement continued until evening, and the prize of victory was ſo well contended for, that when the Sultaun withdrew, beſides officers(1), we had upwards of one hundred men killed and wounded. During the ſeveral actions on this day both parties ſignalized themſelves by atchievements the moſt brilliant, but our troops had the diſadvantage of fighting againſt diſproportionate numbers, and under the fire of a cavalier on which ſeveral pieces of cannon were mounted. About duſk all was quietneſs; and although the

(1) It does not appear that any officer died from wounds received in this action, although ſeveral were for a time diſabled; among whom we find *Lieutenants Douglas, Lloyd, Mears, and Hunt; and Enſign Kennedy.*

ſtruggle

ſtruggle is ſaid to have coſt the Sultaun about ſix hundred fighting men, he found means to convey the whole towards the fort.

WHILST General Abercromby was thus employed, in eſtabliſhing his poſition to the ſouthward, our operations at the trenches went on with much ſpirit. Two parallels of great ſecurity had been completed, at a diſtance of ſix and eight hundred yards from the fort. One battery for twenty, with a ſmaller one for twelve guns, had been laid out in advance of theſe parallels; another for twelve guns was carrried on in front of the Bombay army, under the direction of Major Sartorius; and a communication between the two attacks was rendered ſafe and eaſy by means of a poſt which had been occupied on an iſland to the weſtward of the fort, within the diſtance of one mile. To counteract theſe preparations, the Sultaun endeavoured to ſtrengthen his works againſt the main attack by thickening his walls, and deepening the bed of the river.

So ſoon as he diſcovered our views, after diverting the nulla which ran in front of our encampment into the northern branch of the Cauvery, many thouſands of his people were daily at work, in order to dam up the water at a ford juſt below the fort; but as this part of the river was expoſed to a gun in Sibbald's redoubt, Captain Monſon, the officer in truſt of that poſt, obtained permiſſion to uſe his endeavours towards retarding the embankment. The fire from this piece of ordnance, although it was the only one that opened againſt Seringapatam during the war, ſerved as a warning of what the Sultaun had to expect in the event of an obſtinate defence; for it not only

diſperſed

diſperſed the people who were at work; but the very firſt ſhot penetrated the principal pagoda, which ſtood in the centre of Seringapatam. Several guns opened in return; however, as they were unable to ſilence the redoubt, the coolies, who are naturally inclined to loiter, could never afterwards be prevailed on to work with ſpirit. The critical ſtage at which his affairs had now arrived, evidently diſcovered to Tippoo Sultaun, that his ſuſpenſion from total ruin could not be of long duration.

HEMMED up on all ſides by enemies fluſhed with victory, it was left him only to chooſe between a deſperate defence againſt the ſtorm, and a ſubmiſſive compliance with the dictates of his opponents. Within doors, alſo, he was by no means ſecure from danger. However faithful in their allegiance, it was natural to conceive that the multitudes of peaceful people who had flocked to the capital could not reliſh a ſtruggle of ſo little expectance, whilſt their families and property remained at hazard on the iſſue. His favourite officer, with a large diviſion of his beſt troops, continued ſtill at a diſtance; nor was there aught of hope to cheer up the drooping ſpirits of his diſconſolate garriſon, or to diſſuade them from ſurrendering his perſon as the beſt forfeit of his intemperate attack on Travancore.

IN addition to the numbers that nearly encircled his capital, the diviſion of Purſeram Bhow, which was hourly expected, by compleating the line of circumvallation, would entirely cut off all chance of ſupplies; whilſt the growth, as well of Myſore, as of the ſurrounding kingdoms, remained for the confederates without moleſtation. Brinjaries out of number conveyed grain imported from Bengal to Madras,

Madras, with every ſpecies of produce from the diſtricts to the northward. Nizam Ally and the Marattas, thoroughly bent on the overthrow of their ancient ſcourge, neglected nothing that could tend to whet every inſtrument of vengeance; the indefatigable exertions of General Abercromby, aided by the active and zealous prince of the Coorgs, from the nearneſs of their country, had eſtabliſhed immenſe magazines cloſe at hand to the weſtward; and whatſoever could be brought forward, as well from the diſtricts conquered by Major General Medows, as from the other countries in a ſoutherly direction, was now advanced to Talamally, a fort ſituated near the top of the Guzzlehatty paſs, under an eſcort of fifteen hundred men, headed by Major Cuppage (1).

THESE

(1) From the fall of Coimbatore, on the 3d of November, no movement of importance took place in the neighbouring diſtricts until the laſt day of the enſuing month, when Major Cuppage took the field with the fifth and ſixteenth Coaſt battalions. It is conceived, that beſides the intention of reducing Errood, Sattimungalum, and Deniaguncottah, as alſo of giving ſecurity to our collections, Earl Cornwallis was induced to call forward this detachment, in order to collect the immenſe ſupplies which might have been procured from theſe and the adjacent diſtricts, provided that Seringapatam had ſtood a tedious ſiege. Be this as it will, it is certain that the garriſons of Trichinopoly, Dindigul, Carore, Palamcottah, and Madura, had inſtructions, to comply with the requiſitions of Major Cuppage, with reſpect to any ſupply of troops he might require. In conſequence of which towards the beginning of January, Trichinopoly furniſhed under Captain Alexander Cuppage, about two hundred and twenty Europeans, with the two flank companies of the twenty-fifth Coaſt battalion; Carore gave five companies of the twentieth Coaſt battalion, with Lieutenant More; Palamcottah the two flank companies of the nineteenth, with Lieutenant Seale; in all when aſſembled, about fifteen hundred fighting men: to this was added ſixty European artillery men, under Lieutenant Maddei: on the 12th of January the whole marched for Sinaore, from whence they proceeded next day to Pungaur; a meſſenger was now ſent to Deniaguncottah, with a ſummonſe to ſurrender. The killedar refuſed to comply; on which all the Europeans, together with all the flank companies, were detached in that direction. The Major himſelf accompanied this diviſion, but the immediate command was given to Captain Alexander Cuppage. One ſix pounder was brought on, in order to blow open the gate, in caſe of reſiſtance. On approaching the fort, ſeveral ſhot were fired on the detachment without effect; a ſecond ſummonſe was ſent; and on the killedar's conviction of the ſuperiority with which he had to contend, he immediately ſurrendered the fort, and opened his gates. A company of ſepoys under Enſign Marriot garriſoned the fort, and continued in poſſeſſion of it until the peace. A conſiderable quantity of grain and ammunition was found here, with a few iron guns, in tolerable good repair. Two days were paſſed in ſecuring theſe acquiſitions, after which the detachment proceeded to Sattimungalum. This poſt, like the former, fired ſome guns; but, from the direction of the ſhot, it was evident that they were not intended to do miſchief. The piquets under Captain Torrins croſſed the river and approached the fort. The garriſon immediately took flight, but the inhabitants to a man remained in the pettah, as if certain of a kind reception. This poſt was likewiſe garriſoned with a company of ſepoys under Enſign Grant, who ſoon fell a ſacrifice to the badneſs of the climate. The Major now, in expectation of orders for more ſerious operations, remained in Coimbatore, moving occaſionally, in order to benefit by the forage and grain, as the country could beſt afford, till the beginning of March, when he received his inſtructions to proceed through the Guzzlehatty paſs. During the time

THESE miſerable proſpects, rendered ſtill leſs ſupportable by the diſtraction of his forces in every direction, at length reduced Tippoo Sultaun to the neceſſity of compliance with the terms which had all along been ſought after by the confederates. General orders on the 24th, announcing that preliminary articles of peace had been ſigned, our troops forbid to work, were directed to deſiſt from hoſtilities; but although there was no return, the fort and outworks, inſtead of reciprocal ceſſation, continued to fire with more inveteracy than before. Perhaps this extraordinary demeanour had a view towards impreſſing the natives with an idea of his obtaining peace more from the dread of his guns than from his humility in conſequence of the wretched ſtate to which his affairs had been reduced. Whatſoever were his motives, he ceaſed not to fire until noon, notwithſtanding that repeated meſſages for the purpoſe had been ſent by the confederates.

time that elapſed between the taking of Sattimungulum and the aſcent of the paſs, Captain Vigors had been detached, with his own battalion, together with the fifth, in order to ſurprize the camp of Cawder Ally Cawn, who lay in the point, between the rivers Bewanee and Cauvery, at their confluence. After a forced march of about thirty two miles; which, with the common march of the day, made in all forty-four miles, the battalions commenced an attack on the enemy, who fled in all directions with conſiderable loſs. Cawder Ally with difficulty eſcaped; but his palanquin, his chelumchee, with the reſt of his baggage, and the whole of his camp equipage, was taken; conſiderable ſums of money were thrown into the river; and in ſhort, nothing was ſaved by the enemy except a few horſes that were ſeized on at the firſt panick. On the fifth of March the detachment had got to the bottom of the paſs at Guzzlehatty. Captain Torrens was directed to aſcend with a party of ſepoys.— A redoubt near the top of the paſs that had been well manned, refuſed to ſurrender. Captain Torrens, conſcious of the weakneſs of his party, returned with intelligence, upon which Captain A. Cuppage was immediately directed to reinforce this party with the whole of the Europeans, who proceeded and commenced an attack. The fort ſtood firm till a ball had lodged in the body of their leader, which cauſed the whole to give way, and poſſeſſion was taken of the poſt, where the party remained till morning. The day had ſcarce broke when every exertion was required and given, in order to get up the guns and ſtores; the ſepoys worked like common coolies, and by the power of ropes around the trees, the whole was got up before night. In this the Sultaun had ſhewn the example. Many of the trees were cut half through by ropes, he having conveyed his eighteen pounders through the ſame paſs, when he attacked Colonel Floyd the year before. The whole now proceeded, and next day took poſſeſſion of Tallamallee, where they had not been twenty hours before orders came to retire below the ghauts. In paſſing through the Deniaguncottah diſtrict, a malignant fever coſt us many valuable lives; amongſt theſe Lieutenants Grant, Brown, and Barſour, were ſuddenly carried off. Enſign Lewis, and Lieutenant Madder, of the artillery, ſhared a ſimilar fate. In ſhort, ſo hoſtile was this fever, that amongſt the whole of the Europeans, not one officer was fit for duty.

So

So ſoon as the ceſſation from hoſtilities was acknowledged by both parties, the colours of Seringapatam were diſplayed, although they had until then been laid aſide, probably under the impreſſion of ſome ſuperſtitious idea. Sir John Kennaway, accompanied by the vakeels of Nizam Ally and the Marattas, had daily conferences with thoſe of Tippoo Sultaun; but all to no purpoſe for a length of time. Notwithſtanding that the Bombay army had, in compliance with his intreaties, been ordered back to Caniambaddy, and that all deſcriptions of people had been prohibited croſſing to the ſouth ſide of the river, ſtill the works of Seringapatam were ſtrengthened daily in the direction of our approaches, and the ſame treacherous diſpoſition which had hitherto marked his career in life was evident in every part of his conduct throughout the negociation.

However, on the 26th, about noon, the hoſtages at length made their appearance, and advanced towards the Britiſh camp with a retinue worthy the children of any prince. Abdul Calick, the elder, was about ten years of age; Mooſa ul Dien, the younger, ſcarcely attained eight. That part of the line which lay in their way complimented the royal ſtrangers under arms; and as they approached head quarters, a ſalute of nineteen guns from our park was anſwered by an equal number from the fort. Earl Cornwallis met the hoſtages beyond the cords of his tent with unaffected courteſy; and after ſome converſation, having preſented a gold watch to each, His Lordſhip conducted his new charge to their elephants, and returned the viſit at their own tents on the following day. Here, as to ſtate with reſpect to the accommodation of theſe princely youths, although

there

there was a degree of neatneſs that far exceeded the aukward unmeaning pomp of our allies; ſtill a modeſt ſenſe of misfortune was eaſily diſcernible; and the princes themſelves, in the whole of their demeanour, ſhewed a degree of gracefulneſs which clearly diſcovered that their education had been treated with very particular attention. Each of them preſented Earl Cornwallis with a ſword, and accepted in return, the elder a fuſee, the younger a pair of piſtols. Farther offers were declined by His Lordſhip, who, after the uſual compliments, now returned to his encampment. Beſides their own guards, the hoſtages were farther protected by the twenty-eighth battalion of Bengal ſepoys under Captain Welſh; Captain Doveton conſtantly attended in their ſuite as interpreter; and Sir John Kennaway pitched his tents in their neighbourhood ſo as to render daily viſits at their Durbar the leſs inconvenient. Another motive for this movement, was the nearneſs of their poſition to the tents in which the vakeels held their meetings, in order to adjuſt the definitive treaty of peace. But the Sultaun ſtill continued to protract negociation by numberleſs artifices. At one time his vakeels over-rated the diſtricts which were to be ceded as the principal conditions of peace; at another the pagodas which were tendered in payment, were eſtimated by his ſhroffs at double their value. On ſome days the revenues of his dominions towards the centre of Myſore were diminiſhed to half their amount; on others, the ſupremacy of the Coorga country furniſhed grounds for contention. Day after day produced ſome new quibble; in ſhort, the Sultaun's conduct had ſuch an equivocal appearance, that, on the 10th of March, working parties were again ordered out, both on the iſland and from our encampment.

AFTER much prevarication and loſs of time the Vakeels went into the fort on the 11th, and returned on the following day with ſuch unſatisfactory anſwers, as occaſioned all the guns which had been withdrawn, to be replaced on the lines and in the redoubts; indeed every other preparation was now going forward, on both ſides, for recommencing hoſtilities; but in truth the Sultaun ceaſed not to improve his means of defence from the beginning. Although he had advanced above one million ſterling, and delivered two of his children as hoſtages for the performance of his engagements, ſtill, ſhould hoſtilities have recommenced, his proſpects would have borne a much better appearance than when the ceſſation took place. Whilſt ſuch of his troops as had been diſperſed at the ſtorm of his lines, collected from all directions under an idea of a ſpeedy termination to the war, the diviſion of Cummer ul Dien Cawn, found means to throw themſelves into Seringapatam. But the principal advantage which he derived from protraction, conſiſted in the ſufferings of his enemies, eſpecially in Europeans. Prevented removing their encampment, from a ſituation totally deſtitute of vegetables, or verdure of any kind, he was ſenſible that the putrid air ariſing from the late ſcenes of deſtruction, muſt have occaſioned much ſickneſs amongſt conſtitutions naturally at variance with the climate; he well knew that our materials for the ſiege, being chiefly branches of cypreſs, could not be brought into uſe after the trees had been felled for nearly a month, and rendered ſtill the more unpliant from being expoſed to ſuch extreme heat; and he was certain that in the event of being able to

hold out but a few months, the myriads by whom he was ſurrounded, although they might poſſibly be provided againſt famine, muſt inevitably have yielded to the approaching monſoon. It was theſe impreſſions that actuated his conduct, from the firſt ſtage of negociation; but although Earl Cornwallis could not have expected ſuch a high degree of duplicity, *ſtill* his means of attack, and arrangements for ſupply far exceeded expectation.

MATTERS were thus ſituated on the 14th, when the Princes with their uſual eſcort ſtrengthened by the 19th light dragoons, were directed to proceed towards Bangalore; but the Myſoreans permitted to remain in their train were diſarmed and treated as priſoners of war. The troops under General Abercromby had inſtructions to occupy their former poſition before the fort; and upwards of twenty thouſand horſe, headed by Purſeram Bhow, with Captain Little's brigade of ſepoys, having at length formed a junction, they were commanded to cloſe the line of circumvallation from General Abercromby, to the diviſion ſtationed on the iſland.

STRUCK with theſe preparations, and anxious for the fate of their maſter, the Vakeels again withdrew to the fort. From their repreſentations the Sultaun at length liſtened to reaſon, and ſeriouſly began to relent. The Vakeels returning towards evening with an anſwer full of ſubmiſſion, the march of our weſtern forces towards the capital was countermanded; Captain Welſh was directed to reconduct the hoſtages to their former ground; our parties ceaſed to work; and throughout the confederate lines every department once more aſſumed

a peaceful aſpect. Notwithſtanding that he acceded to the conditions of peace as ſettled by the Vakeels, before Earl Cornwallis conſented to the ſecond armiſtice, ſtill the Sultaun kept our anxieties alive by delaying his ſignature under various frivolous pretences. Truſting ſolely to aſſurances from the Vakeels, day after day paſſed in painful expectation until the afternoon of the 18th, when they made their appearance with a ratification of the definitive treaty(1). On the following day, Abdul Calig, the elder Prince, cloſed the laſt ſcene of this momentous negociation, by delivering a ſeparate copy to the repreſentatives of each confederete power in preſence of the whole, receiving on the 20th, a counterpart of the treaty, from the allies, under a ſalute as on the day before.

This glorious concluſion of the war was celebrated from the center to the utmoſt extremities of the Britiſh empire, with the moſt brilliant rejoicings; few indeed affected to diſapprove of the treaty, and theſe were actuated by a deſire of ſeeing the houſe of Hyder totally extirpated, without attending to the danger of throwing an addition of power into the hands of our northern allies. With men of judgement and experience, the peace was evidently calculated to enſure permanent as well as immediate advantages to the ſeveral European ſettlements in the eaſt, for, whilſt the loſs of half his dominions would be fatal to his plan of conqueſt, the tranquillity of India would in all human probability, be out of danger from the reſtleſs diſpoſition of Tippoo Sultaun for many years. His reſources crip-

(1) See the firſt Volume, Appendix No. 31.

pled,

pled, his treaſures exhauſted, his troops diſperſed, his artillery reduced to wreck, the moſt ſtern policy could not have demanded further reparation for the inſult offered to the Britiſh nation, in the attack of her ancient and faithful ally, the inoffenſive Prince of Travancore.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

APPENDIX.

NUMBER I.

Meteorological Remarks in Myſore, during the Years 1791-2.

AS the army aſcended at the Mugly paſs in February, 1791, a change of climate much for the better was ſenſibly felt. During that month and March, the weather was very hot at noon, but temperate both in the evenings and mornings; with a ſerene ſky. It continued with little variation, only that the heat was greater at noon, until towards the end of April. Frequent ſhowers of rain fell generally in the evening, from that time until the 10th of May, when the fall was ſo heavy in the night, that the army, unable to march, halted of neceſſity the next day.

A MATERIAL change took place at this period: during the day the wind blew, in general, freſh from the ſouthweſt, driving light clouds before it, and at night, or in the evening, there uſually fell ſome rain. On the night of the

14th, there was an inceſſant heavy pour for five hours; on the evening of the 15th, there was alſo a heavy ſhower. The days were cloudy and cold, with frequent ſhowers; and, a freſh ſouthweſt wind blew during the remainder of this month. The weather continued much the ſame throughout the month of June; frequent ſhowers fell, but there was no conſtant rain. In July the wind blew ſtill freſher, with the ſame cloudy ſky, and ſhowers of rain were frequent as in June. But the following diary will, probably, prove more ſatisfactory to the reader, than general remarks.

Meteorological Diary, in Myſore, from July 19th, 1791, to the 18th of February, 1792.

FARENHEIT's THERMOMETER.

1791.	Meridian Heat. Expoſed	Shaded.	At Night.	WEATHER.
July 19,	96	82	66	Dark and cloudy; blowing freſh from the S.W.
20,	96	82	66	Blowing freſh; ſunny day; rain in the evening.
21,	92	82	66	Cloudy, windy day; rain in the evening.
22,	92	80	66	The ſame as yeſterday.
23,	92	80	66	The ſame.
24,	94	82	66	A cloudy, windy day.
25,	90	78	66	A clear, windy day; rain in the evening.
26,	97	84	66	A cloudy, windy day; rain in the evening.
27,	94	82	66	A clear, windy day; rain in the evening.
28,	92	80	66	The ſame as yeſterday.
29,	92	80	66	A cloudy day.
30,	90	78	66	A cloudy day, with light ſhowers.
31,	90	78	66	A cloudy, windy day; rain in the evening.

1791.	Meridian Heat. Exposed	Shaded.	At Night.	WEATHER.
Aug. 1,	84	78	66	Cloudy, windy day; rain in the forenoon.
2,	84	78	66	The ſame.
3,	84	78	66	Cloudy, windy day.
4,	94	78	66	The ſame.
5,	94	78	66	The ſame.
6,	96	84	70	The ſame.
7,	96	82	70	The ſame.
8,	96	82	70	The ſame.
9,	99	84	70	The ſame.
10,	96	82	68	High wind; day cloudy.
11,	96	82	68	The ſame.
12,	96	82	68	The ſame.
13,	96	80	68	Wind much abated.
14,	96	80	68	Little wind; rain in the evening.
15,	96	80	70	Little wind, clear day
16,	96	80	70	The ſame.
17,	96	87	70	The ſame.
18,	98	88	70	No wind; clear day.
19,	96	84	70	Cloudy day; little wind; lightning at night.
20,	96	84	68	Clear, windy day.
21,	94	84	68	Wind increaſed; a light ſhower in the evening
22,	96	82	68	Clear day; leſs wind; a ſhower in the evening.
23,	96	84	68	Clear day; little wind.
24,	94	82	66	Cloudy day; little wind; much appearance of rain
25,	94	82	66	Clear day; windy; much rain at night.
26,	95	82	64	Clear day; windy; cloudy in the evening.
27,	84	73	64	Forenoon clear; cloudy in the evening.

1791.	Meridian Heat. Expoſed	Shaded	At Night.	WEATHER.
Aug. 28,	84	73	64	Little wind; frequent ſhowers.
29,	83	72	62	Cloudy morning; clear and windy at noon.
30,	92	76	63	The ſame; heavy dew at night.
31,	94	78	64	Clear, windy day; wind freſh at night.
Sept. 1,	92	78	64	Clear, windy day.
2,	90	76	62	Clear, windy day; heavy ſhowers in the evening.
3,	92	78	64	Clear, windy day.
4,	92	78	64	The ſame.
5,	93	79	64	The ſame.
6,	93	79	64	The ſame.
7,	94	80	65	Clear day; little wind.
8,	96	88	65	The ſame.
9,	98	92	70	The ſame; rain in the evening.
10,	96	92	70	Cloudy; a ſhower in the morning; no wind.
11,	98	94	68	Clear day; thunder and rain in the evening.
12,	96	92	66	Cloudy morning; clear noon; with little wind.
13,	98	86	66	Clear, calm morning; rain at noon and night.
14,	98	86	66	Cloudy; rain at noon; little wind.
15,	102	88	66	Clear morning; calm noon; rain in the evening.
16,	100	86	66	Cloudy morning with rain; thunder in the evening
17,	102	88	66	Cloudy morning; rain in the evening.
18,	102	88	66	Clear day; heavy dew at night, and lightning.
19,	102	88	66	Clear day; thunder and lightning in the evening.
20,	100	86	65	Calm morning and noon; rain in the evening.
21,	98	84	66	Cloudy morning; clear noon; dew at night.
22,	100	86	64	Clear, calm day; dew at night.
23,	104	86	64	Clear morning and noon; rain in the evening.

1791.	Meridian Heat. Expoſed	Meridian Heat. Shaded.	At Night.	WEATHER.
Sept. 24,	104	86	64	Cloudy morning; clear noon; rain in the evening.
25,	100	80	64	The ſame, with thunder, lightning and rain.
26,	100	80	64	The ſame; but no thunder or lightning.
27,	102	80	64	The ſame.
28,	104	84	66	Clear morning; calm noon; rain in the evening.
29,	104	84	66	The ſame.
30,	104	84	66	Foggy morning; clear, calm noon.
Oct. 1,	104	84	68	Clear, calm morning and noon; windy night.
2,	106	84	68	The ſame, both day and night.
3,	102	84	68	Clear, calm day.
4,	102	84	68	Foggy morning; clear noon; dewy night.
5,	102	84	68	The ſame; but a windy night.
6,	102	84	68	Foggy morning, with dew; calm, clear noon.
7,	102	84	68	Calm, clear morning and noon; wind eaſterly,
8,	102	84	68	The ſame.
9,	102	84	68	The ſame.
10,	102	84	68	The ſame.
11,	100	80	66	Calm, clear morning and noon; dew at night.
12,	100	84	66	The ſame.
13,	100	84	66	The ſame; but without dew.
14,	100	84	64	Cloudy morning; clear noon; rain in evening.
15,	100	84	64	The ſame.
16,	102	86	65	Cloudy morning; calm, clear noon.
17,	104	88	66	Cloudy morning; clear noon.
18,	104	88	66	The ſame.
19,	104	88	66	The ſame.

1791.	Meridian Heat. Expoſed	Shaded	At Night.	WEATHER.
Oct. 20,	98	86	64	Cloudy morning; clear and windy noon.
21,	96	86	64	The ſame.
22,	78	76	68	Cloudy, windy day.
23,	98	80	66	Cloudy, windy morning; rain in the evening.
24,	80	72	68	Cloudy morning; rain; cloudy noon.
25,	76	76	64	Cloudy, rainy morning and evening.
26,	78	76	66	Cloudy day, with rain.
27,	79	74	66	Cloudy day, with heavy rain in the evening.
28,	94	76	66	Cloudy, foggy morning; clear noon.
29,	90	78	68	Calm, foggy morning; clear noon.
30,	84	76	68	The ſame; but more windy.
31,	84	76	68	Calm, foggy morning, with a heavy dew.
Nov. 1,	76	76	66	Dark, cloudy day; rain in the evening and night.
2,	74	74	64	The ſame; more windy from the north.
3,	96	76	64	Rainy morning; clear noon; rain in the evening.
4,	94	80	62	Cloudy morning; clear noon; rain in the evening.
5,	96	80	64	Cloudy morning; clear noon; no rain.
6,	96	80	64	The ſame.
7,	94	80	64	The ſame.
8,	88	80	66	Clear, dewy morning; wind from the N. E.
9,	94	80	66	The ſame.
10,	92	78	64	Cloudy, windy morning; noon clear.
11,	88	78	64	Cloudy, windy morning and noon.
12,	68	68	63	Dark, coludy day; wind freſh; much rain.
13,	66	66	63	Dark, cloudy day, with frequent ſhowers.
14,	66	66	63	Dark, cloudy day, with ſome rain.
15,	66	66	64	Dark, cloudy day, with light ſhowers.

1791.	Meridian Heat. Expoſed	Shaded.	At Night.	WEATHER.
Nov. 16,	66	66	64	Dark, cloudy day, with little wind.
17,	78	78	64	Cloudy, windy day; a little ſun at noon.
18,	70	70	66	The ſame.
19,	92	78	66	Cloudy, dark morning; ſun ſtrong at noon.
20,	92	78	66	The ſame.
21,	92	78	66	The ſame, with lightning in the evening.
22,	92	78	66	The ſame; but without lightning.
23,	92	78	63	The ſame.
24,	110	80	64	Foggy, dewy morning; clear ſunny day; calm.
25,	100	80	65	A calm, dewy morning; clear day.
26,	92	80	62	Cloudy morning; ſun ſtrong at noon; calm night.
27,	92	80	62	A foggy, dewy morning; clear day; little wind.
28,	88	80	62	A cloudy morning, with a little wind.
29,	88	80	63	Cloudy morning; clear, windy day.
30,	90	82	63	Cloudy morning; heavy dew at night.
Dec. 1,	92	82	63	Foggy morning; clear day.
2,	88	80	62	Cloudy morning; rain in the evening.
3,	82	78	63	Dark, cloudy morning and day.
4,	88	78	62	Cloudy morning; ſun at noon; rain in the evening.
5,	68	68	62	Cloudy, dark day, with conſtant ſhowers.
6,	68	68	62	Dark, cloudy day, with frequent ſhowers.
7,	78	68	63	Cloudy morning; ſun at noon.
8,	88	76	63	Cloudy morning; little wind; ſun at noon.
9,	88	76	63	Calm, cloudy morning; clear fore and afternoon.
10,	98	78	63	Calm, dewy morning; clear day, with ſun.
11,	98	78	61	Calm, dewy morning; ſun ſtrong all day.

1791.	Meridian Heat Expoſed	Shaded.	At Night.	WEATHER.
Dec. 12,	98	78	61	Calm, dewy morning; ſun ſtrong in the forenoon.
13,	98	78	61	Calm, dewy morning; ſun in the forenoon.
14,	98	78	61	Calm, dewy morning; ſun ſtrong all day.
15,	98	80	60	Calm morning; clear day, with a ſtrong ſun.
16,	98	82	60	The ſame.
17,	98	82	58	The ſame.
18,	70	70	60	Dark, cloudy day, with frequent ſhowers.
19,	70	70	60	Dark, cloudy day, with frequent ſhowers.
20,	80	80	60	Dark, cloudy morning; ſun at noon.
21,	80	80	60	The ſame; only the ſhowers leſs frequent.
22,	80	80	60	Cloudy morning; ſun in the fore and afternoon.
23,	84	80	60	Dewy morning; clear day, with ſun.
24,	84	76	60	Calm, dewy morning; clear day, with ſun.
25,	86	76	60	As yeſterday.
26,	86	76	60	The ſame.
27,	86	76	60	Dewy, foggy morning; clear, windy day.
28,	86	76	60	Calm, dewy morning; clear day, with ſun.
29,	86	76	58	The ſame.
30,	86	76	58	The ſame; wind regular from N. E.
31,	86	76	58	Calm, dewy morning; clear day; little wind.
1792.				
Jan. 1,	86	76	58	Calm, dewy morning; clear day; a gentle breeze.
2,	86	76	58	The ſame.
3,	86	76	58	The ſame.
4,	84	76	58	The ſame.
5,	80	70	58	Dark, cloudy morning; cloudy, windy day.
6,	80	70	58	The ſame.

1792.	Meridian Heat. Expoſed	Shaded	At Night.	WEATHER.
Jan. 7,	80	70	58	Dark, cloudy day, with ſome rain.
8,	86	76	56	Calm, dewy morning; clear day.
9,	90	78	58	The ſame.
10,	80	78	58	The ſame; a little cloudy.
11,	86	76	58	Calm, cloudy morning; clear day; windy night
12,	90	76	58	Calm, clear day; night windy from nine o'clock
13,	90	80	58	The ſame.
14,	100	80	58	Calm, clear day.
15,	100	80	58	The ſame.
16,	90	80	56	Calm, foggy morning; clear day.
17,	90	80	56	Calm morning, with a little dew; clear day.
18,	90	80	56	The ſame as yeſterday.
19,	88	80	56	Calm morning, with a little dew; clear day.
20,	88	80	56	The ſame.
21,	88	80	56	The ſame.
22,	90	80	56	Calm morning, with a little dew.
23,	90	80	56	The ſame.
24,	92	82	56	Calm morning; little dew; clear, calm day.
25,	95	83	55	The ſame.
26,	97	82	58	The ſame.
27,	90	80	58	The ſame.
28,	70	70	58	Calm, cloudy morning; cloudy, windy day.
29,	88	80	58	Calm, cloudy morning; clear and windy at noon
30,	97	82	69	Calm, clear day.
31,	100	90	69	The ſame.
Feb. 1,	100	90	70	Calm, clear, hot day; morning and evening cold.
2,	100	90	70	The ſame.

1792.	Meridian Heat Expoſed	Shaded.	At Night.	WEATHER.
Feb. 3,	100	90	70	Calm, clear, hot day; morning and evening cold.
4,	100	90	70	The ſame.
5,	100	90	70	The ſame.
6,	100	90	70	The ſame.
7,	100	90	70	The ſame.
8,	100	90	70	The ſame.
9,	102	90	70	The ſame.
10,	102	90	70	The ſame.
11,	102	90	70	The ſame.
12,	104	90	70	The ſame.
13,	104	90	70	The ſame.
14,	104	90	70	The ſame.
15,	104	90	70	The ſame.
16,	108	90	70	The ſame.
17,	104	90	70	The ſame.
18,	104	90	70	The ſame.

Meteorological Remarks in continuation.

DURING the months of December and January, no climate could be more delightful than that of Myſore. The country every where was covered with rich verdure, but the luxuriance of the foliage began to fade towards the beginning of February. From the 18th to the 24th of that month, the ſky continued cloudy, and occaſional ſhowers of rain fell. For the three following days the ſky was the ſame, but the ſhowers were much heavier. At this period the weather became ſettled as before; for ſome time, however, the rains were ſucceeded by heavy dews at night.

THE

The wind, blowing in general from the northeaſt during the firſt fortnight of March, increaſed in ſtrength till the 15th, when for a week, it blew uncommonly freſh from ten in the morning, till paſt three in the evening, with frequent whirlwinds which raiſed much duſt. The heat alſo became very great. On the 23d, the wind abated much, and the appearance of the ſky indicated rain; but after much lightning changed as before. The weather continued exceſſively hot for the remainder of this month, and the firſt part of April, but became cooler as that month advanced. On the night of the 10th, there was much thunder and lightning. In the evenings and mornings it blew a fine freſh breeze, but about noon it became perfectly calm.

On the evening of the 15th, it blew a heavy ſquall from the ſoutheaſt, accompanied with a ſlight ſhower of rain. It continued to blow freſh during the night; and on the morning of the 16th, there was another heavy ſquall with thunder, lightning and rain. For two days afterwards the wind was ſtrong, with thunder, lightning and rain in the evening. The ſky was cloudy for the reſt of this month, and although it ſometimes varied, the wind blew freſh, in general, from the ſouthweſt. It rained on the 19th and 20th. It was moderately cool throughout April excepting the firſt week, and for an hour or two about noon, when it became calm with a great increaſe of heat.

During what part of May we remained in Myſore, the weather continued much the ſame as in April. The winds were variable, with a cloudy ſky and occaſional ſhowers; but theſe ſhowers were leſs ſevere as we advanced to the eaſtward, and the wind appeared to ſettle in the ſouthweſt. Although oppreſſed with heat in the Carnatic, at the time of our aſcent at the Muglee, and on our return by Padnaigdirgum, during the time of our remaining in Myſore, we never ſuffered much inconvenience from the climate, except at Seringapatam in the months of February and March 1792. Theſe months in 1791, we paſſed near Bangalore, where the ſeaſon was perfectly moderate.

In

In point of temperature there appears a great difference between the air of Seringapatam and that of Bangalore. The former is ſituated in a much lower country than the latter, and conſequently we experienced there a greater and more diſagreeable heat. Of the fourteen months we continued in Myſore three only paſſed without rain, viz. March 1791, with January and March 1792. The influence of the ſouthweſt monſoon from the Malabar coaſt, and that of the northeaſt monſoon from the Coromandel Coaſt, ſeems to extend all over Myſore, with this difference, that each is of more conſiderable ſtrength according to the vicinity of the country to either coaſt; that is, the ſouthweſt monſoon is felt more at Seringapatam, and in the provinces to the ſouthward and weſtward of it than at Bangalore, and in the diſtricts to the northward and eaſtward, where again the northeaſt monſoon from the Coromandel Coaſt falls heavier. Some deſcription of the effect of theſe rains on the cultivation of Tippoo Sultaun's poſſeſſions has been already attempted.

APPENDIX.

NUMBER II.

Equipment Tables for Armies, or Detachments, in India.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

1*ſt.*—IN calculating proviſions for an army, to act in a country where forage is not procurable, either owing to its having been deſtroyed by the enemy, the barrenneſs of the ſoil, or the want of cavalry to cover foragers, it is evident that food not only for the men, and for the cattle employed in carrying the proviſion and ſtores, for the men, muſt be included; but alſo that food, and the means of tranſporting it, muſt be provided for the cattle employed in carrying the food of the firſt loaded cattle; and ſo on till the loweſt number is reduced to one bullock carrying ſomething more than its own food. Conſidering this to be undeniable, the Tables Nos. 1, 2 and 3 have been conſtructed; the 1ſt, ſuppoſing a bullock to carry two maunds; the 2d, ſuppoſing the burthen to be two and a half maunds, and the 3d, ſuppoſing it to be three maunds.

2*d.*—BUT as theſe Tables exhibit only the number of bullocks neceſſary, on ſuch a particular occaſion, to carry the proviſions of the men and of the cattle

cattle that carry the men's proviſions, the calculations muſt be extended to other ſtores. For this purpoſe, the Table No. 4, calculated on a ſuppoſion, that a bullock can march with two maunds of proviſions or ſtores, exhibits the number of cattle that would be neceſſary to carry thirty day's proviſions for 1,000 men, as well as for the ſeveral other ſervices therein detailed; and by multiplying theſe, the number neceſſary for any ſpecified force, or quantity of ſtores, may be found: The detail from which the Table is conſtructed, is annexed to it.

3d.—THE Tables Nos. 5 and 6, are calculated exactly for the ſame number of men and articles, as detailed in No. 4, with this difference, that in No. 5, the bullocks are ſuppoſed to carry each two and a half maunds, and in No. 6, three maunds. Grain, of any ſort, procurable, is the moſt compact food for carriage, and the eaſieſt collected, in great quantities, for cattle; but whatever the food may be, it muſt, on ſome expeditions, under the circumſtances above deſcribed, be carried along with the troops, unleſs there is a certainty of finding ſufficient proviſions in the courſe of the marches of the army, or unleſs ſuch expedition be undertaken under imminent hazard of failure. Each bullock is allowed two ſeers per diem, not as full food, but as equal to the preſervation of their lives, when they cannot procure dry, or even green, forage, to make up their full food.

4th.—IN order to lead the mind towards the totality of the ſupplies neceſſary, the Table No. 7, has been conſtructed, on the principle of Nos. 1 and 4. It ſuppoſes an army to conſiſt of 80,000 men, furniſhed with thirty day's proviſions for men and cattle, appointed with a certain field train, and ſerved by bullocks able to carry two maunds; and the detail of the data on which the Table is formed is annexed to it.

5th.—THE Table No. 8, for the like army, is calculated on the principle of the Tables Nos. 2 and 5, for bullocks carrying burdens of two and a half maund. According to this Table, the ſuppoſed army would require 87,823 bullocks, and 202,890 maunds of proviſion; whereas according to the Table No. 7, the ſame army, appointed in the ſame manner, would require

1,79,344

1,79,344 bullocks, and 3,40,266 maunds of proviſion, for one month for the men and cattle, excluſive of all the cattle conſtantly employed to repleniſh, the grand depot, from various quarters.

6th.—THE Table No. 9, conſtructed on the principle of Nos. 3 and 6, for bullocks carrying three maunds each, will ſhew that the ſervices detailed in Nos. 7 and 8, may be performed by 65,422 bullocks; which manifeſtly proves the great advantage of ſtrong, over ſlender cattle, for the ſervice of an army; but as it would be difficult to collect ſuch a number of bullocks, and more difficult to provide food for them, in a collected body, the paper No. 10 has been prepared, in order to demonſtrate the practicability of performing the ſervice with a ſmaller number of bullocks, by endeavouring to ſhew the nature of a plan, or arrangement, which might be uſed to effect this; and if the army conſiſts of fewer men; if any of its appointments be leſs than the quantity adopted; if the ſtrength of the bullocks be greater; if the trips to the different ſtations can be made in ſhorter periods, or if the proviſions of the cattle need not be carried with them, ſtill fewer bullocks will be ſufficient; and the principles of the calculations may, with facility, be adapted to any given number of men and cattle, with defined appurtenances of ſtores and proviſions, to be tranſported to fixed diſtances, by cattle or men, carrying ſpecified burdens.

7th.—IT will be found from theſe Tables, that in expeditions on which provender for the cattle muſt be carried, two uſeleſs followers would occaſion three uſeleſs two maund bullocks, and a waſte of four and a half maunds of grain for the bullocks, with one and a half maund for the two uſeleſs men, in all ſix maunds, equal to the carriage of eight uſeful men's proviſions for a month; and that four uſeleſs followers would occaſion three uſeleſs two and a half maund bullocks, and a waſte of ſeven maunds of grain, or carriage for more than nine men's proviſions for a month, excluſive of the proviſions of the bullock drivers in both caſes, and the carriage for them; and this eſtabliſhes the importance of not ſuffering uſeleſs attendants to accompany an army.

8th.

8th.—But as it may not, on ordinary occaſions, be neceſſary to include in the calculations for the equipment of an army, or detachment, the carriage of provender for the cattle, the Tables Nos. 11, 12 and 13, have been conſtructed on that principle, for detachments ſerved by bullocks carrying two, two and a half, and three maunds each, and the Tables Nos. 14, 15 and 16, exhibit the number of cattle that would be required, on the ſame principle, for large bodies of troops, appointed as therein deſcribed; and theſe Tables afford data that will facilitate the various calculations that may be neceſſary, according to different circumſtances, in equiping troops for ſervice, eſpecially if a Table of the weight of an article of every denomination of ſtores was printed; and it is underſtood that ſuch a Table has been actually prepared by Lieutenant Golding, the Commiſſary of Stores, under direction of the Bengal Military Board.

Table No. 1.

EIGHTY THOUSAND Men will require for one Month's Proviſion, at the Rate of 1 Seer each Man per Day, 60,000 Maunds of Grain; each Bullock will carry 2 Maunds, requiring 30,000 Bullocks; and their Food, at the Rate of 2 Seers per Day, will, in one Month, amount to 45,000 Maunds.

BULLOCKS.		MAUNDS.
30,000 Bullocks, will carry the	- - - - -	60,000
	Their food as above is -	45,000
22,500 Bullocks, will carry that,		
	Their food is - - -	33,750
16,875 Bullocks, will carry that,		
	Their food is - - -	25,312
69,375	Carried over,	1,64,062

Brought

BULLOCKS.		MAUNDS.
69,375	Brought forward,	1,64,062
12,656 Bullocks, to carry	25,312 maunds.	
	Their food is	18,984
9,492 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	14,238
7,119 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	10,678
5,339 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	8,009
4,004 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	6,006
3,003 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	4,505
2,252 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	3,378
1,689 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	2,534
1,267 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	1,900
950 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	1,425
712 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	1,069
534 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	801
400 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is	601
300 Bullocks, to carry that,		
1,19,092	Carried over,	2,38,190

BULLOCKS.		MAUNDS.
1,19,092.	Brought forward, -	2,38,190
	Food for 300 Bullocks is - -	451
225 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is - - -	338
169 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is - -	253
126 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is - - -	190
95 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is - -	142
71 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is - - -	107
53 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is - -	80
40 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is - - -	60
30 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is - - -	45
22 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is - -	33
16 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is - - -	25
12 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is - - -	19
9 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is - -	14
7 Bullocks, to carry that,		
	Their food is - - -	10
1,19,967 - -	Carried over, - -	2,39,957

Brought

BULLOCKS.		MAUNDS.
1,19,967	Brought forward	2,39,957
5	Bullocks, to carry 10 maund, Their food is	8
4	Bullocks, to carry that, Their food is	6
3	Bullocks, to carry that, Their food is	4
2	Bullocks, to carry that, Their food is	3
1	Bullock, to carry that, Its food is	2
1	Bullock, to carry that, Its food is	2
	It has been aſcertained by an accurate Calculation, that the Fractional Parts in this Table, amount to a Number equal	
to 17	whole Bullocks, and to	18
1,20,000	Bullocks, will carry	2,40,000

☞ *There are not any ſpare Bullocks included in the preceding Table.*

Table

Table No. 2.

EIGHTY THOUSAND Men's Provisions for a Month, at the Rate of one Seer each Man per Day, is equal to 60,000 *Maunds. Each Bullock will carry* 2 *and* 1*-half Maunds, requiring* 24,000 *Bullocks; and their Food, at the Rate of* 2 *Seers each per Day, will amount in a Month to* 36,000 *Maunds.*

BULLOCKS.		MAUNDS.
24,000	Bullocks, will be required, for the Carriage of -	60,000
	Their food is - -	36,000
14,400	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is - -	21,600
8,640	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is - -	12,960
5,184	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is - -	7,776
3,110	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is - -	4,665
1,866	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is - - -	2,799
1,120	Bullocks, will carry that,	
	Their food is - -	1,680
672	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is - -	1,008
403	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is - -	604½
242	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is - -	363
145	Bullocks, to carry that,	
59,782	- - Carried over, - -	1,49,455½

Brought

BULLOCKS.		MAUNDS.
59,782	Brought forward - -	1,49,455½
	Food for 145 Bullocks, is - -	217½
87	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is - -	130½
52	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is - - -	78
31	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is - -	46½
19	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is - -	28½
12	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is - - -	18
7	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is - -	10½
4	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is - - -	6
3	Bullocks, to carry that,	
	Their food is - -	4½
2	Bullock's food is - - - - -	3
1	Bullock's food is - - - - -	1½
60,000	Bullocks, will carry, at 2½ maunds, - -	150,000

Spare Bullocks not included.

N. B.—The fractional parts of the Bullocks, have not been attended to in this Table.

Table No. 3.

EIGHTY-THOUSAND Men, will require for one Month's Provisions, at the Rate of one Seer each Man per Day, 60,000 *Maunds of Grain. Each Bullock will carry three Maunds, requiring* 20,000 *Bullocks, and their Food, at the rate of two Seers each per Day, will amount, in one Month, to* 30,000 *Maunds.*

BULLOCKS.		MAUNDS.
20,000 Bullocks will be	required for the carriage of -	60,000
	Their food is, - -	30,000
10,000 Bullocks to carry that,		
	Their food is - -	15,000
5,000 Bulloks to carry that,		
	Their food is - -	7,500
2,500 Bullocks to carry that		
	Their food is - -	3,750
1,250 Bullocks to carry that,		
	Their food is - - -	1,875
625 Bullocks to carry that,		
	Their food is - -	937
313 Bullocks to carry that,		
	Their food is - - -	469
156 Bullocks to carry that,		
	Their food is - - - -	234
78 Bullocks to carry that,		
	Their food is - - - -	117
39 Bullocks to carry that,		
	Their food is - - -	59
17 Bullocks to carry that,		
	Their food is - - -	25
39,978	Carried over, -	1,19,966

Brought

BULLOCKS.		MAUNDS.
39,978	Brought forward,	1,19,966
	8 Bullocks to carry 25 Maunds, Their food is	12
	4 Bullocks to carry that, Their food is	6
	2 Bullocks to carry that, Their food is	3
	1 Bullock to carry that, Its food is	1½
39,993	Bullocks will carry	1,19,988½

N. B. The Fractional Parts have not been attended to in this Table.

Table No. 4.

SHEWING the Number of Bullocks and Maunds of Grain required for the undermentioned Services, allowing each Bullock to carry two Maunds.

Food for each man, 1 ſeer per day,
Ditto of each bullock, 2 ſeers per day, } for 30 days.

SPECIFICATION OF THE SERVICE.

	BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
Rice, for 10,000 men, and as in all other caſes, the food of the neceſſary bullocks,	1,500	3,000
ORDNANCE.		
One braſs ſix-pounder,	140	210
One iron twelve-pounder,	312	468
One iron eighteen-pounder,	468	802
One iron twenty-four-pounder,	620	930
CAVALRY.		
One thouſand horſe,	6,000	12,000

Elephants

	BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
Elephants, 10,	150	300
SHOT LOOSE.		
200 Shot for eighteen-pounders,	100	150
200 Shot for twenty-four-pounders,	136	204
CARTRIDGES, MUSQUET BALL.		
150 Rounds for one thouſand men,	500	750
50 Ditto for one thouſand cavalry and artillery,	168	252
SPIRITS.		
Drams for one thouſand men,	240	360
CAMP EQUIPAGE.		
For one battalion native infantry,	64	96
For one company of Europeans.	16	24
Every maund of public ſtores or private baggage,	2	3

☞ Though grain only is mentioned, this weight is ſuppoſed to include ſalt, ſpiceries, and the other neceſſary articles of proviſions, as well as ſome allowance for waſte.

Spare Bullocks only included for the Train.

Detail from which the preceding Table has been conſtructed.

Rice for 1,000 men, for 30 days, at 1 ſeer per day.

1,000 Men,	Maunds,	750
1,500 Bullocks to carry that and their own food, which is,	do.	2,250
1,500 Bullocks,	Maunds of Grain,	3,000

ORDNANCE.

From information received, the draught cattle of the Madras eſtabliſhment, employed in this department, are in the proportion of ten to ſix upon the Bengal eſtabliſhment:— For example, a tumbril, which is the ſame ſize upon both eſtabliſhments, is here drawn by ſix bullocks, whereas, upon the Madras eſtabliſhment, ten bullocks are required.

COMPARISON.

COMPARISON.

	Bengal Bullocks.	*Madras Bullocks.*
One braſs ſix-pounder, with its two tumbrils and ſpare cattle,	21	35
One iron twelve-pounder, with its four tumbrils and ſpare cattle,	47	78
One iron eighteen-pounder, with its ſix tumbrils and ſpare cattle,	70	117
One iron twenty-four-pounder, with its eight tumbrils and ſpare cattle,	93	155
	231 *as 6 is to* 10	385

ONE BRASS SIX POUNDER.

35 Bullocks as above,—their food is,	52½
105 Bullocks to carry the food of the 35, and their own food,	157½
140 Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	210

ONE IRON TWELVE POUNDER.

78 Bullocks as above,—their food is,	117
234 Bullocks to carry the food of the 78, and their own food,	351
312 Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	468

ONE IRON EIGHTEEN POUNDER.

117 Bullocks as above,—their food is,	175½
351 Bullocks to carry the food of 117, and their own food,	526½
468 Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	702

ONE IRON TWENTY-FOUR POUNDER.

155 Bullocks as above,—their food is,	232½
465 Bullocks to carry the food of 155, and their own food,	697½
620 Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	930

CAVALRY.

Allow each horſe only four ſeers per day, is 3 maunds in 30 days.

1,000	Horſe, - - - - - - -	3,000
6,000	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, -	9,000
6,000	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	12,000

ELEPHANTS.

Allow each elephant 10 ſeers per day, is 7½ maunds in 30 days.

10	Elephants, - - - - - - -	75
150	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, - -	225
150	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	300

LOOSE SHOT FOR EIGHTEEN AND TWENTY-FOUR POUNDERS.

One bullock will carry eight ſhot for eighteen-pounders, or 144 pounds,

Ditto, ——— ſix ſhot for twenty-four-pounders, or 144 pounds.

At this rate,

25	Bullocks carry 200 ſhot for 18-pounders,—their food is, - -	37½
75	Bullocks to carry the food of the 25, and their own food, -	112½
100	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	150
50	Bullocks carry 300 ſhot for 24-pounders,—their food is -	75
150	Bullocks to carry the food of the 50, and their own food, -	225
200	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	300

MUSQUET-BALL CARTRIDGES.

N. B. One bundle containing ten muſquet-ball cartridges, with the paper, wraper, and ſtring, in which they are put up, will weigh one pound and twelve drams.

Each bullock to carry 1,200 rounds, or the ammunition of eight men, which is more than 120 pounds, excluſive of the barrels.

FOR

FOR 1,000 MEN,

125	Bullocks,—their food is, - - - -		187½
375	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, - -		562½
500	Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	750

Fifty rounds for 1,000 Cavalry and Artillery.

42	Bullocks, — their food is, - - - -		63
126	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, - -		189
168	Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	252

SPIRITS.

The ordinary allowance is one gallon per day for forty men; at this rate, which is very ſmall in the field, the drams of 100 men will weigh, including the caſks, about thirty pounds. — 1,000 men, for thirty days, is 9000 pound weight, equal to 110 maunds, or the load of ſixty bullocks, which allows for eight extra drams per man, per month.

60	Bullocks as above, — their food is, - - -		90
180	Bullocks to carry the food of the 60, and their own food, is -		270
240	Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	360

CAMP-EQUIPAGE, NATIVE INFANTRY.

Allowing three officers to go in a tent; twelve officers require four tents, to be carried on four bullocks: and for a tent per company for the natives, quarter and rear guards, twelve tents, carried by twelve bullocks.

16	Bullocks, as above, for a battalion, without allowing for bells of arms,—their food is, - - - -		24
48	Bullocks to carry the food of the 16, and their own food -		72
64	Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	96

One

One tent, Madras pattern, for a company of ſepoys, including the poles, dry weight, two maunds, nine ſeers.

CAMP-EQUIPAGE FOR A COMPANY OF EUROPEANS.

Suppoſing twenty men to a tent, including thoſe on duty, and only ſixty men, is three private tents, and only one tent for the officers.

4	Bullocks,—their food is,	6
12	Bullocks to carry the food of the four, and their own food,	18
16	Bullocks.	Maunds of grain, 24

Spare bullocks only included for the train.

General Rule reſulting from the preceding Table.

For every maund of public ſtores, or private baggage, two bullocks, and three maunds of grain for their food are required.

Table No. 5.

SHEWING the Number of Bullocks and Maunds of Grain required for the undermentioned Services, allowing each Bullock to carry Two Maunds and One Half.

Food of each Man, One Seer per Day,
Ditto of each Bullock, Two Seers per Day, } For 30 Days.

SPECIFICATION.

	BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
Rice for 1,000 men, and, as in all other caſes, the food of the neceſſary bullocks,	750	1875
Ordnance. One braſs ſix-pounder,	52	78¼
One iron twelve-pounder,	117	176¼
One iron eighteen-pounder,	175	262½
One iron twenty-four-pounder,	232	348¾

Cavalry.

	BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
Cavalry. One-thouſand horſe,	3,000	7,500
Elephants. Ten,	112	281¼
Looſe Shot. Two-hundred ſhot for eighteen-pounders,	50	75
Two-hundred ſhot for twenty-four-pounders,	62	93¾
Spirits. Drams for 1,000 men,	170	255
Muſquet-ball Cartridges. 150 Rounds for 1,000 men,	250	375
50 Ditto for 1,000 Cavalry and Artillery,	85	129
Camp-equipage. For one battalion native infantry,	40	60
——————For one company of Europeans,	10	15
Every maund of public ſtores or private baggage,	1	1½

The mode of preparing the detail on which this Table is conſtructed, will be ſeen by looking at the detail annexed to No. 4.

The general Rule reſulting from this Table is, that for every maund of public ſtores or private baggage, one bullock and 1½ maunds of grain, are neceſſary.

Table No. 6.

SHEWING the Number of Bullocks and Maunds of Grain required, as per the annexed Detail, for the undermentioned Services, allowing each Bullock to carry three Maunds.

SPECIFICATION.

	BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
Rice for 1,000 men, and as in all other caſes, the food of the neceſſary Bullocks,	500	1,500
Ordnance. One braſs ſix-pounder,	42	62
One iron twelve-pounder,	94	141
One iron eighteen-pounder,	140	210
One iron twenty-four-pounder,	186	279

Cavalry

	BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
Cavalry. One thouſand horſe, - -	2,000	6,000
Elephants ten, - - -	50	150
Looſe ſhot 200, for eighteen-pounders, - -	34	51
300, for twenty-four-pounders, -	68	122
Muſquet-ball } 150 rounds, for 1,000 men, -	128	192
Cartridges. } 50 Ditto, for 1,000 Cavalry and Artillery,	44	66
Camp Equipage. One battalion native infantry, -	24	36
For one company of Europeans, -	6	9
Spirits. Drams for 1,000 men, - -	72	108
Every maund and one-half of public ſtores, or private baggage, - - - -	1	1½

Spare Bullocks only included for the train.

DETAIL.

Rice for 1,000 men for 30 days, at one ſeer per day,

1,000 men will require in 30 days, - - -		750
500 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, -		750
500 Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	1,500

ORDNANCE.

One braſs ſix-pounder,

21 Bullocks will be required,—their food is, -		31½
21 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, -		31½
42 Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	63

One iron twelve-pounder,

47 Bullocks will be required,—their food is, -		70½
47 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, -		70½
94 Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	141

One

One iron eighteen-pounder,

70	Bullocks will be required,—their food is, - -	105
70	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, -	105
140	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	210

One iron twenty-four-pounder,

93	Bullocks will be required, — their food is, -	139½
93	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, -	139½
186	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	279

CAVALRY.

Allow each Horſe only four ſeers per day, is three maunds in 30 days.

1,000	Horſe, will conſume, - - -	3,000
2,000	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, -	3,000
2,000	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	6,000

ELEPHANTS.

Allow each elephant ten ſeers per day, is 7 ½ maunds in 30 days.

	Ten elephants will conſume, - - - -	75
50	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, - -	75
50	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	150

LOOSE SHOT.

16	Bullocks carry 200 ſhot for eighteen-pounders,—their food is,	24
16	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, - -	24
32	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	48

30 Bullocks carry 300 ſhot for twenty-four-pounders,

	Their food is - - -	45
30 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	- -	45
60 Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	90

MUSQUET-BALL CARTRIDGES.

Each bullock to carry equal to three maunds: vide Detail of No. 4.

For 1,000 men,

64 Bullocks,—their food is,	- - - -	96
64 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	- -	96
128 Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	192

Fifty rounds for 1,000 Cavalry and Artillery.

22 Bullocks,—their food is,	- - - -	33
22 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	- -	33
44 Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	66

SPIRITS.

The drams of 1,000 men for thirty days, is equal to 9000 pounds weight, or the load of thirty-ſix bullocks, which allows for eight extra drams per month, per man.

44 Bullocks as above,—their food is,	- - -	66
44 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	- -	66
88 Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	132

CAMP-EQUIPAGE, NATIVE INFANTRY.

12 Bullocks to carry the tents of a battalion,—their food is	-	18
12 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	- -	18
24 Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	36

For

For one company of Europeans,

4 Bullocks will be required,—their food is,	- - -	6
4 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, which is,	- -	6
8 Bullocks.	Maunds of grain, -	12

For every maund and a half of public ſtores, or private baggage, one bullock and one maund and a half of grain, are required.

Table No. 7.

CALCULATION, agreeably to the Tables No. 1 *and* 4, *of the Bullocks and Grain required to move an Army of the undermentioned Strength, carrying Thirty Day's Proviſions, and each Bullock carrying Two Maunds.*

SPECIFICATION.

	BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
Rice for 80,000 men, viz. 20,000 fighting men, and 60,000 followers, including laſcars, &c. -	1,20,000	2,40,000
Ordnance, braſs ſix-pounders, - 44 -	6,160	9,240
Iron twelve-pounders, - 12 -	3,744	5,616
—— eighteen-pounders, - 10 -	4,680	7,020
—— twenty-four-pounders, - 6 -	3,720	5,580
Cavalry, 3,000 horſe, - - -	18,000	36,000
Elephants, 200 - - - -	4,500	9,000
Looſe ſhot, 8,000 - - - -	4,000	6,000
4,000 - - - -	2,800	4,200
Muſquet ball-cartridges for 15,000 men, -	7,500	11,250
50 Rounds for 5,000 cavalry and artillery,	832	1,248
Spirits, drams for 5,000 Europeans, - -	1,200	1,800
Carried over,	1,77,136	3,36,954

	BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
Brought forward,	1,77,136	3,36,954
Camp-equipage for native fighting men, equal to twenty-two battalions, - -	1,408	2,112
——— For Europeans equal to fifty companies,	800	1,200
Total, -	1,79,344	3,40,266

As it is ſuppoſed that all private baggage is carried by the followers, and that all public ſtores, and the baggage of head quarters, are carried by the 200 elephants, nothing is ſtated on theſe accounts.

Spare bullocks only included for the train.

Shells are not included; but a Table of the weight of ſhells of different ſizes is annexed.

The number of battering ſhot is too ſmall for a long ſiege, and this is intentionally done, to ſhew, that the calculation of the cattle is not exaggerated. The number of men and guns, as well as the quantity of ſtores, aſſumed in this calculation, is merely arbitrary; but the principle of the calculation will apply to any given number of men, or quantity of ſtores.

A Table of the Weight of Bomb Shells, and the Quantity of Powder each contains.

Nature.	*Higheſt.*	*Medium.*	*Loweſt.*	*Powder each Shell contains.*	
Inches diameter.	*lbs.*	*lbs.*	*lbs.*	*lbs.*	*oz.*
13	200		190	9	
10	88	84	80	3	
8	42	40	38	2	4
$5\frac{1}{2}$	$15\frac{1}{4}$	$14\frac{1}{2}$	14		14
$4\frac{2}{5}$	8	$7\frac{1}{2}$	7		7
Grenade.	2	1 14	1 5		4

Detail

Detail of No. 7.

Rice, or other food, for 80,000 men, at one ſeer per day, viz. 20,000 fighting men, and 60,000 followers, including laſcars, &c.

80,000 Men,		60,000
1,20,000 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,		1,80,000
1,20,000 Bullocks carry,	Maunds of grain,	2,40,000

ORDNANCE.

	Bengal proportion of Bullocks, of 6 to 10.		*Madras proportion of Bullocks, of 10 to 6.*
One braſs ſix-pounder, with carriage and limber, requires,	6		
Its two tumbrils, ſix to each,	12		
Its ſpare cattle, one in ſix,	3		
		21	35
One iron twelve-pounder, with carriage and limber, allowing $\frac{1}{3}$ more cattle for iron than for braſs ordnance, requires,	16		
Its four tumbrils, ſix each,	24		
Its ſpare cattle, one in ſix,	7		
		47	78
One iron eighteen-pounder, with carriage and limber, requires,	24		
Its ſix tumbrils, ſix each,	36		
Its ſpare cattle, one in ſix,	10		
		70	117
One iron twenty-four pounder, with carriage and limber, requires,	32		
Its eight tumbrils, ſix each,	48		
Its ſpare cattle, one in ſix,	13		
		93	55

44 Braſs ſix-pounders, with tumbrils, &c. at the Madras proportion will require,

1,540	Bullocks,—their food is, - - - -	2,310
4,620	Bullocks to carry the food of the 1,540 and their own food, -	6,930
6,160	Bullocks.	Maunds of grain, 9,240

TWELVE IRON TWELVE-POUNDERS.

936	Bullocks as above,— their food is, - - -	1,404
2,808	Bullocks to carry the food of the 936, and their own food,	4,212
3,744	Bullocks.	Maunds of grain, 5,616

TEN IRON EIGHTEEN-POUNDERS.

1,170	Bullocks as above,—their food is, - - -	1,755
3,510	Bullocks to carry the food of 1,170, and their own food,	5,265
4,680	Bullocks.	Maunds of grain, 7,020

SIX IRON TWENTY-FOUR-POUNDERS.

930	Bullocks as above, — their food is, - - -	1,395
2,790	Bullocks to carry the food of 930, and their own food, -	4,185
3,720	Bullocks.	Maunds of grain, 5,580

CAVALRY.

Allow each horſe only four ſeers per day, is 3 maunds in 30 days.

3,000	Horſe, - - - - - -	9,000
18,000	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, -	27,000
18,000	Bullocks.	Maunds of grain, 36,000

ELEPHANTS.

ELEPHANTS.

Allow each elephant 10 ſeers per day, is 7½ maunds in 30 days.

200	Elephants, - - - - - - -	1,500
3,000	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, - -	4,500
3,000	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	6.000

LOOSE SHOT FOR EIGHTEEN AND TWENTY-FOUR POUNDERS.

8,000 for eighteen-pounders.

Allow one bullock to eight ſhot, or 25 to 200;—at that rate,

1,000	Bullocks carry 8,000 ſhot,—their food is, - -	1,500
3,000	Bullocks to carry the food of the 1,000, and their own food,	4,500
4,000	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	6,000

4,200 for twenty-four-pounders, allow ſix ſhot to load each bullock; then,

700	Bullocks will carry 4,200 ſhot,—and their food is, -	1,050
2,100	Bullocks to carry the food of the 700, and their own food,	3,150
2,800	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	4.200

MUSQUET-BALL CARTRIDGES.

Each bullock to carry 1,200 rounds, or the ammunition of eight men, which is more than 120 pounds, excluſive of the barrels.

For 150,000 men, at 150 rounds each,

1,875	Bullocks will be required,—their food is,	2,812½
5,625	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	8,437½
7,500	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	11,250

For 5,000 cavalry and artillery, at fifty rounds each.

208	Bullocks will be required,—their food is, - -	312
624	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, -	936
832	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	1,248

SPIRITS.

The ordinary allowance is one gallon per day for forty men; at this rate, which is very ſmall in the field, the drams of 100 men will weigh, including the caſks, about thirty pounds,—this for 1,000 men, for thirty days, is 9000 pound weight, equal to 110 maunds, or the load of ſixty bullocks, which allows for eight extra drams per man, per month.

For 5000 men,

300	Bullocks will be required,— their food is, - -	450
900	Bullocks to carry the food of 300, and their own is - -	1350
1,200	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	1,800

CAMP-EQUIPAGE, NATIVE INFANTRY, MADRAS PATTERN.

Allowing three officers to go in a tent; twelve officers require four tents, to be carried on four bullocks: and for a tent per company for the natives, quarter and rear guards, twelve tents, carried by twelve bullocks.

For 22 battalions, at 16 bullocks is,

352	Bullocks,— their food is, - - - -	528
1,056	Bullocks to carry the food of the 352, and their own food	1,584
1,408	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	2,112

For one company of Europeans, ſuppoſing twenty men to a tent, including thoſe on duty, and only ſixty men, is 3 private tents, and only 1 tent for the officers—4 tents carried by 4 bullocks.

For 50 companies, at the above rate;

200	Bullocks will be required, their food is, - -	300
600	Bullocks to carry the food of the 200, and their own -	900
800	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	1200

GENERAL RULE.

For every maund of public ſtores, or private baggage, two bullocks and three maunds of grain for their food, are neceſſary per month.

Table

Table No. 8.

CALCULATION agreeably to the Tables Nos. 2 and 5, of the Bullocks and Grain required to move an Army of the undermentioned Strength, carrying 30 Day's Proviſions, and each Bullock carrying two Maunds and a half.

SPECIFICATION.

			BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
Rice for 80,000 men, viz. 20,000 fighting men, and 60,000 followers, including laſcars, &c.			60,000	150,000
Ordnance.	Braſs ſix-pounders,	44	2,310	3,465
	Iron twelve-pounders,	12	1,410	2,115
	Eighteen-pounders,	10	1,750	2,625
	Twenty-four-pounders,	6	1,395	2,092½
Cavalry.	Three-thouſand horſe,		9,000	22,500
Elephants.	Two-hundred,		2,250	5,625
Looſe Shot.	Eight-thouſand for eighteen-pounders,		2,000	3,000
	Four thouſand two hundred, for twenty-four-pounders,		1,313	1,875
Muſquet-ball Cartridges, for 15,000 men,			3,750	5,625
50 Rounds for five-thouſand Cavalry and Artillery,			415	622½
Spirits.	Drams for 5,000 men,		805	1,275
Camp-equipage.	For native fighting men, equal to 22 battalions,		880	1,320
	For Europeans, equal to 50 companies,		500	750
		Total,	87,823	202,890

As it is ſuppoſed that all private baggage is carried by the followers, and that all public ſtores, and the baggage of head quarters are carried by the 200 elephants, nothing is ſtated on theſe accounts.

Shells

Shells are not included: vide Remark and Table, relative to them and to the ſhot for battering guns, &c. annexed to No. 7, as applicable, verbatim, in this place.

Table No. 9.

CALCULATION, agreeably to the Tables Nos. 3 and 6, of the Bullocks and Grain, required to attend an Army of the undermentioned Strength, carrying 30 Day's Proviſions, and each Bullock carrying 3 Maunds.

SPECIFICATION.

			BULLOCKS.	MAUNDS.
Rice for 80,000 men,			40,000	1,20,000
Ordnance. Braſs ſix-pounders,		44	1,848	2,772
Iron twelve-pounders,		12	1,128	1,692
Iron eighteen-pounders,		10	1,400	2,100
Iron twenty-four-pounders,		6	1,116	1,674
Cavalry. Three thouſand horſe,			6,000	18,000
Elephants. Two hundred,			1,000	3,000
Looſe ſhot 8000, for eighteen-pounders,			1,334	2,001
4200, for twenty-four-pounders,			840	1,260
Muſquet-ball Cartridges. For 15,000 men,			1,920	2,880
50 rounds, for 5000 Cavalry and Artillery,			220	330
Spirits. Drams for 5000 men,			440	660
Camp Equipage, for native fighting men, equal to 22 battalions,			528	792
For Europeans, equal to 50 companies,			400	600
Total,			58,174	1,57,761

DETAIL

DETAIL OF NO. 9.

Rice, or other food, for 80,000 men, at one ſeer per day, viz.

20,000	fighting men, and 60,000 camp-followers, is, -	60,000
40,000	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, -	60,000
40,000	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	1,20,000

ORDNANCE.

Forty-four braſs ſix-pounders, with tumbrils, &c.

924	Bullocks will be required,—their food is, - -	1,386
924	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, -	1,386
1,848	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	2,772

Twelve iron twelve-pounders,

564	Bullocks will be required,— their food is, - -	846
564	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, - -	846
1,128	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	1,692

Ten iron eighteen-pounders.

700	Bullocks will be required,—their food is, - -	1,050
700	Bullocks to carry that,—and their own food, - -	1,050
1,400	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	2,100

Six iron twenty-four pounders,

558	Bullocks will be required,—their food is, - -	837
558	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, - -	837
1,116	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	1,674

CAVALRY.

Allow each horſe four ſeers per day, is three maunds in thirty days.

3,000	Horſes at that rate, will require, - - -	9,000
6,000	Bullocks to carry that,—and their own food, - -	9,000
6,000	Bullocks. Maunds of grain,	18,000

ELEPHANTS.

Allow each elephant ten ſeers per day, is 7 ½ maunds in thirty days.

200	Elephants at that rate, will require, - -	1,500
1,000	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food is, - -	1,500
1,200	Bullocks.	Maunds of grain, 3,000

LOOSE SHOT FOR EIGHTEEN AND TWENTY-FOUR POUNDERS.

1,000 For eighteen pounders.

Allow one bullock to twelve ſhot, or 25, to 200, At that rate,

667	Bullocks will carry 8,000 ſhot,—their food is, -	1,000½
667	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, -	1,000½
1,334	Bullocks.	Maunds of grain, 2,001.

4,200 For twenty-four pounders.

Allow ten ſhot to load each Bullock, then,

420	Bullocks will carry 4,200,—their food is, - - -	630
420	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, - -	630
840	Bullocks.	Maunds of grain, 1,260

MUSQUET BALL-CARTRIDGES, FOR 1,5000 MEN.

Each Bullock to carry equal to three maunds.

960	Bullocks will be required,—their food is, - -	1,440
960	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, - -	1,440
1,920	Bullocks.	Maunds of grain, 2,880

For 5000 Cavalry and Artillery, at 50 rounds each.

110	Bullocks will be required,—their food is, - -	165
110	Bullocks to carry that, and their own food, - -	165
220	Bullocks.	Maunds of grain, 330

SPIRITS.

SPIRITS.

For 5000 Men.

220 Bullocks will be required,—their food is,	- - -	330
220 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	- -	330
440 Bullocks.	Maunds of grain, -	660

CAMP EQUIPAGE.

For 22 Battalions of Native Infantry, at 24 Bullocks to each.

264 Bullocks will be required,—their food is,	- -	396
264 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	- -	396
528 Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	792

For 50 companies of Europeans,

200 Bullocks will be required,—their food is,	- -	300
200 Bullocks to carry that, and their own food,	- -	300
400 Bullocks.	Maunds of grain,	600

GENERAL RULE.

For each 1½ maunds of public ſtores, or private baggage, one bullock, and 1½ maunds of grain, are neceſſary per month.

No. 10.

SKETCH of a Plan for forming a Depot of Provisions, &c.

Vide Remarks at the End of this Sketch.

	CONSUMPTION.		II. STATION.		III. STATION.	
	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.
Thirty-thousand bullocks, each carrying two Bengal maunds, march five days, with 10 day's provisions for themselves, equal to 20 seers each, and 1 ½ maunds surplus grain.						
The 30,000 bullocks will consume in 5 days, - -		7,500				
And they will lay down at the end of the 5th day, at a strong post, to be occupied and maintained as a grand depot, - -			23,326	21,674		
Twenty-nine thousand, five hundred bullocks, having left five-hundred, with the detachment, as hereafter mentioned, which protects the store, at the 2d Station, return to the 1st point, on the 10th day, after having consumed, - - - -		7,375				
And allow, if necessary, one day's rest, in which they will consume,		1,475				
Consumption by cattle, during one trip, - -		16,350				
The 29,500 bullocks, move loaded as above, on the 12th day, and having consumed on the march, - - 7,375						
They will lay down on the 16th day, - -			22,576	21,674		
They will return on the 21st to the 1st Station, after having consumed, - - - - - 7,375						
Rest the 22d, in which they will consume, - - 1,475						
		16,225				
Carried over,		32,575	45,902	43,348		

Brought

	CONSUMPTION.		II. STATION.		III. STATION.	
	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.
Brought forward,		32,575	45,902	43,348		
They will move on the 23d, with equal quantities of provisions, as on the preceding trip, and after having consumed, 7,375						
They will lay down on the 27th day,			22,576	21,674		
They will return on the 32d day, after having consumed in returning, 7,375		14,750				
Twenty-thousand camp-followers, will perform the same number of marches as above, under the same escorts, and each will carry 35 seers, viz. 10 day's provisions for themselves, and 25 seers surplus grain,—they will consume in 32 days,	16,000					
And they will lay down a surplus of,			37,500			
These Bullocks are supposed to have been escorted by 5,000 artillery and infantry, from the 1st to the 2d Station, which is to be occupied; a body of allied cavalry, is also supposed to have attended, but to have found their own provisions, the followers carrying their own provisions, all the marches.						
The 5,000 fighting men would carry 5 day's provisions for themselves, from the 1st, to serve on their march to the 2d, Station, at 1 seer each is,	625					
Carried over,	16,625	47,325	105978	65,022		

	CONSUMPTION.		II. STATION.		III. STATION.	
	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.
Brought forward,	16,625	47,325	105978	65,022		
The provisions of so many of these men, as shall be left established at the 2d Station must, from that time, be taken from the store laid in there.						
Say three thousand fighting men, with 1000 camp-followers, and 500 bullocks, which may be supposed to be sufficient whilst at that fixed station.						
The other 2000 fighting men, and most of the allied cavalry, return to the 1st point with the cattle.						
These 2000 men will carry 5 day's provisions for themselves, from the surplus laid down at the 2d point, which is deducted below.						
The escorts who attend the subsequent convoys of provisions, from the 1st to the 2d Stations, are supposed to carry with them from the 1st point their own provisions for each trip.						
The 2000 fighting men, exclusive of allied cavalry, composing the escorts, will have consumed in performing the 2d and 3d trips, from the 1st to the 2d point, 12 day's provisions equal to,	600					
The 1000 camp-followers carried 5 day's provisions, from the 1st point, making, - - - -	125					
Carried over,	17,350	47,325	105978	65,022		

Brought

	CONSUMPTION.		II. STATION.		III. STATION.	
	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.
Brought forward,	17,350	47,325	105978	65,022		
The 500 bullocks carried 5 day's food from the 1st point.						
From the depot at the 2d point, make the following deductions, viz.						
Provisions for the above escort of 2000 men, returning from the 2d to the 1st Station, for 3 trips, or 15 days,—Maunds, 750						
Provisions of 3000 fighting men, who maintain the post established, at the 2d Station, for 32 days, they having carried 5 day's provisions, as above from the 1st point, *i. e.* till the period, at which it is supposed the army will arrive at the middle Station, or the 37th day, from the movement of the 1st convoy with grain, - - 2,400						
Provisions of 1000 followers, supposed to be attached to the above number of fighting men, exclusive of those who carried grain, for 32 days, - - - 800						
	3,950		3,950			
Deduct from the food for cattle, at the 2d Station, food for 32 days, for 500 bullocks, supppoſed to be attached to the 3000 fighting men, - - - -		800		800		
The quantity of provisions for men and cattle, at the middle Station, on the arrival of the army, - -			102028	64,222		
Carried over,	21,300	48,125	102028	64,222		

Brought

	CONSUMPTION.		II. STATION.		III. STATION.	
	Men's Provisions. Maunds	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.
Brought forward,	21,300	48,125	102028	64,222		
The army consisting of 76,009 men, viz. 17,000 fighting men, and 59,000 camp-followers, together with 3000 horses, 200 elephants, 20,289 grain bullocks, 500 being stationed as above, and 9,211 ordnance bullocks, arrive at the middle Station, after 5 day's march, or on the 37th day from the movement of the 1st convoy.						
The fighting men will have consumed in these 5 days, provisions carried by themselves, from the 1st Station, being at 1 seer, each, per day, - - - -	2,125					
The camp-followers will have consumed 5 day's provisions, out of the 20, also carried by themselves, from the 1st point amounting to, - - - -	7,375					
The 3000 horses will have consumed 5 day's provisions, carried by themselves from the 1st point, at 4 seers each, is, -		1,500				
The 200 elephants will have consumed 5 day's provisions, out of the 10, carried by themselves, from the 1st point, which at 10 seers each per day is, - - -		250				
The 20,289 grain bullocks will have consumed 5 day's food out of the 16, carried from the 1st point, - -		5,072¼				
And the 9,211 ordnance bullocks, will have consumed 5 day's food out of the 10, brought by them from the 1st point, being,		2,302¾				
Carried over,	30,800	57,250	102028	64,222		

Brought

	CONSUMPTION.		II. STATION.		III. STATION.	
	Men's Provisions. Maunds	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.
Brought forward,	30,800	57,250	102028	64,222		
From the above quantity of provisions, at the middle station, for men and cattle, deduct, and insert in the column, of consumption 5 day's provisions for the fighting men, camp-followers, Horses, Elephants, and grain, and ordnance Bullocks, in order to serve them for 5 day's march, to the 3d station, as under viz.						
Five day's provisions for 17,000 fighting men, 2,125						
Do. for 59,000 Camp-followers, - - 7,375	9,500		9,500			
Five day's food for 3,000 Horses, - - 1,500						
Five do. for 200 Elephants, - - 250						
Five do. for 20,289 Grain Bullocks, - - $5072\frac{1}{4}$						
Five do. for 9211 Ordnance Bullocks, - $2,302\frac{3}{4}$				9,125		
Provisions for men and cattle, at the middle station, after the above deductions, and the movement of the army to the 3d. Station.		9,125	92,528	55,097		
On the 10th day, from the first point, or the 42d day, after the movement of the 1st convoy, to the 2d point, the army, composed as above, arrives at the 3d station, or object of attack, and the Camp-followers lay down, 15 out of the 20 day's provisions, carried by themselves, from the 1st point, - - - - -					22125,	
The 20,289 Grain Bullocks, having replaced from the store at the 2d point as before noticed, the 5 days provisions,						
Carried over,	40,300	66,375	92,528	55,097	22,125	

G

Brought

	CONSUMPTION.		II. STATION.		III. STATION.	
	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.
Brought forward,	40,300	66,375	92,528	55,097	22,125	
Viz. 5,072¾ maunds, which they consumed between the 1st, and 2d Stations, will lay down a proportion of provisions for men, of					19,397	
And a proportion of food, for cattle, exclusive of their 5 day's consumption on the march, of - Maunds, 16,109						
The 9,211 Ordnance bullocks arrive with 5 day's provisions, - - - - 2,302¾						
And the 200 Elephants arrive with 5 day's provisions, being 250						
Food carried by cattle, to the 3d Station, - 18,661¾						
From which deduct the food of 22,289 bullocks, viz. 18,289 grain bullocks, and 4,000 Ordnance bullocks, for 7 day's, i. e. 2 days for the choice of ground, at the object of attack, and for 5 days to return to the middle Station for grain, - - - 7,801		7,801				
Remains at the 3d Station, food for cattle left for occasional services, viz. 2,000 grain bullocks, 5,211 Ordnance bullocks, 3,000 horses, and 200 elephants, for 15 days,						10860¾
Deduct from the above quantity of grain, at the 3d Station, and insert in the column of consumption, provisions for 7 day's, as						
Carried over,	40,300	74,176	92,528	55,097	41,522	10860¾

Brought

	CONSUMPTION.		II. STATION.		III. STATION.	
	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.
Brought forward,	40,300	74,176	92,528	55,097	41,522	10860¼
above, for 2,000 fighting men, and 20,000 camp followers, who return to the 2d point, with the bullocks, -	3,850				3,850	
Remains 27 day's provisions for 15,000 fighting men, and 39,000 camp followers, at the 3d Station, or object of attack equal to, - - - - -					37,672	
The 22,289 bullocks above mentioned, march from the middle Station, carrying 44,578 maunds of provisions, to the 3d, viz. 5 day's for themselves, being 5572¼ with a surplus of 28,028¾ for men, and a surplus of 10,977 maunds for cattle, the whole of which falls to be deducted from the store at the 2d Station, excepting the 5 day's provisions for the cattle, which must be entered in the column of consumption, - -		5,572¼	28028¾	16549½	28028¾	10,977
			64499¼	38547¼		
The 2,000 fighting men, and 20,000 camp followers, who accompany the above bullocks from the 2d to the 3d Station, will have consumed 5 day's provisions, which therefore falls to be deducted from the store, at the 2d Station, and entered in the column of consumption. - - -	2,750		2,750			
Carried over,	46,900	79748¼	61749¼	38547¾	65700¾	21837½

Brought

	CONSUMPTION.		II. STATION.		III. STATION.	
	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.
Brought forward,	46,900	79748¼	61749¼	38547¾	65700¾	21837¾
And the camp followers having carried 35 seers each, including the 5 day's provisions for themselves, above mentioned, will lay down at the 3d Station a surplus of 30 seers each, which falls to be deducted from the store, at the 2d Station, and added to that at the 3d, - - -			15,000		15,000	
			46749¼			
Provisions for the 3,000 fighting men, 1,000 camp followers, and 500 bullocks, left to protect the store at the middle Station, after the departure of the army from thence, until the escort which went from the army for supplies, to the 2d point, shall have returned to the army at the 3d Station, viz. for 17 days, must be deducted from the store at the 2d Station, and entered in the column of consumption, - -	1,700	425	1,700	425		
Provisions for men and cattle, left at the 2d point, after deducting the quantities consumed, and supplied to the army, as above detailed, - - - -			45049¼	38122¾		
From the above quantity of provisions for men and cattle, at the 3d Station, deduct provisions for 54,000 men, including fighting men, and camp-followers, - - - -						
Carried over,	48,600	80173¼	45049¼	38122¾	80700¾	21837¾

Brought

	CONSUMPTION.		II. STATION.		III. STATION.	
	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.	Men's Provisions. Maunds.	Cattle's Food. Maunds.
Brought forward,	48,600	80173¼	45049¼	38122¾	80700¾	21837¾
followers, 3,000 horses, 200 elephants, and 7,211 bullocks, for 12 days, being the space of time from the arrival of the army, at the 3d Station, or object of attack, until the return of the escort with the grain, from the middle Station; which quantities fall to be deducted from the store at the 3d point, and to be inserted in the column of consumption, - - -	16,200	8,526¾			16,200	8,526¾
There will remain with the army, after the arrival of the 1st convoy, from the middle Station, a quantity equal to 33 day's provisions for 76,000 men, and 18 day's food for 3,000 horses, 200 elephants, and 9,211 bullocks; the rest of the cattle being supposed to have been sent back immediately after their arrival, - - - -					64500¾	13,311
	64,800	88,700	45049¼	38122¾	64500¾	13,311

THE poſt and the detachment at the 2d point, muſt be ſo ſtrong as to put the depot there, out of the danger of being captured, or deſtroyed, by the enemy. The principles of this ſketch, for forming a depot, will apply equally to progreſſive ſupplies, from the rear, or flanks, or in any direction; and to any number of bullocks of ſpecified ſtrength, with given quantity of ſupplies, to be carried from given diſtances; the intention being only to ſhew, what may be gradually performed, by a certain number of men and cattle, in caſes where it is not practicable to carry, at once, with a great army, to a conſiderable diſtance, every thing neceſſary for undertaking a ſiege, and for enabling the troops to perſevere againſt an obſtinate defence, until they ſhall have conquered the place.

SPARE cattle are not included in this detail, nor any allowance made for the contingencies of capture, of any part of the convoys; but the ſurplus left at the ſecond ſtation, will admit of a greater allowance, than the probable loſs by contingencies.

THE calculations of the preceding detail, have been proved; but the proof Table is not inſerted, becauſe it is deemed unneceſſary in this place.

PADDY, or unhuſked rice, may be reckoned at full weight, for cattle; but, in being prepared for the food of men, it would loſe quarter of its weight.

THESE Tables were formed in the interval between the firſt and ſecond campaigns, againſt Tippoo, under Lord Cornwallis. The wiſe and politic meaſure, of having gained over and conciliated to the Britiſh ſervice the Brinjaries, whoſe ſucceſſive ſupplies, reſembling, in ſome degree, the operations deſcribed in filling a depot, gave deciſive advantage to our army, in the articles of ſupply; and the following memorandum taken, before Seringapatam, by the proper officers, will corroborate the uſefulneſs of Tables of this nature. Indeed the whole will afford a leſſon of great value, to thoſe to whom it may belong to declare, or to conduct, war, by conveying to their minds, more competent ideas than they might, perhaps, otherwiſe have, of the

the immenſity of the requiſite ſupplies; nor muſt they reflect on thoſe for their own troops only, but, on the grand aggregate, for all the belligerent armies, which muſt be furniſhed from countries of known extent and capabilities.

Memorandum above alluded to.

GRAIN ſold and delivered at the Moodie, before Seringapatam, between the 5th of February, and 24th March, 1792.

Rice,	Seers	37,00,000
Jowary and Badjurah,		7,20,000
Cooltie, or horſe gram,		4,20,000
Dell,		80,000
Sugar,		40,000
	Seers	49,60,000

Equal to 76,307 bullocks load.

Gee and Oil,	Seers	70,000

THE above was excluſive of private ſales, by the Brinjaries to individuals, and of the great variety of bazar articles, ſuch as ſpices, mauſaulahs, ſalt, cloths, &c. &c. which conſtitute a part of the Brinjara traffick. It has no connection with the ſupplies brought to the Maratta and Nizam's camps, by the Brinjaries attached to them. The fighting men of the Engliſh army, were alſo provided for by a ſeparate and public ſtore, which accompanied the grand army from Bangalore, and General Abercromby from the other ſide.

THE above was alſo excluſive of draft and carriage cattle, employed for the train; the tranſport of immenſe quantities of ſhot, ſhells, ammunition, pioneer's tools, camp equipage, and other public ſtores and private baggage.

FROM twelve to fourteen thouſand bullocks are ſaid to have died before Bangalore, for want of food.—They could not be ſent to forage, becauſe there was not a ſufficient ſtrength of cavalry to protect them; whereas at Seringapatam, the cattle foraged at a diſtance under protection of the allied cavalry.

Table

Table No. 11.

SHEWING the Number of Bullocks and Maunds of Grain required for the undermenticned Services. Each Bullock carrying two Maunds, Food of each Man, 1 Seer per Day, for 30 Days; without Grain for the Bullocks.

SPECIFICATION.

	Number of bullocks.	Maunds of grain.
Rice, For 1,000 men, - -	375	750
Ordnance, One braſs ſix pounder, with its two tumbrils, and ſpare cattle,	35	
One iron twelve pounder, with its four tumbrils, and ſpare cattle, - - -	78	
One iron eighteen pounder, with its ſix tumbrils, and ſpare cattle, - - -	117	
One iron twenty-four pounder, with its eight tumbrils and ſpare cattle, - -	155	
Cavalry, One thouſand horſe, - -	1,500	3,000
Elephants, Ten, - - - -	38	75
Shot looſe, 200 for eighteen pounders, -	25	
200 for twenty-four pounders, -	33	
Cartridges, Muſquet balls, 150 rounds each, for 1,000 men,	125	
50 ditto for 1,000 cavalry or artillery,	42	
Spirits, Drams for 1,000 men, - -	60	
Camp Equipage, For one battalion native infantry, -	16	
For one company of Europeans, -	4	
Every two maunds of public ſtores, or private baggage, -	1	

Rice is mentioned in theſe Tables, as the food for the men; but they will apply equally well to the ſame weight of any other ſort of proviſions.

Table

Table No. 12.

SHEWING the Number of Bullocks and Maunds of Grain required for the undermentioned Services, allowing each Bullock to carry two Maunds, and one half.—Food of each Man, 1 Seer per Day, for 30 Days; without Grain for the Bullocks.

SPECIFICATION.

	Number of bullocks.	Maunds of grain.
Rice, For 1,000 men,	300	750
Ordnance, One braſs ſix pounder, with its two tumbrils, and ſpare cattle,	21	
One iron twelve pounder, with its four tumbrils, and ſpare cattle,	47	
One iron eighteen pounder, with its ſix tumbrils, and ſpare cattle,	70	
One iron twenty-four pounder, with its eight tumbrils and ſpare cattle,	93	
Cavalry, One thouſand horſe,	1,200	3,000
Elephants, Ten,	30	75
Looſe Shot, 200 for eighteen pounders,	20	
200 for twenty-four pounders,	25	
Spirits, Drams for 1,000 men,	60	
Muſquet-ball Cartridges, 150 rounds each, for 1,000 men,	100	
50 ditto for 1,000 cavalry or artillery,	34	
Camp Equipage, For one battalion native infantry,	16	
For one company of Europeans,	4	
Every maund of public ſtores, or private baggage,	1	

Table No. 13.

SHEWING the Number of Bullocks and Maunds of Grain, required for the under-mentioned Services, allowing each Bullock to carry three Maunds. Food of each Man, 1 Seer per Day for 30 Days; without Grain for the Bullocks.

SPECIFICATION.

	Number of bullocks.	Maunds of grain.
Rice, for 1,000 men,	250	750
Ordnance, One braſs ſix pounder, with its 2 tumbrils, and ſpare cattle,	21	
One iron twelve pounder, with its 4 tumbrils, and ſpare cattle,	47	
One iron eighteen pounder, with its 6 tumbrils, and ſpare cattle,	70	
One iron twenty-four pounder, with its 8 tumbrils, and ſpare cattle,	93	
Cavalry, One thouſand horſe,	1,000	3,000
Elephants, Ten,	25	75
Looſe Shot, 200 for eighteen pounders,	17	
200 for twenty-four pounders,	20	
Muſquet-ball Cartridges, 150 rounds for 1,000 men,	64	
50 ditto for 1,000 cavalry and artillery,	22	
Camp Equipage, for 1 battalion of native infantry,	12	
for 1 company of Europeans,	4	
Spirits, Drams, for 1,000 men,	44	
Every 3 maunds of public ſtores, or private baggage,	1	

Table

Table No. 14.

SHEWING the Number of Bullocks and Maunds of Grain, required for the undermentioned Services. Each Bullock carrying two Maunds. Food of each Man, 1 Seer per Day for 30 Days; without Grain for the Bullocks.

SPECIFICATION.

			Number of bullocks.	Maunds of grain.
Rice,	For 80,000 men, viz. 20,000 fighting men, and 60,000 followers, including laſcars, &c.		30,000	60,000
Ordnance,	Braſs ſix pounders, with tumbrils, and ſpare cattle, -	44	1540	
	Iron twelve pounders, with tumbrils, and ſpare cattle, -	12	936	
	Eighteen pounders, with tumbrils, and ſpare cattle, -	10	1170	
	Twenty four pounders, with tumbrils and ſpare cattle, -	6	930	
Cavalry,	Three thouſand horſe, - -		4,500	9,000
Elephants,	Two hundred, - - -		750	1,500
Looſe Shot,	8,000 for eighteen pounders,		1,000	
	4,200 for twenty-four pounders,		700	
Muſquet-ball Cartridges,	for 15,000 men, - -		1,875	
	50 rounds for 5,000 cavalry and artillery,		208	
Spirits, Drams,	for 5,000 Europeans, - - -		300	
Camp Equipage,	for native fighting men, equal to 22 battalions, - - -		352	
	For Europeans equal to 50 companies, -		200	
		Total,	44,461	70,500

Table

Table No. 15.

SHEWING the Number of Bullocks and Maunds of Grain, required for the undermentioned Services, allowing each Bullock to every two Maunds and one half. Food of each Man 1 *Seer per Day, for* 30 *Days*; without Grain for the Bullocks.

SPECIFICATION.

			Number of bullocks.	Maunds of grain.
Rice,	For 80,000 men, viz. 20,000 fighting men, and 60,000 followers, including laſcars, &c.		24,000	60,000
Ordnance,	Braſs ſix pounders, with tumbrils, and ſpare cattle,	44	924	
	Iron twelve pounders, with tumbrils, and ſpare cattle,	12	564	
	Eighteen pounders, with tumbrils and ſpare cattle,	10	700	
	Twenty four pounders, with tumbrils, and ſpare cattle,	6	558	
Cavalry,	Three thouſand horſe,		3,600	9,000
Elephants,	Two hundred,		600	1,500
Looſe ſhot,	8,000 for eighteen pounders,		800	
	4,200 for twenty four pounders,		525	
Muſquet-ball Cartridges, for 15,000 men,			1,500	
	50 rounds for 5,000 Cavalry and Artillery,		170	
Spirits, Drams, for 5,000 Europeans,			300	
Camp Equipage, for native fighting men, equal to 22 battalions,			352	
	For Europeans, equal to 50 companies,		200	
		Total,	34,793	70,500

Table

Table No. 16.

SHEWING the Number of Bullocks and Maunds of Grain, required for the undermentioned Services, allowing each Bullock to carry three Maunds; Food of each Man, 1 Seer per Day for 30 Days; without Grain for the Bullocks.

SPECIFICATION.

		Number of bullocks.	Maunds of grain.
Rice,	For 80,000 men, viz. 20,000 fighting men, and 60,000 followers, including lascars, &c.	20,000	60,000
Ordnance,	Brass six pounders, with tumbrils, and spare cattle, - 44	924	
	Iron twelve pounders, with tumbrils, and spare cattle, - 12	564	
	Eighteen pounders, with tumbrils, and spare cattle, - 10	700	
	Twenty four pounders, with tumbrils and spare cattle, - 6	558	
Cavalry,	Three thousand horse, - -	3,000	9,000
Elephants,	Two hundred, - - -	500	1,500
Loose Shot,	8,000 for eighteen pounders, -	680	
	4,200 for twenty-four pounders, -	420	
Musquet-ball Cartridges,	for 15,000 men, - -	960	
	50 rounds for 5,000 cavalry and artillery,	110	
Spirits, Drams,	for 5,000 Europeans, - -	220	
Camp Equipage,	for native fighting men, equal to 22 battalions, - - -	264	
	For Europeans equal to 50 companies, -	200	
	Total,	29,100	70,500

ERRATA and ADDENDA,

IN THE

APPENDIX, No. 2.

Page 14, Laſt line, and page 15, firſt line, for " 179,344 bullocks, and 340,266 maunds," *read* 177,136 bullocks and 336,954 maunds.
Page 15, Paragraph 6, for " 65,422 bullocks," *read* 58,174.
Page 23, Table No. 4. inſtead of rice for " 10,000 men," *read* for 1,000 men.
Ibid. Third line from the bottom, for " 802" *read* 702.
Page 29, Table No. 6. One braſs ſix pounder, under maunds, for " 62" *read* 63.
Page 30, Line 3, Looſe ſhot for 18 pounders, for " 34 bullocks, 51 maunds," *read* 32 bullocks, 48 maunds.
Page 32, Under the head " Spirits," after the words " 36 bullocks," in place of " *which* " *allows* 8 *extra drams per month per man*," read *but allowing for* 8 *extra drams per month per man, would require* 44 *bullocks:* and the ſame proportion is ſtated for this article throughout theſe Tables.
Ibid. Camp Equipage, native infantry 12 bullocks, to carry the tents.—This number is ſufficient for the weight; but, if the walls cannot be conveniently ſeparated from the flys, one bullock muſt be allowed for each tent of this deſcription.—The proportion of tents for officers, is only for ſervices on which it would be neceſſary to move lightly equipped.
Page 33, After " Looſe ſhot 8,000" add 18 pounders.
Ditto for " 4,000," *read* 4,200, twenty four pounders.
Page 37, Under the head " Muſquet Ball Cartridges"—for " 150,000 men," *read* 15,000.
Page 42, Under the head Looſe ſhot, for " 25 to 200" *read* 25 to 300.
Page 57, Laſt line, for " every maund" *read* every $2\frac{1}{2}$ maunds.

N. B. In Bengal, the barrels for muſquet cartridges, are uſually made to hold 800 rounds each, or 1,600 for a bullock; but the packing boxes or barrels, can be made to ſuit the ſtrength of different claſſes of bullocks, whether 2, $2\frac{1}{2}$, or 3 maunds.

In the Tables Nos. 5, 8, and 12, the number of bullocks merely for the draft of the ordnance guns, with their tumbrils, is calculated for Bengal, or 3 maund bullocks, becauſe it is ſuppoſed that as many ſtrong bullocks, as can be wanted, for that particular purpoſe, may be collected, even in a country where the Cattle in general, are weaker, and it is of importance to ſhorten the line;—but if calculations be required for the draft of ordnance, by $2\frac{1}{2}$ maund bullocks, in proportion to thoſe of 3 maunds, they may be made by the following data;

	3 *md. bullocks.*	$2\frac{1}{2}$ *md. bullocks.*
One ſix pounder, with 2 tumbrils,	21	25
One 12 ditto, with 4 ditto,	47	57
One 18 ditto, with 6 ditto,	70	84
One 24 ditto, with 8 ditto,	93	121

APPENDIX.

NUMBER III.

Preliminary Articles of Peace.

" PRELIMINARY articles of a treaty of peace concluded between the " allied armies and Tippoo Sultaun.

" ARTICLE I.

" One half of the dominions of which Tippoo Sultaun was in poſſeſſion " before the war, to be ceded to the allies from the countries adjacent, " according to their ſituation.

" ARTICLE II.

" Three crores and thirty lacs of rupees, to be paid by Tippoo Sultaun, " either in gold mohurs, pagodas, or bullion.

" 1ſt. One crore and ſixty-five lacs, to be paid immediately.

" 2d. One crore and ſixty-five lacs, to be paid in three payments, not " exceeding four months each.

" ARTICLE

" ARTICLE III.

" All priſoners of the four powers, from the time of Hyder Ally, to " be unequivocally reſtored.

" ARTICLE IV.

" Two of Tippoo Sultaun's three eldeſt ſons to be given as hoſtages for a " due performance of the treaty.

" ARTICLE V.

" When they ſhall arrive in camp, with the articles of this treaty, under " the ſeal of the Sultaun, a counterpart ſhall be ſent from the three powers. " Hoſtilities ſhall ceaſe, and terms of a treaty of alliance and perpetual " friendſhip ſhall be agreed upon."

FINIS.

LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS.

A.

Major Gen. Sir Robert Abercromby, Commander in Chief, &c. 2 *copies.*
Captain Achmuty, 75th regiment.
Doctor Anderſon, 77th ditto.
Captain Abercromby, 75th ditto.
Captain Auſtin, 36th ditto.
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Mr. Auſtin, merchant, Madras.
Captain Anderſon, Bombay eſtabliſhment.
J. Anderſon, Eſq. ſurgeon-general, Coaſt ditto.
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Lieutenant Bateman, Bengal eſtabliſhment.
James Brodie, Eſq. Madras.
Alexander Boſwell, Eſq. ſurgeon, Madras eſtabliſhment.
Lieutenant Boſs, ditto.
William Beattie, Eſq. ſurgeon, ditto
Lieutenant Brunton, ditto.
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